On 7/22/2019 4:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com
<mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
<mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <danialso...@gmail.com
<mailto:danialso...@gmail.com>> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the
indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at
both city at once, but that will need some telepathy
hardly compatible with the idea that the level of
substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math
and let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original
is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after
a delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the
original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more
sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more
the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily
continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not
depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For
example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate
has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is
the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the
same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are
two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense
of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the
original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than
your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical
question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So
rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the
relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the
experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will
not happen.
As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of
assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you
are building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical
matter. Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of
personal identity and other matters.
What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide
that might have any bearing on the question of personal identity?
If the the brain scans showed the same correlations between patterns of
neuron activity and behavior (like speech or problem solving) that would
be evidence that it was the same person.
Brent
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