On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 10:41 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 08:55, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 6:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 21:49, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:37 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Mon, 22 Jul 2019 at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <danialso...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <snip> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by >>>>>>>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will >>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of >>>>>>>> substitution was correctly chosen. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and >>>>>>> let's find out -- you go first. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me rephrase the question: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is >>>>>> cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, >>>>>> or >>>>>> in several different places. >>>>>> >>>>>> The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original >>>>>> disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of >>>>>> personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous >>>>>> states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of >>>>>> whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of >>>>>> personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if >>>>>> the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single >>>>>> continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered >>>>>> the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two >>>>>> or >>>>>> more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", >>>>>> then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists >>>>>> (dies). >>>>>> >>>>>> So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your >>>>>> simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to >>>>>> whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair >>>>>> philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed >>>>>> possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely >>>>>> on >>>>>> what will or will not happen. >>>>>> >>>>>> As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of >>>>>> assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are >>>>>> building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any >>>>>> of >>>>>> it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other >>>>>> matters. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What evidence do you think “the relevant brain scans” could provide >>>>> that might have any bearing on the question of personal identity? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions >>>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out >>>> several times. >>>> >>> >>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in >>> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>> >> >> I am reminded of Kafka's novella, 'Metamorphosis': "When Gregor Samsa >> awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a >> monstrous cockroach in his bed."...... >> >> Is the person just the brain, or is there more to it? >> > > If you radically changed your body, you would also change the inputs to > your brain. So we can maintain the theory that the sense of self comes > directly from the brain. > You might wish to maintain this theory, but you, yourself, have directly contradicted it by saying that our sense of self depends on the inputs to the brain. The qualification "directly" adds nothing but obfuscation. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQLbvrTZS6-%2B_c7e0T31AiO4J1aF0CtzuT0dmKRYFd5RQ%40mail.gmail.com.
