> On 22 Jul 2019, at 06:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <danialso...@gmail.com > <mailto:danialso...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> > <snip> >> >> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming >> that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some >> telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was >> correctly chosen. >> >> So, do you die or not in the step 3? >> >> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find >> out -- you go first. > > Let me rephrase the question: > > Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3? > > According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The > scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several > different places. > > The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original > disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of > personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous > states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether > the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal > identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the > duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is > the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person > in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, > and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer > is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
That shows, as I explained in details in my long version, that Nozick’s closer continuer is incompatible with digital Mechanism. But I ma not sure you get it right. From memory, it seems Nozick chose the closest continuer. In step 4, he would choose the one on the branche without the delay. Anyway, are you saying that you stop at step 4? Then you have to stop at step 2, then step 1, and then you are just saying that you do not assume mechanism, but then you are outside the scope of the reasoning. > > So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your > simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to > whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. Not at all. There is nothing that we can verify empirically at this stage, except by assessing having personally survived, which typically cannot be used here. Yet, what I say follows from the theoretical Digital Mechanist assumption, very easily. > So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant > brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we > pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen. Then you condemn all theories, including all theoretical physics. On the contrary, we have to take our assumptions seriously, to get some consequences that we can test, in the usual 3p way. Mechanism itself is not directly testable. > > As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming > this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in make > sense or not. We can never known that in advance. But mechanism is one of the most fertile assumption in the history of science, used by Darwin. Diderot consider it to be the most rational theory, and if you shows it making nonsense, it is up to you to show the contradiction. > And that is an empirical matter. Yes. But not from what you say, just from the fact that if mechanism is true, then the logic of the observable must be given by the “probability” and credibility one, and that has been tested positively up to now. > Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and > other matters. It does so, where physicalism needs a non computationalist theory of mind, which they usually does not even handle yet. If you are OK with Digital Mechanism, you are the one who need to abandon the metaphysical assumption of (weak) materialism. Or just say that you don’t believe in Mechanism, or find an error in the reasoning (which you didn’t). Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQFzBRYZpS5O8YhexQwkjB-WAAUVcOE29235r2yMuk_9Q%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQFzBRYZpS5O8YhexQwkjB-WAAUVcOE29235r2yMuk_9Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7EDE0A5D-7F82-41A8-B981-2CC24C8CB58B%40ulb.ac.be.
