On 7/25/2019 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jul 2019, at 07:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 7/24/2019 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note that the personal identity is not a transitive notion.
Step 3 actually illustrates well this. I recall he cut and copy
itself from Helsinki (H) in both Washington (W) and Moscow (M).
With the definition of the personal identity above, both the HW
and the HM guy are, from that personal identity view, the same
person as the H person.
With a more sensible notion of personal identity, the copies are
different persons, and different persons from the original.
But that would entail that you die in step 1, which would again just
be your opinion that mechanism is false.
Why do you assume this is all-or-nothing, live-or-die?
Because digitalness makes it so. The copies are numerically identical
at or below the substitution level.
What does "numerically identical" mean? And what if they aren't? You're
shifting the argument. One may very well say "yes" to the doctor
believing that one's essential character and memories will be preserved,
while also believing that many details will be different. So which is
it? Is it essential to your argument that the duplication be
exact?...exact at what level?
Brent
What seems likely to me is that the copy will be necessarily
different due to information limitations of quantum mechanics…
Quantum mechanics, nor any physics, is part of the assumption, except
for the existence of a physical reality (but not necessarily an
ontological existence).
but maybe not so different that one would still say yes to the
doctor, depending on the alternatives.
Yes. There are the usual difference between our mental state, but the
personal identity is defined by the ability to have our past
experience memories, which by definition are conserved in the process.
Bruno
Brent
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