> On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:31, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/26/2019 12:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> And that is necessary with digital mechanism, where to copy any piece of 
>> matter we would need the entire run of the universal dovetailer. Neither 
>> matter nor consciousness are Turing emulable, but they are are “Turing 
>> borrowable” in some sense.
>> 
>> Bruno
> 
> And so the duplication of your thought experiment is impossible.

Why?

Not at all. The whole point of the computationalist assumption is that we are 
duplicated at some substitution level, finitely describable. The duplication 
would be indeed impossible if we need to duplicate the physical brain, but with 
the *digital* hypothesis we don’t need to duplicate the matter of the brain, 
only the relevant functional disposition of its part.

That is the reason why matter is not copiable. We can’t duplicate the 
infinitely many computations below our substitution level.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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