> On 25 Jul 2019, at 18:44, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> > wrote: > On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, questions >> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed out >> several times. >> >> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in these >> debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. > > But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible to copy a > brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will necessarily be possible > to distinguish physical differences. Now these differences may not matter to > consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at the > conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the > duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. > > I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am pretty close > to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to look at me in > enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am quite different > today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person must be closer > to the original than the "copying" that occurs in everyday life. > > Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of Nozick's > 'closest continuer' theory. > > > Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal > identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of > paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. > > As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are forced > to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the zero > universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers to a > single person (like many worlds). > > Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity can > always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and > changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body.
They break down with digital mechanism. With soma analog mechanism, or non-mechanism, we can’t conclude (but we can also feel that such a move is ad hoc and non convincing). With digital or numerical mechanism, we avoid such ad hoc move and the “closer continuers” can be numerous, (even infinite) like in Everett Relative State, indeed. Bruno > > "Oneself: the logic of experience" by Arnold Zuboff is a good introduction to > the reasoning. Many thinkers, including Shrodinger, Dyson, and Hoyle reached > the same conclusion. > > Jason > > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRMwU0NiM_x5jvxhv9M-Z5m0DPOjgL6%3D6E%2BYPv99Qv%2BpA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRMwU0NiM_x5jvxhv9M-Z5m0DPOjgL6%3D6E%2BYPv99Qv%2BpA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgn5XdTWybsKo%2B0TNzyvFz8vtQVQhmug4cUwme5xCh3kg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgn5XdTWybsKo%2B0TNzyvFz8vtQVQhmug4cUwme5xCh3kg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97FB8B92-DAB5-4B83-809B-44F6DA1B5B49%40ulb.ac.be.
