On Tuesday, September 10, 2019 at 12:09:19 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 8 Sep 2019, at 12:51, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 8, 2019 at 5:40:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 7 Sep 2019, at 07:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 9/6/2019 9:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> I would put "Horganism" another way. 
>> >> 
>> >> Science tells stories/theories, and some are successful in their 
>> application. But we don't know if any of the stories are the final ones to 
>> be told, or even close to being final. (They probably are not.) There is no 
>> settled story of gravity yet, much less consciousness. One reads about a 
>> new story of gravity in science news every week, it seems. 
>> >> 
>> >> David Chalmers' conclusion is ... 
>> >> 
>> >> "I think that the Hegelian [dialectical] argument gives good reason to 
>> take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a 
>> reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view would 
>> immediately become the most promising solution to the mind–body problem. So 
>> the combination problem deserves serious and sustained attention." 
>> >> - http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf 
>> > 
>> > Zero predictive power and it's not clear that it's consistent with the 
>> rest of neurophysics. 
>>
>> + zero explanation power at all, also. 
>>
>> Bruno 
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> But panpsychism more explanatory than consciousness from numbers. 
>
>
>
> “Pan” is not well defined. The proposition  "my cup of tea is conscious” 
> is not well defined for me.
>
> What is the panpsychist theory of consciousness? If everything is 
> conscious, “consciousness seems trivialised”.
>
> With the number, and their + and * laws, we can define the universal 
> digital machine, and study what they can prove about themselves, including 
> what they cannot prove, but still guess, and incompleteness makes the 
> standard definition of the greeks making sense. The universal machine has 
> already an interesting discourse about, not just his body, but its souls, 
> its physics, etc.  
>
> It is coherent with both AI, and the theory of evolution (which is already 
> used on mechanism).
>
> Consciousness also get a role, as it provides semantic which accelerate 
> the computation relatively to the universal machine which run the subject, 
> allowing a greater number of degree of freedom.
>
> A very interesting video on the Limbic system, and its relation with 
> emotion is here:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAOnSbDSaOw
>
> Panpsychism assumes matter, making it inconsistent with digital mechanism 
> (that is not obvious, ask for explanation if interested). 
> But even without that still a bit ignored fact, panpsychism makes the 
> functioning of the brain quite mysterious. With mechanism, consciousness is 
> a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the neural loops, whose 
> importance is well illustrated in that video.
>
> Panpsychism has not yet a testable theory, which might change tomorrow, 
> but again, it speculates on very strong axioms, which cannot be used to 
> invalidate a much simpler theory, not yet contradicted by any facts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
  consciousness is a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the 
neural loops

It depends on what the meaning of "is" is.

"is" could be a descriptive relationship, like a program of a tornado is 
not a tornado.

But if tornados are just mental creations, where everything mental is a 
numerical fixed point, then all reality *is* numerical simulation.


@philipthrift

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