> On 11 Sep 2019, at 20:47, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:02:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 10 Sep 2019, at 21:28, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 10, 2019 at 12:09:19 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 8 Sep 2019, at 12:51, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 8, 2019 at 5:40:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> > On 7 Sep 2019, at 07:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> > <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On 9/6/2019 9:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >> >>> >> I would put "Horganism" another way. >>> >> >>> >> Science tells stories/theories, and some are successful in their >>> >> application. But we don't know if any of the stories are the final ones >>> >> to be told, or even close to being final. (They probably are not.) There >>> >> is no settled story of gravity yet, much less consciousness. One reads >>> >> about a new story of gravity in science news every week, it seems. >>> >> >>> >> David Chalmers' conclusion is ... >>> >> >>> >> "I think that the Hegelian [dialectical] argument gives good reason to >>> >> take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can >>> >> find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this >>> >> view would immediately become the most promising solution to the >>> >> mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and >>> >> sustained attention." >>> >> - http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf >>> >> <http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf> >>> > >>> > Zero predictive power and it's not clear that it's consistent with the >>> > rest of neurophysics. >>> >>> + zero explanation power at all, also. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But panpsychism more explanatory than consciousness from numbers. >> >> >> “Pan” is not well defined. The proposition "my cup of tea is conscious” is >> not well defined for me. >> >> What is the panpsychist theory of consciousness? If everything is conscious, >> “consciousness seems trivialised”. >> >> With the number, and their + and * laws, we can define the universal digital >> machine, and study what they can prove about themselves, including what they >> cannot prove, but still guess, and incompleteness makes the standard >> definition of the greeks making sense. The universal machine has already an >> interesting discourse about, not just his body, but its souls, its physics, >> etc. >> >> It is coherent with both AI, and the theory of evolution (which is already >> used on mechanism). >> >> Consciousness also get a role, as it provides semantic which accelerate the >> computation relatively to the universal machine which run the subject, >> allowing a greater number of degree of freedom. >> >> A very interesting video on the Limbic system, and its relation with emotion >> is here: >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAOnSbDSaOw >> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAOnSbDSaOw> >> >> Panpsychism assumes matter, making it inconsistent with digital mechanism >> (that is not obvious, ask for explanation if interested). >> But even without that still a bit ignored fact, panpsychism makes the >> functioning of the brain quite mysterious. With mechanism, consciousness is >> a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the neural loops, whose >> importance is well illustrated in that video. >> >> Panpsychism has not yet a testable theory, which might change tomorrow, but >> again, it speculates on very strong axioms, which cannot be used to >> invalidate a much simpler theory, not yet contradicted by any facts. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> consciousness is a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the >> neural loops >> >> It depends on what the meaning of "is" is. >> >> "is" could be a descriptive relationship, like a program of a tornado is not >> a tornado. > > No problem with this. > > >> >> But if tornados are just mental creations, > > Mechanism does not implies this. Tornados are not ontologically real, but > they are phenomenologically real, and their existence depends in fine on > natural number relations, which are not mental creation, at least not human > mental creations. > > > > >> where everything mental is a numerical fixed point, then all reality *is* >> numerical simulation. > > Consciousness and other semantical notion are fixed point of partially > computable functional. But most of arithmetic are not, unless you intent > them, but them it relies on fixed point of transformation in your brain, > which, as a phenomenological object, will be a fixed point at a different > level. It is hard to describe this without getting a bit more technical. I > might have some opportunity to explain more on this later. > > Bruno > > > > > It seems though that while I was referencing a material pan[propto]psychism - > where elementary constituents of matter that ends up in an integrated brain > have proto-experientiality - what you have is a numerical pan[proto[psychism, > where there are elementary numeral constituents in things that are not brains > that possess a proto-consciousness. (Even rocks of certain types have been > shown to be a kind of signal processors.) If fact, a numerical reality > reveals a panpsychism of a numerical nature even more explicitly than a > material one.
Mechanism assumes only the natural numbers with their laws of addition and multiplication (or Turing equivalent like S and K + the application laws). There is no consciousness in numbers. Consciousness relies on complex Turing universal number relations, which can be proved to exist (in elementary arithmetic), and which describes a non trivial discourse on the par of the machine, including the physical discourse, making Mechanism refutable (but confirmed up to now). Rock simply do not exist per se. They belong to appearances emerging from long computational histories and their first person statistics. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a66d1826-6751-43be-97ab-763270aedaa1%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a66d1826-6751-43be-97ab-763270aedaa1%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BEAC6DB4-BB17-4868-BADE-159780EC2607%40ulb.ac.be.
