> On 20 Sep 2019, at 09:19, spudboy100 via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > At this point, I'd settle for mere intelligence that helps solve human > problems as opposed to the "hard" Chalmers Question.
Chalmers “hard problem” is just a materialist reformulation of the well known, by philosopher of mind and theologian, mind-body problem. For some humans, death or the idea of death is a problem, which plays a big role in our history, but of course, you might not be interested in that human problem or type of human problem. That’s OK, but I am not sure we ever discuss here of human problem, we just try to figure out what is happening here and now, and why … Bruno > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > Sent: Thu, Sep 19, 2019 9:19 am > Subject: Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic > > >> On 17 Sep 2019, at 22:23, spudboy100 via Everything List >> <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> >> wrote: >> >> Premise-wise, Consciousness could indeed be algorithmic, and thus emergent. >> In other words baked-in. >> View this video link and despair puny humans! >> https://openai.com/blog/emergent-tool-use/ >> <https://openai.com/blog/emergent-tool-use/> > > > Consciousness cannot be algorithmic if Mechanism is true, because it relies > on the notion of truth, which is not just not algorithmic, but is not even > definable. > > Consciousness is related to the semantic of some program observing itself, > and no program can defined its own semantic once he has enough arithmetical > belief. > > Sometimes “mechanism” is described as a theory in which consciousness is > algorithmic, and that is OK for an oversimplified description of mechanism, > but at some point we have to be more precise to avoid contradictions and some > nonsense. > > Most attribute of a program are not algorithmic. > > A program can compute the factorial function. That is algorithmic. But the > attribute “being a program computing the factorial function” is not > algorithmic. > > A total (everywhere defined) program is an algorithm, which stops on all > inputs. But being a program computing a total function, or emulating total > program is NOT algorithmic at all. It is Pi_2-complete, which is far beyond > what is emulable or definable by the partial computable function which does > not leave the sigma_1 reality. > > In practice, that is not important, but it is crucial for handling the > mind-body problem when we assume mechanism. > > Bruno > > > >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> >> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> >> Sent: Tue, Sep 17, 2019 3:55 pm >> Subject: Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic >> >> On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 9:10 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> >> >>I think the guy is a bit of an idiot. He starts off badly by equating >> >>intelligence and consciousness and then it gets worse when he defines the >> >>personal pronoun "I" by what will happen in the future rather than what >> >>actually happened in the past. And that was all in the first paragraph, I >> >>didn't read any further. >> >> > But “I” is used in statement concerning the future, or you could not say >> > “I didn’t read any further”. >> >> "Did" is the PAST tense form of "do". However personal pronouns are >> perfectly fine and everybody uses them a thousand times a day, so it would >> be OK to say "I will not read him in the future" UNLESS: >> 1) The statement was NOT made in our everyday world where personal pronoun >> duplicating machines don't exist yet, or... >> 2) The personal pronoun was used in a thought experiment that was trying to >> illustrate a point about existentialism and the fundamental nature of >> personal identity. >> >> John K Clark >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1uoHkY%2BxUOh%3DkgMHgfw5GPoWQZwL67CDsTD1-WCZS1fg%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1uoHkY%2BxUOh%3DkgMHgfw5GPoWQZwL67CDsTD1-WCZS1fg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1251532279.8809560.1568751818806%40mail.yahoo.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1251532279.8809560.1568751818806%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/850A8278-AE8B-4615-A788-9EA1B5D5522B%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/850A8278-AE8B-4615-A788-9EA1B5D5522B%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1769560140.10128221.1568963999872%40mail.yahoo.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1769560140.10128221.1568963999872%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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