> On 26 Nov 2019, at 14:49, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 7:11 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > > >> thought exparament because there is no way to determine who won and who > >> lost or even nail down exactly what the bet was about, > > > No less than in the Everett theory. > > In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about > because after its all over it's clear who has won,
In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication too. > there is only one person that even comes forward and claims to have won. There are two persons in the wave. The fact that they cannot communicate is not relevant. You can easily modify the protocol in step 3 to make the W and M guys never meeting after the split. > This is because there is only one person around who has inherited the grand > title of "you”. Same in W, and same in M, except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant with mechanism). > None of that is true with Bruno Marchal's "theory" or in the thought > experiment that attempts to prove it; The thought experiment proves only that physics is reduce to computer science, which is a branch of (intensional) arithmetic. We never prove any theory. We prove *in* the theory which can only been assumed. > and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is > suposed to be about. I bet one dollar with you that you will see W, in Helsinki. Then I accompany you in the duplication box.After pushing the button, I open the door, and I lost: we are in Moscow. In Washington, A guy looking like me, and a guy looking like you get the different outcome, and there the guy looking like me has won, but in Moscow, I clearly loss. Both copies on me have understood the bet, and clearly assessed the lost and the win in the region concerned. In arithmetic, the copies also never met, that is why your argument is not relevant, and you would understand this by following the whole reasoning, indeed of being stuck in step 3. > > >> but the situation is quite different with the MWI because it's unambiguous > >> what the bet was about and there is no one around to dispute the outcome. > > > That is not relevant for the prediction on the first person experience, > > It sure as hell is relevant when you make a bet! You can't go to your bookie > after the race and just say "In my mind's eye my horse won" and expect to > collect your winnings from him. The prediction is on the first person feeling, not on something 3p descriptible. You change the enunciation of the experience! > And if that wasn't bad enough in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment there is > no such thing as THE first person experience. There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the experience. Indeed there two of them, and both agrees that their bet “I will see only one city but I cannot know which one” was perfect, and, with a bit of reflexion, the only one possible in this setting. That is the FIRST-PERSON indeterminacy. > > > You can make the WM thought experience with Robots > > How is replacing people with Robots suposed to rescue your drowning theory? > If you do then in the WM thought experiment only one Robot will claim to have > won, Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to listen to both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be correct. With some training, the robot will find the correct prediction “only once city, but absolutely ignorant about which one in particular I will live. The iteration of the experience can help to figure out this. > but in your thought experiment a gaggle of Robots will come forward all with > equally valid claims to have won Of course not, unless in Helsinki the robot got the right prediction above, in which case, they all won. That was the point, and now, they all agree that the correct bet was "“I will see only one city but I cannot know which one””. Bruno > and you're right back in the ridiculous position you were before. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0GP7-j45QvM5Ybup%3D2GBF75q1gBR02fbYanJ3Xye2PcQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0GP7-j45QvM5Ybup%3D2GBF75q1gBR02fbYanJ3Xye2PcQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C49F7EDA-AAA8-449A-AB2D-9DF749A9EE02%40ulb.ac.be.
