On 12/5/2019 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 10:45 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,It's not clear to me. How can there be a response to an input ("input" to what) that doesn't occur? And why would such a response be anything but crazy?Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy. I have a dog. If my dog died I'd get another dog. My dog didn't die today. The counterfact then is that my dog did die today. So responding the counterfact I get another dog.In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not relevant here, but it has to make sense)So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs". You meant responses in some different world, where the input and the response (and maybe everything else) are different.The whole question about counterfactuals relates back to philosophical questions about what counterfactuals can possible mean when the antecedent is manifestly false. I think it was Lewis who proposed an analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals, giving them meaning through the concept of "possible worlds". Philosophy has moved on past this understanding of counterfactuals, but it seems that Bruno is attached to the idea of multiple worlds, so he thinks that consciousness depends on a "possible worlds" understanding of the response to counterfactual inputs.
Bruno is a logician, so he looks at in terms of Kripke's possible worlds modal logic. But unlike a physicist who takes mathematics and logic to be rules of language intended to conserve the validity of inferences in the language, he takes them to be proscriptive of reality. I'm bothered by his modal logic of "B" which seems to morph betweeen "believes" and "proves" (beweisbar) which he justifies by saying he's referring to perfect reasoner who therefore proves, and believes, everything provable. But this not a model of human reasoning. Factual doesn't enter into it, so how can counterfactual.
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