> On 6 Dec 2019, at 02:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 12/5/2019 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 10:45 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> >> wrote: >> On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, >>>>>>> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly >>>>>>> actions as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for >>>>>>> consciousness, >>>>>> It's not clear to me. How can there be a response to an input ("input" >>>>>> to what) that doesn't occur? And why would such a response be anything >>>>>> but crazy? >>>>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism. >>>> >>>> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy. I have a dog. If my dog died I'd >>>> get another dog. My dog didn't die today. The counterfact then is that >>>> my dog did die today. So responding the counterfact I get another dog. >>> >>> In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not relevant >>> here, but it has to make sense) >> >> So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs". You meant >> responses in some different world, where the input and the response (and >> maybe everything else) are different. >> >> The whole question about counterfactuals relates back to philosophical >> questions about what counterfactuals can possible mean when the antecedent >> is manifestly false. I think it was Lewis who proposed an analysis of >> causation in terms of counterfactuals, giving them meaning through the >> concept of "possible worlds". Philosophy has moved on past this >> understanding of counterfactuals, but it seems that Bruno is attached to the >> idea of multiple worlds, so he thinks that consciousness depends on a >> "possible worlds" understanding of the response to counterfactual inputs. > > Bruno is a logician, so he looks at in terms of Kripke's possible worlds > modal logic.
I started from biology. I discovered Mechanism in the work of Descartes and Darwin. I have just been lucky to discover Gödel’s theorem before deciding to study biology, and it makes me realise that what Descartes and Darwin described is realised in the number relations. I will still remain a bit skeptical on this until I eventually understood how solid the Church-Turing thesis is. > But unlike a physicist who takes mathematics and logic to be rules of > language intended to conserve the validity of inferences in the language, he > takes them to be proscriptive of reality. No less than any physicist who use mathematics. Not just the mathematical language, but also some mathematical truth. > I'm bothered by his modal logic of "B" which seems to morph betweeen > "believes" and "proves" (beweisbar) which he justifies by saying he's > referring to perfect reasoner who therefore proves, and believes, everything > provable. That is the lesson of Gödel’s theorem: “provable” does not entail “true”, and “true” does not entail provable. And “provable” (beweisbar) obey to a logic of belief, not of knowledge. And yes, I use “perfect reasoner”, which simplifies a lot the derivation of physics. Interrogating machines which lies, or are deluded is not necessary for the solution of the metaphysical/theological mind-body problem. > But this not a model of human reasoning. Right, but using “human reasoning” would make the whole derivation of physics far more complex than necessary, especially that we want to show that *all* correct universal machine find the same physics. You could criticise newton for simplifying the sun up to a point. That would be a poor critics of classical mechanics. > Factual doesn't enter into it, so how can counterfactual. ? (If you can elaborate. With mechanism, factual is an indexical) Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/688f2c18-2e9b-613a-37d8-db0d0dc3b8c6%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/688f2c18-2e9b-613a-37d8-db0d0dc3b8c6%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/302A8C9A-6133-443F-AACA-290A659717E7%40ulb.ac.be.
