> On 21 Feb 2020, at 14:25, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 21, 2020 at 3:40:51 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Feb 2020, at 21:59, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> I think Bruce's position is that quantum processes are inherently random and >> thus NOT computable. Doesn't this conclusion, if true, totally disconfirm >> Bruno's theory that the apparent physical universe comes into being by >> computations of arithmetic pre-existing principles or postulates? AG > > > On the contrary, Mechanism reduces the apparent indeterminacy to the > computable. With mechanism, things might be too much non computable, when you > take the first person indeterminacy into account. Then the math shows that > this refutation of mechanism does not work, as the computations are done with > the exact redundancy making the physical reality enough computable to get > stable histories. > > Mechanism entails that the physical reality cannot be entirely computed, like > it predicted that no piece of matter can be cloned. Indeed, it emerges from a > non computable statistics on infinitely many computation, which are not > algorithmically recognisable in arithmetic. We can test mechanism by > measuring its degree of non computability. Too much computable would be more > problematic than too much non-computable. > > Bruno > > I really can't follow the above. What I understand by mechanism (as you > define it), is that the human nervous system, and presumably a human being, > can be duplicated by computers.
Yes. If you want, we could define a mechanist practitioners as someone accepting an artificial prosthesis, like an artificial heart (a pump), or an artificial kidney ( filter machine), etc. A mechanist is then someone accepting this whatever organ is concerned, and in particular an artificial and digital brain. > If that's what you mean, can you explain each sentence above. For example, > how does mechanism reduce the apparent indeterminacy to the computable? And > so forth. AG Self-duplication is made possible by the Digital Mechanism. If you agree that with self-duplication, like in the Washington-Moscoow thought experiment, the person is unable to predict his immediate particular personal future feeling, despite being certain (assuming Mechanism and all default hyoptheses) that it will be either like feeling to be in Moscow or like feeling to be in Washington, then you understand that mechanism entails the existence of a personal, subjective (first person) indeterminacy. Then you will need to understand that the elementary arithmetical truth implement all computations (including all quantum computations, notably), in the original sense of Turing, Church, Kleene (cf the 1930s papers), which makes us, in any “here and now” indexical state, indeterminate on which computations continue us, making eventually the physical science as a statistics on all (relative) computations, among an infinity (which are indeed realised in that elementary part of arithmetic). > > On of the things I seriously dislike about MW, which makes it utterly > REPELLENT (Steven Weinberg's word), is that there are too many damned worlds! > For example, when one considers the worlds created when putting on left or > right shoe first, this just scratches the surface of how many worlds are > created -- not just two worlds, but uncountably many (if space is continuous) > when one considers how many distinct worlds are created just for the case of > the left shoe first. I am referring to the uncountably many ways to put on > one's left shoe first. For me, this is hardly an ELEGANT Cosmos, but rather a > downright SILLY one! AG When you decide to put the left shoes, in bot “quantum Mechanism” à-la Everett, or in arithmetic, only the consistent extensions must be taken into account, and if you decide to put the left shoe, you will put in all continuation that left shoe. Both the quantum and the purely Mechanist frame does not make everything happening, only the consistent (with you local belief) extension will occur, in the vast majority of extensions. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F52276C7-E496-4566-B47C-5ED67FB76857%40ulb.ac.be.
