On Monday, February 24, 2020 at 6:55:59 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2020, at 05:44, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 5:08:16 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Feb 2020, at 14:25, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, February 21, 2020 at 3:40:51 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 21:59, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> I think Bruce's position is that quantum processes are inherently random >>> and thus NOT computable. Doesn't this conclusion, if true, totally >>> disconfirm Bruno's theory that the apparent physical universe comes into >>> being by computations of arithmetic pre-existing principles or postulates? >>> AG >>> >>> On the contrary, Mechanism reduces the apparent indeterminacy to the >>> computable. With mechanism, things might be too much non computable, when >>> you take the first person indeterminacy into account. Then the math shows >>> that this refutation of mechanism does not work, as the computations are >>> done with the exact redundancy making the physical reality enough >>> computable to get stable histories. >>> >>> Mechanism entails that the physical reality cannot be entirely computed, >>> like it predicted that no piece of matter can be cloned. Indeed, it emerges >>> from a non computable statistics on infinitely many computation, which are >>> not algorithmically recognisable in arithmetic. We can test mechanism by >>> measuring its degree of non computability. Too much computable would be >>> more problematic than too much non-computable. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> I really can't follow the above. What I understand by mechanism (as you >> define it), is that the human nervous system, and presumably a human being, >> can be duplicated by computers. >> >> Yes. If you want, we could define a mechanist practitioners as someone >> accepting an artificial prosthesis, like an artificial heart (a pump), or >> an artificial kidney ( filter machine), etc. A mechanist is then someone >> accepting this whatever organ is concerned, and in particular an artificial >> and digital brain. >> >> If that's what you mean, can you explain each sentence above. For >> example, how does mechanism reduce the apparent indeterminacy to the >> computable? And so forth. AG >> >> Self-duplication is made possible by the Digital Mechanism. If you agree >> that with self-duplication, >> > > *I don't. Although it has some plausibility, there's no way that > arithmetic alone can CREATE space and time. A computer can create "points" > in a hypothetical grid, and various types of distance formulas, but it > cannot create space or time.* > > Arithmetic cannot create space and time. I agree with you. That would be > rather magical indeed. >
*Then arithmetic cannot create other worlds! End of story. Case closed. AG * > > But once you assume digital mechanism, > *If arithmetic can't create other worlds, it throws grave doubt that digital mechanism is true. AG* > and once you understand that the simple arithmetical truth emulates all > computations, you can understand that arithmetic create the experience of > space-time, and indeed, with, apparently until now, the right redundancy > which explain the “many-world” aspect of the physical reality, and that is > confirmed mathematically, in the sense that we recover quantum logic for > the logic of experimental s-certainty, relatively to the computational > states accessible from arithmetic, by universal numbers/machines “living” > in there. > The quantum is explained by the digital “seen from inside”. We get the > qubits for the bits when seen from the bits, roughly speaking. > > *BTW, what's your definition of physicalism? AG * > > The idea that physics is the fundamental science. > > With mechanism, this does not work, (I can show this), and we have to > explain the “illusion of a physical world” by a statistic on all machine > “dreams", where a dream is just a computation rich enough to support a > “self-aware observer” > *So, with a false theory of mechanism, or digital mechanism, and arithmetic which you admit can't create space (and probably time as well), you claim to derive a self-aware observer? AG* > (which can be defined in arithmetic by a consistent machine having enough > rich cognitive abilities (precisely: believing in enough induction axioms, > if you have heard about theories like Peano arithmetic, or Zermelo-Fraenkel > set theory, those are typical examples of such digital (immaterial) machine. > *Yes, I am aware of those axioms, and, as I have written, Peano's axioms imply arithmetic, but not IMO, of other worlds. AG * > > With mechanism, physics is reduced to computer science or to arithmetic, > in the same sense that for most educated people today think that biology > can be reduced to physics, in principle of course. > > My first older result is simply that mechanism (the idea that we could > survive with a digital brain/body) is incompatible with weak-materialism or > with physicalism (the idea that there is a physical universe having a > fundamental ontology, not reducible to any other science). > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > like in the Washington-Moscoow thought experiment, the person is unable to >> predict his immediate particular personal future feeling, despite being >> certain (assuming Mechanism and all default hyoptheses) that it will be >> either like feeling to be in Moscow or like feeling to be in Washington, >> then you understand that mechanism entails the existence of a personal, >> subjective (first person) indeterminacy. >> >> Then you will need to understand that the elementary arithmetical truth >> implement all computations (including all quantum computations, notably), >> in the original sense of Turing, Church, Kleene (cf the 1930s papers), >> which makes us, in any “here and now” indexical state, indeterminate on >> which computations continue us, making eventually the physical science as a >> statistics on all (relative) computations, among an infinity (which are >> indeed realised in that elementary part of arithmetic). >> >> >> >> >> On of the things I seriously dislike about MW, which makes it utterly >> REPELLENT (Steven Weinberg's word), is that there are too many damned >> worlds! For example, when one considers the worlds created when putting on >> left or right shoe first, this just scratches the surface of how many >> worlds are created -- not just two worlds, but uncountably many (if space >> is continuous) when one considers how many distinct worlds are created just >> for the case of the left shoe first. I am referring to the uncountably many >> ways to put on one's left shoe first. For me, this is hardly an ELEGANT >> Cosmos, but rather a downright SILLY one! AG >> >> >> When you decide to put the left shoes, in bot “quantum Mechanism” à-la >> Everett, or in arithmetic, only the consistent extensions must be taken >> into account, and if you decide to put the left shoe, you will put in all >> continuation that left shoe. Both the quantum and the purely Mechanist >> frame does not make everything happening, only the consistent (with you >> local belief) extension will occur, in the vast majority of extensions. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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