On Monday, February 24, 2020 at 9:06:45 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2020 at 6:55:59 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Feb 2020, at 05:44, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 5:08:16 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Feb 2020, at 14:25, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, February 21, 2020 at 3:40:51 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 21:59, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> I think Bruce's position is that quantum processes are inherently >>>> random and thus NOT computable. Doesn't this conclusion, if true, totally >>>> disconfirm Bruno's theory that the apparent physical universe comes into >>>> being by computations of arithmetic pre-existing principles or postulates? >>>> AG >>>> >>>> On the contrary, Mechanism reduces the apparent indeterminacy to the >>>> computable. With mechanism, things might be too much non computable, when >>>> you take the first person indeterminacy into account. Then the math shows >>>> that this refutation of mechanism does not work, as the computations are >>>> done with the exact redundancy making the physical reality enough >>>> computable to get stable histories. >>>> >>>> Mechanism entails that the physical reality cannot be entirely >>>> computed, like it predicted that no piece of matter can be cloned. Indeed, >>>> it emerges from a non computable statistics on infinitely many >>>> computation, >>>> which are not algorithmically recognisable in arithmetic. We can test >>>> mechanism by measuring its degree of non computability. Too much >>>> computable >>>> would be more problematic than too much non-computable. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> I really can't follow the above. What I understand by mechanism (as you >>> define it), is that the human nervous system, and presumably a human being, >>> can be duplicated by computers. >>> >>> Yes. If you want, we could define a mechanist practitioners as someone >>> accepting an artificial prosthesis, like an artificial heart (a pump), or >>> an artificial kidney ( filter machine), etc. A mechanist is then someone >>> accepting this whatever organ is concerned, and in particular an artificial >>> and digital brain. >>> >>> If that's what you mean, can you explain each sentence above. For >>> example, how does mechanism reduce the apparent indeterminacy to the >>> computable? And so forth. AG >>> >>> Self-duplication is made possible by the Digital Mechanism. If you agree >>> that with self-duplication, >>> >> >> *I don't. Although it has some plausibility, there's no way that >> arithmetic alone can CREATE space and time. A computer can create "points" >> in a hypothetical grid, and various types of distance formulas, but it >> cannot create space or time.* >> >> Arithmetic cannot create space and time. I agree with you. That would be >> rather magical indeed. >> > > *Then arithmetic cannot create other worlds! End of story. Case closed. > AG * > >> >> But once you assume digital mechanism, >> > > *If arithmetic can't create other worlds, it throws grave doubt that > digital mechanism is true. AG* > > >> and once you understand that the simple arithmetical truth emulates all >> computations, you can understand that arithmetic create the experience of >> space-time, and indeed, with, apparently until now, the right redundancy >> which explain the “many-world” aspect of the physical reality, and that is >> confirmed mathematically, in the sense that we recover quantum logic for >> the logic of experimental s-certainty, relatively to the computational >> states accessible from arithmetic, by universal numbers/machines “living” >> in there. >> The quantum is explained by the digital “seen from inside”. We get the >> qubits for the bits when seen from the bits, roughly speaking. >> >> *BTW, what's your definition of physicalism? AG * >> >> The idea that physics is the fundamental science. >> >> With mechanism, this does not work, (I can show this), and we have to >> explain the “illusion of a physical world” by a statistic on all machine >> “dreams", where a dream is just a computation rich enough to support a >> “self-aware observer” >> > > *So, with a false theory of mechanism, or digital mechanism, and > arithmetic which you admit can't create space (and probably time as well), > you claim to derive a self-aware observer? AG* > > >> (which can be defined in arithmetic by a consistent machine having enough >> rich cognitive abilities (precisely: believing in enough induction axioms, >> if you have heard about theories like Peano arithmetic, or Zermelo-Fraenkel >> set theory, those are typical examples of such digital (immaterial) machine. >> > > *Yes, I am aware of those axioms, and, as I have written, Peano's axioms > imply arithmetic, but not IMO, of other worlds. AG * >
*Test of memory; is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory just Peano's Axioms (PA) plus the Axiom of Choice? TIA, AG * > >> With mechanism, physics is reduced to computer science or to arithmetic, >> in the same sense that for most educated people today think that biology >> can be reduced to physics, in principle of course. >> >> My first older result is simply that mechanism (the idea that we could >> survive with a digital brain/body) is incompatible with weak-materialism or >> with physicalism (the idea that there is a physical universe having a >> fundamental ontology, not reducible to any other science). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> like in the Washington-Moscoow thought experiment, the person is unable >>> to predict his immediate particular personal future feeling, despite being >>> certain (assuming Mechanism and all default hyoptheses) that it will be >>> either like feeling to be in Moscow or like feeling to be in Washington, >>> then you understand that mechanism entails the existence of a personal, >>> subjective (first person) indeterminacy. >>> >>> Then you will need to understand that the elementary arithmetical truth >>> implement all computations (including all quantum computations, notably), >>> in the original sense of Turing, Church, Kleene (cf the 1930s papers), >>> which makes us, in any “here and now” indexical state, indeterminate on >>> which computations continue us, making eventually the physical science as a >>> statistics on all (relative) computations, among an infinity (which are >>> indeed realised in that elementary part of arithmetic). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On of the things I seriously dislike about MW, which makes it utterly >>> REPELLENT (Steven Weinberg's word), is that there are too many damned >>> worlds! For example, when one considers the worlds created when putting on >>> left or right shoe first, this just scratches the surface of how many >>> worlds are created -- not just two worlds, but uncountably many (if space >>> is continuous) when one considers how many distinct worlds are created just >>> for the case of the left shoe first. I am referring to the uncountably many >>> ways to put on one's left shoe first. For me, this is hardly an ELEGANT >>> Cosmos, but rather a downright SILLY one! AG >>> >>> >>> When you decide to put the left shoes, in bot “quantum Mechanism” à-la >>> Everett, or in arithmetic, only the consistent extensions must be taken >>> into account, and if you decide to put the left shoe, you will put in all >>> continuation that left shoe. Both the quantum and the purely Mechanist >>> frame does not make everything happening, only the consistent (with you >>> local belief) extension will occur, in the vast majority of extensions. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ec85541-5cf5-4c42-9813-4e1fd48b0fd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09a295f9-8a36-4afa-a54f-184ff439b9e8%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/70d0f849-c6b5-4396-ab6f-2b97f5da4169%40googlegroups.com.
