On Sunday, March 1, 2020 at 8:22:37 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 1 Mar 2020, at 09:39, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 3:56:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Feb 2020, at 06:35, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 27, 2020 at 5:41:57 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's > WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each > branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 0.5 > on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these > probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary > sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number of > 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. > > The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only > probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli > trial is one, > > > That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in > the personal diary, > > > I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. You > confuse 1p with 3p yet again. > > > Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will subjectively > refute that prediction, and as the question was about the subjective > accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute your > statement. > > > > And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and > the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see > only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0.. > > > That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even > for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I > was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one! > > In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet > know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one > copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the > others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as > refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. > > > But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same > result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. > > > If I toss a perfect coin too. > > Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case > scenario. > > > > > > If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in > mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. > > > > In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the > protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of > the duplication. > > > In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the > question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know > that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the > first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever > *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. > > > And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give > you any expectations at all. > > > If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” > scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to > see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. > > I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give > any expectations”. > > Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee > will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability > one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming > Mechanism, of course). > > I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability > one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids > hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.). > > And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be > Russian or American coffee. > > > > > > The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry > is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be > in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. > > > Regardless of any prior probability assignment. > > > Exactly. > > > > > > I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I > infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. > > > But we try to find the probability from the theory. > > > And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = > p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be > refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of > measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. > > > Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no > probabilities at all. > > > > > As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we > see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. > > > What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will > get the wrong answer. > > > Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true > protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. > > If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind that > this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the derivation of > matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all computations” > being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first person > indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to calculate > the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is invariant > for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. (P > = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most people find this > to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” protocol). > > > > > Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame > of that theory/hypothesis. > > > > You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as > they are generated. > > > You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, even > a unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume > digital mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical > universe, and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the > same computation in arithmetic of consciousness. > > Bruno > > > *Bruno; What's the difference between mechanism and digital mechanism? * > > > > In all my posts, there is none. I use Mechanism as a shortcut for “Digital > Mechanism”, or “Indexical Digital Mechanism”, that is what I sum up by YD + > CT (Yes doctor, for the acceptance of a digital brain, and CT = Church > Turing, of Church’s thesis or equivalent). > > Mathematically, we can give sense to “non computable phenomenon”, and some > non-digital form of mechanism could not been excluded, bu most described in > the literature fails to be non digitalisable, and I am not sure a non > digital mechanist hypothesis makes sense, or could be made precise enough. > In fact, when a non digital notion is made precise, it usullat can be shown > to be digitally emulable, after all. But from a pure logical point of view, > we cannot exclude this. Some people do argue that all forms of mechanism > are digital. I don’t know, but I study only the consequence of the digital > hypothesis. > > > > > *What's the difference between 1p and 3p? * > > > It is like the difference between seeing someone tortured and being > tortured. The 1p is the first person subjective account of you feel and > could write in a personal diary, where, at least in a first approximation, > the 3p is the account of an “external observer”. > > Actually, I have invested the duplication experience tp make clear that > difference. In the 3p account, we have a perfect symmetry between the > copies, but in the first person diary, it diverges. > > > > > *If digital mechanism (which I assume you mean a brain can be replaced by > a digital computer) * > > > Roughly speaking, yes. When progressing in the reasoning, that has to be > made more precise, but this is better done au fur et à mesure. > > > > *and the postulates of arithmetic cannot create space,* > > > Nor does any postulate. The postulation of space does not create space > either. > > Now, not only does the postulates of arithmetic not creating space, but > the arithmetical reality does not create space either too. > > To be honest, I don’t no what could create space, and I doubt such a thing > can ever exist in any other sense that by self-localisation experience made > by coherent dreams or “video-games”. > > > > > * how can these two concepts imply and create Many Worlds, presumably > worlds without space? AG * > > > > What all mathematical logicians do know, (and apparently only them), is > that all computations (by definition: a computation is the activity of a > universal machine or machinery) are emulated (executed) in virtue of the > number relations. > > Exactly like you can prove the existence of all prime numbers, and study > they astonishing behaviour, using just the laws of succession, addition and > multiplication, you can prove the existence of all computations using just > the same laws. > > If you ask, I can explain more on this. I do that for time to time in this > list. With all details, or just a sketchy summary, as you want. They key > element is the Church-Turing thesis (found by Emil Post before, and > understood and made precise by Kleene). > Church’s thesis is everything but obvious. > > Bruno > > > The bottom line IMO is that you acknowledge NOT being able to use > arithmetic to create space, > > > > Yes. Actually I am not sure that anything can create space, but that is > not a problem a priori, because with Mechanism, there is no space. Like in > Kant; it is all in the mind (of the universal machine/number, which exists > in the sense that prime numbers exist) > > > > > regardless of the number of computations, yet you claim to be able to > create worlds with arithmetic alone. AG > > > I did not. > > > OK, but you claim arithmetic, plus an infinity of computations, > > > > The infinity of computations are there once you assume arithmetic. No need > of that “plus”. > > > > > creates the illusion of the physical world, hence the illusion of space in > this world. > > > “This world” is part of the illusion. There is no world at all. All there > is is 0, 1, 2, 3, …, or if written in the language of PA, 0, s0, ss0, sss0, > ssss0, …. Nothing else exist. > > We still have to assume some laws, of course, but as amazing it might > look, the laws of addition and multiplication are enough: > > Addition: > > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > > > Multiplication: > > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > That’ all. From this you can define computation(x) and prove > Ex(computation(x)), and if you accept the Church Turing thesis, you can > show that we get *all* computations, with their redundancy, in a highly > stuttered way, actually a different structure for all machine’s possible > “points of view”. > > > > > But why do we get this particular illusion out of an infinity of > possibilities? AG > > > > The “general” answer is, because our particular illusion is the most > probable relatively to our most probable long history/computation. > > The “particular” answer is shown not answerable, a bit like we can explain > to ourself that, after a WM duplication, if the M guy asks himself why he > is the one in Moscow, and not the one in Washington, there is no > explanation at all. If one would exist, it could be use by the Helsinki > guy, and there would be non first person indeterminacy. > > Bruno > > *Here is where I think you've tried to answer my gravity problem posed on another thread. You say there is an infinity of calculations, but what is doing the calculations? And why among those multitudes is one set chosen, namely our "illusion"? AG*
> > > > > > > > > Have you any way to resolve this insufficiency? It's true that existence > of space leaves the question of its creation unresolved, but I fail to see > why infinite computations offers an answer. AG > > > Because with the minimal amount of Mechanism to make sense of Darwin, you > already get *all* computations, including their redundancy, in arithmetic, > and things like world, space, energy, bosons, fermions, are show to be “in > the head” of the universal number/machine. > > I can and probably will give more explanations, I have to go now. I will > add some explanations on this in a new answer to a remark/question by Brent > Meeker. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59c2cd33-b5a0-459d-abfd-6e9a7245b046%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/113fe785-71a7-4205-b6f5-14ca2e8192c7%40googlegroups.com.
