On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet >> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one >> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the >> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as >> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa. >> > > But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same > result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect. > > > If I toss a perfect coin too. > Huh????? If you toss a coin, perfect or not, you will get either heads or tails -- you do not get both results in different branches of the wave function. That is the difference here: in WM-duplication, or Everett, every result is obtained every time, even if on different branches. That is why the probabilities that you hypothesize at the start are irrelevant: you get the same outcomes whatever probabilities you assign. > Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case > scenario. > I don't understand this comment. What difficulties? All, I am saying is that no concept of probability applies in the WM-duplication case. > If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in >>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. >>> >> >> >> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the >> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of >> the duplication. >> >> >> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the >> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know >> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the >> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever >> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole. >> > > And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give > you any expectations at all. > > > If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” > scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to > see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle. > You make the same mistake as above with the coin tosses -- you are trying to compare duplication scenarios to single-outcome scenarios. That is wrong -- no matter how many pixels on your screen, they are all either black or white, not both. And there are no other worlds in which all possibilities occur. > I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give > any expectations”. > Just that you cannot assign any 1p probabilities to particular outcomes in duplication scenarios. Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee > will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability > one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming > Mechanism, of course). > > I would expect, in Helsinki, to drink a cup of coffee with probability > one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids > hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.). > Since both copies are given coffee, that is a certain outcome for both. And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be > Russian or American coffee. > Exactly, that is the point: you can't predict which brand of coffee you will receive, even if you do know that you will be given coffee. But bringing coffee in here adds nothing. It is yet another meaningless distraction. The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry >> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be >> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”. >> > > Regardless of any prior probability assignment. > > > Exactly. > What? Do you actually agree that there are no meaningful probability assignments in this case? I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I >> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1]. >> >> >> But we try to find the probability from the theory. >> > > And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) = > p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be > refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of > measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data. > > > Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no > probabilities at all. > There you go again. Confusing single outcome scenarios with the duplication scenarios in which all outcomes occur. This is not 'honest dealing' in argument, Bruno. As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we >> see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experiences alone. >> > > What the WMS example shows is that if you guess the wrong theory, you will > get the wrong answer. > > > Yes, and that shows that the fact the guy in Helsinki knows the true > protocol is important, to derive the theoretical first person indeterminacy. > Knowledge of the protocol is irrelevant, for even in the third person view, there are no meaningful individual probabilities. All that one knows from the 3p view is that one copy will certainly be in M, and one copy certainly in W. These are statements with p = 1. And they are 3p, not 1p. >From the first person perspective, there is indeterminacy, but no sensible assignment of probabilities is possible. If you have a problem with the specific answer P = 1/2, keep in mind that > this is not use in the reduction of the mind-body problem the derivation of > matter appearance from a statistics on all computation (“all computations” > being defined in arithmetic). What is used is only the first person > indeterminacy (and some variants) and the fact that the means to calculate > the probabilities, or the credibilities, or the plausibilities is invariant > for the changes made at each step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. > But the trouble is that there is no way to calculate invariant probabilities. If each copy uses his or her individual data to estimate a probability, lover the 2^N individual copies, all probabilities in the range (0,1) are observed -- rendering the notion of probability totally suspect in these scenarios. (P = 1/2 is used just to fix the idea, and also because most people find > this to be the natural easiest solution with this “simple” protocol). > Using some particular value as an 'example' is completely disingenuous in this case because there is no meaningful probability assignment. Keep in mind that we *postulate* Mechanism. We work precisely in the frame >> of that theory/hypothesis. >> > > > You might do so. But I do not. I am working with the protocols and data as > they are generated. > > > You seem to use also the assumption that there is a physical reality, even > a unique one. That is the point which does no more work when we assume > digital mechanism, or you need to say more about that ontological physical > universe, and explain how it makes consciousness, and how it deprives the > same computation in arithmetic of consciousness. > Since I do not assume digital (or any other) mechanism, this comment is irrelevant. Also, whatever my theory of consciousness might be, it is irrelevant to the points under discussion. As usual, you raise irrelevancies in an attempt to divert attention from the fact that you have no answer to the simple points that I am making. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTYVYkFE%2BoPCpvwCwssiFw7UHRTOGNjpDNvM-EL0mEe%2BQ%40mail.gmail.com.
