On 2/27/2020 3:45 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

    On 26 Feb 2020, at 23:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com
    <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

    From the first person perspective, there is indeterminacy,

    That is the whole point. That is the 1p-indeterminacy I am talking
    about (and that Clark, and only Clark, has a problem with).

    but no sensible assignment of probabilities is possible.

    And you are right on this, in any “real case scenario”, but that
    is for the next steps.



And in the theoretical analysis. I am glad that you acknowledge that there is no useful concept of probability in this WM-duplication scenario.


    A probability is never observed, but evaluated, using some theory.
    In the finite case, the numerical identity suggest the usual
    binomial, and this is easy to verify for simple scenario.


Yes, it is binomial because there are only two possible outcomes. But binomial without any specification of a probability for 'success'.


    All what is used is the fact that you are maximally ignorant on
    the brand of coffee, and thus on the city you will see. Maximal
    ignorance is just modelled by P = 1/2 traditionally, but that is
    not important, as the math will show that we have no
    probabilities, but a quantum credibility measure.



That is probably what all this argument is actually about -- the maths show that there are no probabilities. Because there are no unique probabilities in the classical duplication case, the concept of probability has been shown to be inadmissible in the deterministic (Everettian) quantum case. The appeal by people like Deutsch and Wallace to betting quotients, or quantum credibility measures, are just ways of forcing a probabilistic interpretation on to quantum mechanics by hand -- they are not derivations of probability from within the deterministic theory. There are no probabilities in the deterministic theory, even from the 1p perspective, because the data are consistent with any prior assignment of a probability measure.

The probability enters from the self-location uncertainty; which is other terms is saying: Assume each branch has the same probability (or some weighting) for you being in that branch.  Then that is the probability that you have observed the sequence of events that define that branch.

Brent

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