> On 6 Jun 2020, at 19:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/6/2020 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 21:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/5/2020 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 4 Jun 2020, at 20:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/4/2020 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 3 Jun 2020, at 21:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>> <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6/3/2020 3:26 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote: >>>>>>>> On Tuesday, June 2, 2020 at 12:34:37 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 6/2/2020 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >> On 1 Jun 2020, at 22:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>>> >> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> On 6/1/2020 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>> Brent suggest that we might recover completeness by restricting N >>>>>>>> >>> to a finite domain. That is correct, because all finite function >>>>>>>> >>> are computable, but then, we have incompleteness directly with >>>>>>>> >>> respect to the computable functions, even limited on finite but >>>>>>>> >>> arbitrary domain. In fact, that moves makes the computer simply >>>>>>>> >>> vanishing, and it makes Mechanism not even definable or >>>>>>>> >>> expressible. >>>>>>>> >> That's going to come as a big shock to IBM stockholders. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Why? On the contrary. IBM bets on universal machine >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No, they bet only on finite machines, and they will be very surprised >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> hear that they have vanished. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For the most part computers are meant to run various algorithms that >>>>>>>> solve some restricted set of >>>>>>>> problems, say business applications. We use them largely as tools. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mathematics is largely a tool. My pure mathematics friends over on >>>>>>> math-fun seem to have most of their fun on Mathematica. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, this is close to Aristotelian theology. It assumes that there >>>>>> is something which is not mathematical in some reality. A platonism or a >>>>>> pythegaorean think that he physical universe is but a tool, invented by >>>>>> the numbers to figure out what happens, and what is real. >>>>>> >>>>>> But once you grasp that all computations exists in arithmetic (or more >>>>>> exactly, that they are enabled by the arithmetical true relations), even >>>>>> without Mechanism, the charge are reversed. It is those who claim (in >>>>>> metaphysics, not in physics) that there is a primitive universe who have >>>>>> the task to provide evidence. >>>>> >>>>> You have implicitly asserted that computation=reality. With not proof, >>>>> or even evidence. >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> The UDA *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic. >>> >>> All proofs are relative to their premises. You just assume arithmetic is >>> real. >> >> To assume arithmetic is real is ambiguous, if not non sensical. > > A proposition cannot be ambiguous or nonsensical and also proven: "The UDA > *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic.”
But the “UDA proves that …” is not derived from “arithmetic is real”. It is derived from x + 0 = x, etc. You seem to confuse the theory/machine (and what its says) with the arithmetical reality. Those do not belong to the same level of explanation. The arithmetical reality proves nothing: it is not a theory. > >> >> All we have to assume is that a number added to 0 gives that number, that 0 >> is not a successor, etc. We have just to believe that 817 is prime or not >> prime, or that (x + 4 = 9) admits a solution, or not. I have never met a >> physicist who does not believe in those truth. > > I've never met a physicist who confused true with real. But I've met such > mathematicians. Because they interpret “real” by physically real. They are studying the physical reality, not the ultimate truth, which is the object of philosophy/metaphysics/theology/whatever-you-call-this. “Real” without an adjective making it precise, is the same as truth. The existence of the moon is a physical truth, and that is what makes the moon physically real, but that does not mean that the moon is a primitively real thing in the ontology. > >> >> Now, given that all computations are run in arithmetic, a believer in Matter >> is invited to provide evidences, but as Plato understood already, there are >> no evidences at all. > > No evidence for what? For a PRIMITIVELY ontological physical reality. For the ideas that we have to assume that a physical universe exist, and cannot be explained by something conceptually simpler, like natural numbers. > >> Not one. All the evidences we have today points on the immaterial >> consequence of Digital mechanism, from molecular biology to QM without >> collapse. > > A theory that depends on the collapse interpretation of QM >From what follows, I guess you meant “non-collapse” here. > as proof that mathematics is real; Of course I do not do that. I do not assume collapse or non-collapse, given that I assume only elementary arithmetic. I assume only that 2+3 = 5, and alike, with classical logic, or much less if I use KAB = A, etc. Then I use Mechanism, of course, but no more in the theory of everything extracted from mechanism, and that is the one in which the physical laws are mathematically derivable, and I have derived the propositional physics, and it is not yet refuted, unlike physics when used by physicalist, which is refuted by the existence of consciousness and first person, already, since long. > is self contradictory since there are mathematically consistent theories of > QM in which the wave function does collapse. Plausibly. But not relevant. It just means that if you find an evidence for a collapse, you refute Mechanism.With QM we have either “many-world” or “non mechanism”. But with mechanism, even without QM, we have already the many-world/histories, so why invent a Universe, collapse, … except for wishful thinking? When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, we cannot invoke god or universe. Any ontological commitment is problematic, except for the terms needed to define what we are taking about when postulating mechanism in the cognitive science. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> And AUDA (arithmetical Dovetailer Argument) makes the proof constructive, >>>> and it makes Mechanism testable, and the evidences for mechanism are >>>> striking, at a place where we know since 1500 years that Materialism is >>>> already refuted. Oh, yes, that is well hidden since 1500 years, by all >>>> gnostic (atheist or non atheists). >>>> >>>> You are the one who seems to claim the existence of an ontological >>>> physical universe, where there is no proof nor any evidence. >>> >>> When I kick it, it kicks back. >>> >>>> Evidences for a physical reality is not evidences for an ontological or >>>> primitive physical reality. >>> >>> Nobody said it was. But it is evidence for physical reality. The thirst >>> for an absolute primitive is a sickness of philosophy. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> The confusion between both of those is know as Aristotle theology. The >>>> belief in primary matter or physicalism (mathematicalist or not). >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>>> I have given the way to test this, and, thanks to QM, we can say that >>>>>> there are not yet any evidence found for a primitive physical universe. >>>>>> On the contrary, nature seems to obey exactly to what is needed for >>>>>> mechanism to be true. >>>>>> >>>>>> Then, if we assume furthermore Mechanism, there is no more choice in >>>>>> this matter. Physics cannot be the fundamental science, it reduces to >>>>>> arithmetic (or any model of any Turing equivalent machinery) “seen-from >>>>>> inside”. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>>> an email to [email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/55f184ef-663c-1acb-af92-a9db0346c4c1%40verizon.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/55f184ef-663c-1acb-af92-a9db0346c4c1%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an email to [email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/22C3F6D1-890C-413B-A316-3E197100196F%40ulb.ac.be >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/22C3F6D1-890C-413B-A316-3E197100196F%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/786a7e9c-118d-d516-b3a6-b16238486255%40verizon.net >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/786a7e9c-118d-d516-b3a6-b16238486255%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8E2846BA-05C5-4066-B768-815DB0A446B8%40ulb.ac.be >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8E2846BA-05C5-4066-B768-815DB0A446B8%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/811521da-af37-5f5f-2f7b-90a30109d8b5%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/811521da-af37-5f5f-2f7b-90a30109d8b5%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F04333A8-5F14-44D4-8BD8-A51E8A9A9E0D%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F04333A8-5F14-44D4-8BD8-A51E8A9A9E0D%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6b6f5262-643d-34c8-2d80-d015dea0c734%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6b6f5262-643d-34c8-2d80-d015dea0c734%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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