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> On 8 Jun 2020, at 22:51, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/8/2020 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 23:03, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/7/2020 5:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> The UDA *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic.
>>>>>>> All proofs are relative to their premises.  You just assume arithmetic 
>>>>>>> is real.
>>>>>> To assume arithmetic is real is ambiguous, if not non sensical.
>>>>> A proposition cannot be ambiguous or nonsensical and also proven: "The 
>>>>> UDA *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic.”
>>>> But the “UDA proves that …” is not derived from “arithmetic is real”. It 
>>>> is derived from x + 0 = x, etc.
>>>> 
>>>> You seem to confuse the theory/machine (and what its says) with the 
>>>> arithmetical reality. Those do not belong to the same level of 
>>>> explanation. The arithmetical reality proves nothing: it is not a theory.
>>> I'm not confused.  You made two statements that are implicitly 
>>> contradictory:
>>> 
>>> (1) To assume arithmetic is real is ambiguous, if not non sensical.
>> It is unclear if by “assuming arithmetic” you are are assuming 0 + 0 = 0, 1 
>> + 0 = 1, etc.
> 
> Ask yourself what you were assuming.  It's your statement.

So to be clear, I assume Mechanism (YD + CT), and from Mechanism, I derive that 
we cannot assume more than the axioms of classical logic + the non logical 
arithmetical axioms:

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x


I can assume much less, but this is OK.



> 
>> or if you are assuming that the theory exists and is consistent (that is: 
>> assuming that a model of arithmetic exists, which when formalised assumes 
>> much more, like infinite sets, etc.).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> (2) The UDA *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic.
>> 
>> UDA shows that we cannot use the assumption that there is a universe to 
>> explain why we see a universe. It shows rigorously that this idea does not 
>> work.
> 
> But you can assume the UDA. 

You cannot assume a proof? You assume only a theory. The theory is shown above. 
The notion of computations is defined in the language of that theory, without 
adding any other assumption (except YD + CT at the meta-level, to help making 
sense of the relation between consciousness as used in the thought experience 
and its metamathematical definition).


> Proofs are relative to their premises.

Indeed.


> 
> But that is beside my point: It is contradictory to say that to assume 
> proposition X is nonsense and also that proposition X can be proven. 

Absolutely, unless X is an axiom, in which case you can prove it in two/three 
words, like “see the axioms”. 




> Any proposition that can be proven (in any logical system) is a proposition 
> that can be consistently added to the axioms.

That gives a redundant theory, but that is not a problem. 

I got the feeling that you seem to believe that I have both prove something and 
assume it, but I don’t see what you allude too.

I just said that assuming arithmetic is fuzzy. I just assume Mechanism, and all 
what is needed to give sense to mechanism, which is just elementary arithmetic, 
without induction (RA). Then I define an observer as being anything, provably 
existing in very elmemrentary arithmetic, believing in much more than that: the 
same + the induction axioms (PA).
RA can prove the existence of PA, and can mimic PA, but of course, RA remains 
much more cognitively weaker than PA.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> Of course, the neoplatonician udesrood this since long, but without the 
>> Church thesis, their argument (mainly the dream argument) is not 
>> constructive, and does not provide the means of verification.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I just made the contradiction explicit by pointing out that any proposition 
>>> that can be proven, cannot be ambiguous or nonsensical and hence can be 
>>> unambiguously assumed.
>> 
>> The expression “assuming arithmetic” is unclear. With mechanism (which is an 
>> heavy assumption) we isolate by meta-reasoning a theory of everything which 
>> has very few assumptions: just 0 + 0 = 0, 1 + 0 = 1, etc. That is quite 
>> different than assuming that arithmetic is consistent, or make sense, etc.
>> 
>> There is a subtlety here, no doubt. As we assume as much math as we needed 
>> at the meta-level, and for the internal phenomenology as well, but all this 
>> is done without assuming more than elementary arithmetic at the fundamental 
>> ontological level. Mechanism justifies such an approach. All the machine 
>> interviews in the context of RA, believes far more proposition than RA. 
>> Arithmetic explains why numbers believe (even “richly”) in much more than 
>> arithmetic, indeed, they believe in most of the objects that they are 
>> dreaming…
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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