No. You're not blocked. I'll try to look at it and give a response. AG On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 12:48:14 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Obviously I'm blocked by AG for whatever reason, because that's what I've > been telling him since and got no answer... I even bother to take the time > to make a schematics (well a ugly one but still) :D > > Le ven. 15 janv. 2021 à 07:36, Pierz Newton-John <pie...@gmail.com> a > écrit : > >> >> >> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 >>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>>>> johnk...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> as what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> electron go >>>>>>>>>>>>>> left, in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> electron go >>>>>>>>>>>>>> right, other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one was the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds >>>>>>>>>>>>> in third >>>>>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the >>>>>>>>>>>>> SAME other >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of >>>>>>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no >>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" >>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. The worlds that arise at each trial are different in >>>>>>>>>>>> precisely one >>>>>>>>>>>> way and one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. >>>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>> different eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of >>>>>>>>>>>> differentiations" >>>>>>>>>>>> as the consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> different worlds generated by the original experimental difference >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> multiply. "World" really means a unique configuration of the >>>>>>>>>>>> universal wave >>>>>>>>>>>> function, so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the >>>>>>>>>>>> "same >>>>>>>>>>>> world", and yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI >>>>>>>>>> "doesn't >>>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. >>>>>>>>>> It's that >>>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this >>>>>>>>>> context and >>>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 >>>>>>>>>> twice >>>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the >>>>>>>>>> "SAME >>>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how >>>>>>>>>> can we >>>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>>>>>>> "WTF?" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally >>>>>>>>>>>> likely per the >>>>>>>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version >>>>>>>>>>>> knowing >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole >>>>>>>>>>>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you >>>>>>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>>>>>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an >>>>>>>>>>>> apparently >>>>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens >>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>>>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. >>>>>>>>>>>> Objectively >>>>>>>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to >>>>>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in >>>>>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of >>>>>>>>>> outcomes >>>>>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally >>>>>>>>>> wrong-headed. >>>>>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse >>>>>>>>>> branches at >>>>>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior >>>>>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of >>>>>>>>>> randomness >>>>>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective >>>>>>>>>> lack of >>>>>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", >>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI >>>>>>>>>> multiverse >>>>>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are >>>>>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So >>>>>>>>> the only >>>>>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye >>>>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not >>>>>>>> that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really >>>>>>>> all that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> probability" are moot. If the world is as described by MWI, the >>>>>>>> appearance >>>>>>>> of probability is an outcome, and probability is the best possible >>>>>>>> description of how quantum experiments turn out from any real >>>>>>>> observer's >>>>>>>> POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you disagree that >>>>>>>> experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 0s, then >>>>>>>> you'll >>>>>>>> need to explain why you think that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW >>>>>>> OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other >>>>>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need >>>>>>> another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world >>>>>> who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and >>>>>> 0s >>>>>> or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this >>>>> world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were true* >>>> here. >>>> This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go >>>> if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a >>>> world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and >>>> 1's", then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic >>>> predictions from it. >>>> >>>>> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG >>>>> in this world measured. >>>>> >>>> >>>> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you >>>> remove the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking >>>> you to believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI >>>> were true. >>>> >>>>> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always >>>>> measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't >>>> measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >>>> >>> >>> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created >>> for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless >>> you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected >>> any other "other AG". AG * >>> >> >> Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more >> misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the structure of >> a tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of some >> observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are >> ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. Each AG’s past at >> a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs at that trial, though >> each AG’s future diverges into further trees of different observed >> realities. The equal status of all branches means that your idea that AG >> observers on other branches are in some way different from the AG branch >> you happen to be on in that they only ever have one observation is just >> totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get it. >> >>> >>> As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. >>>>> >>>> >>>> What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means >>>> "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured >>>> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference >>>> between >>>> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot >>>> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is >>>> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because >>>> without >>>> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint >>>> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely >>>> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. >>>> >>>> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to >>>>> your MWI. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting >>>> it slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in >>>> this experiment if MWI describes reality? >>>> >>> >>> *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI >>> interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never >>> observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of >>> interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So >>> the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG* >>> >> >> Im not assuming it. It’s part of QM that wave functions interfere with >> themselves. In MWI that translates to different “worlds” interfering. That >> interference is extremely limited since it only occurs to the extent that >> two branches can become identical again after having diverged. Nonetheless >> it is the basis for proposed experimental proofs of MWI. One argument goes >> that if we can make a quantum computer with a sufficiently large number of >> qubits, we can prove the existence of other worlds because the other worlds >> are the only place we can get all that information from. So, no, this is >> not my assumption, it’s intrinsic to MWI. Again, if you don’t get that, you >> don’t get MWI. You can’t expect your arguments to be taken seriously if you >> don’t understand basics like this. >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS00gPngPUgNvQLBvjOAHN%2B0TVVkBC%2BtYSJSah_5PNSx9qQ%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS00gPngPUgNvQLBvjOAHN%2B0TVVkBC%2BtYSJSah_5PNSx9qQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7c6a0c4a-bccb-4034-9bf2-7e900ec808ean%40googlegroups.com.
