On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com > wrote: > >> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, >>>>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER >>>>>>>>>>>> worlds as >>>>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as >>>>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>> go left, >>>>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>>>>> right, >>>>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which >>>>>>>>>>> one was >>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI >>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals >>>>>>>>>>> with probability. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can >>>>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not >>>>>>>>>>> so much. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in >>>>>>>>>> third >>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the >>>>>>>>>> SAME other >>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of >>>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no >>>>>>>>>> ensemble of >>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. >>>>>>>>> The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one >>>>>>>>> way and >>>>>>>>> one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The >>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the >>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >>>>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave >>>>>>>>> function, >>>>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same >>>>>>> other >>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't >>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 >>>>>>> twice >>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME >>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how >>>>>>> can we >>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>>>> "WTF?" >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely >>>>>>>>> per the >>>>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version >>>>>>>>> knowing >>>>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave >>>>>>>>> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat >>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently >>>>>>>>> random >>>>>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the >>>>>>>>> next >>>>>>>>> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively >>>>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to >>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in >>>>>>> each >>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes >>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. >>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse >>>>>>> branches at >>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior >>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of >>>>>>> randomness >>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective lack >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", >>>>>>> then >>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI >>>>>>> multiverse >>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the >>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are >>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So the >>>>>> only >>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an >>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you >>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye >>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that >>>>> every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series >>>>> of experiments as described in my scenario will record a *seemingly* >>>>> random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. >>>>> Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a probability" are >>>>> moot. >>>>> If the world is as described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an >>>>> outcome, and probability is the best possible description of how quantum >>>>> experiments turn out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the >>>>> Bird's >>>>> Eye observer). If you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly >>>>> random string of 1s and 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think >>>>> that. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW >>>> OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other >>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need >>>> another postulate for this to work. AG >>>> >>> >>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who >>> repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or >>> not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>> >> >> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this >> world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >> > > That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were true* here. > This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go > if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a > world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and > 1's", then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic > predictions from it. > >> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in >> this world measured. >> > > They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you remove > the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking you to > believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI were > true. > >> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always >> measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >> > > Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't > measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >
*I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected any other "other AG". AG * As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. >> > > What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means > "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured > different results, initially their worlds have only this difference between > them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot > interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is > only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because without > interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint > seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely > what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. > > The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your >> MWI. AG >> > > No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting it > slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in this > experiment if MWI describes reality? > *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG * > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com.
