On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >> >>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> johnk...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go left, in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go right, other than that the two worlds are absolutely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identical, so which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one was the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deals with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds in third >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAME other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. The worlds that arise at each trial are different in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precisely one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way and one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiment. The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiations" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the consequences of that singular difference ramifies, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causing the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different worlds generated by the original experimental >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiply. "World" really means a unique configuration of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universal wave >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function, so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the "same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world", and yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about >>>>>>>>>>>>> "same other >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>> "doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's that >>>>>>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this >>>>>>>>>>>>> context and >>>>>>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and >>>>>>>>>>>>> 1 twice >>>>>>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the >>>>>>>>>>>>> "SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then >>>>>>>>>>>>> how can we >>>>>>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that >>>>>>>>>>>>> is "WTF?" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantum experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equally likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> per the Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> effectively - two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> version >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> record an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between 1 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that way. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to >>>>>>>>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because >>>>>>>>>>>>> in each >>>>>>>>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of >>>>>>>>>>>>> outcomes >>>>>>>>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong-headed. >>>>>>>>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse >>>>>>>>>>>>> branches at >>>>>>>>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior >>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of >>>>>>>>>>>>> randomness >>>>>>>>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective >>>>>>>>>>>>> lack of >>>>>>>>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all >>>>>>>>>>>>> along", then >>>>>>>>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>> multiverse >>>>>>>>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are >>>>>>>>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So >>>>>>>>>>>> the only >>>>>>>>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To >>>>>>>>>>>> get an >>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a >>>>>>>>>>>> probability, you >>>>>>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's >>>>>>>>>>>> Eye >>>>>>>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or >>>>>>>>>>> not that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who >>>>>>>>>>> records a >>>>>>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's >>>>>>>>>>> really all that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles >>>>>>>>>>> required to >>>>>>>>>>> get a probability" are moot. If the world is as described by MWI, >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> appearance of probability is an outcome, and probability is the >>>>>>>>>>> best >>>>>>>>>>> possible description of how quantum experiments turn out from any >>>>>>>>>>> real >>>>>>>>>>> observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you >>>>>>>>>>> disagree >>>>>>>>>>> that experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 0s, >>>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>> you'll need to explain why you think that. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a >>>>>>>>>> NEW OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You >>>>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>>>> another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world >>>>>>>>> who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s >>>>>>>>> and 0s >>>>>>>>> or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in >>>>>>>> this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were >>>>>>> true* here. This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining >>>>>>> how things would go if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're >>>>>>> admitting >>>>>>> that, in such a world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random >>>>>>> sequence of 0's and 1's", then you have all the preconditions for >>>>>>> making >>>>>>> probabilistic predictions from it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what >>>>>>>> AG in this world measured. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you >>>>>>> remove the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not >>>>>>> asking >>>>>>> you to believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" >>>>>>> MWI >>>>>>> were true. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs >>>>>>>> always measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they >>>>>>> don't measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when >>>>>> created for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes >>>>>> because, >>>>>> unless you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or >>>>>> connected any other "other AG". AG * >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more >>>>> misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the structure >>>>> of >>>>> a tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of >>>>> some >>>>> observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are >>>>> ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *I'm really dumb. Ask Bruce for confirmation. I agree; in a horse race >>>> there's no difference between AG observing the winner, and a MWI >>>> enthusiast >>>> imagining another winner in another world. AG* >>>> >>>> >>> Bruce thinks that MWI violates Born’s rule and generally hates MWI. I >>> don’t think his argument about the Born rule holds water, though it’s a >>> well-known one. David Deutsch’s chapter on MWI in The Beginning of Infinity >>> presents a refutation of that argument that I personally find convincing. >>> But Bruce does at least understand MWI. I’m sure that while he shares your >>> disdain for it, he would not accept that your specific argument against is >>> valid. All you are doing is asserting that the other observers are >>> imaginary, which is not a valid form of argument. >>> >>> Each AG’s past at a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs at >>>>> that trial, though each AG’s future diverges into further trees of >>>>> different observed realities. The equal status of all branches means that >>>>> your idea that AG observers on other branches are in some way different >>>>> from the AG branch you happen to be on in that they only ever have one >>>>> observation is just totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get it. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *What I get is that "ex hypothesi" covers a multiple of sins, including >>>> a complete disregard of experimental verification in physics. AG* >>>> >>> >>> A hypothesis by definition has no experimental verification - yet! The >>> same objection could have been made against General Relativity in 1915. But >>> I’m not trying to convince you of MWI. Only that your argument about it not >>> giving rise to probabilities is not valid. You can’t assume the hypothesis >>> isn’t valid in your argument against it. You have to show how it’s >>> logically inconsistent. >>> >> >> *Your comparison with GR is plainly deficient if not silly. GR was >> published in Nov 1915, and with it was a postulated empirical test which >> the theory passed in 1920 (the bending of starlight as it passes the Sun). >> By comparison, the MWI was published around 1957, and now, after about 63 >> years, there's no proposal for a test of its validity. As for the >> observers being imaginary, I contend they remain in that status until they >> are experimentally detected. Have you seen one? As for Bruce's position, I >> don't know his perspective on my argument, nor do I particularly care. But >> I am pretty sure he would not agree on the absolute thematical reliance on >> mathematics as support for the Interpretation. After all, he put forth the >> horse racing model to cast grave doubt on the MWI. AG* >> > > If your argument is that MWI is wrong because it hasn’t been “proved” yet > (or supported by empirical test) you’re welcome to hold that position and I > won’t argue with you. My point relates to the internal logic of your > argument. You’re saying the other observers are imaginary and then using > that to build a case against MWI giving rise to probabilities. That’s > illogical. If you want to argue against the internal logic of MWI, you have > to start by accepting what it proposes then proceeding to demonstrate how > that leads to internal inconsistency. However I can see the futility of > trying to hold you to the finer points of logic so I will bow out at this > point - as I note many here have before me. > *If you don't like my characterization of those other worlds as "imaginary", then you should certainly accept their status as "speculative", as well as the idea that these other worlds interact with each other. It's not that I oppose speculation, but given the lack of any empirical evidence of such other worlds, seems to be a strong point against their existence! But for you and others who apply Trumper-type logic to physics, the lack of empirical evidence, after 63 years, has no argumentative weight and the postulates remain "consistent". AG * > > >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each >>>>>>>> other. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" >>>>>>> means "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have >>>>>>> measured >>>>>>> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference >>>>>>> between >>>>>>> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot >>>>>>> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because >>>>>>> without >>>>>>> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint >>>>>>> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely >>>>>>> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to >>>>>>>> your MWI. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, >>>>>>> adjusting it slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> 0s in this experiment if MWI describes reality? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the >>>>>> MWI interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds >>>>>> are >>>>>> never observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no >>>>>> observations of interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM >>>>>> or >>>>>> without QM. So the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG* >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Im not assuming it. It’s part of QM that wave functions interfere with >>>>> themselves. In MWI that translates to different “worlds” interfering. >>>>> That >>>>> interference is extremely limited since it only occurs to the extent that >>>>> two branches can become identical again after having diverged. >>>>> Nonetheless >>>>> it is the basis for proposed experimental proofs of MWI. One argument >>>>> goes >>>>> that if we can make a quantum computer with a sufficiently large number >>>>> of >>>>> qubits, we can prove the existence of other worlds because the other >>>>> worlds >>>>> are the only place we can get all that information from. So, no, this is >>>>> not my assumption, it’s intrinsic to MWI. Again, if you don’t get that, >>>>> you >>>>> don’t get MWI. You can’t expect your arguments to be taken seriously if >>>>> you >>>>> don’t understand basics like this. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>>>>> . >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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