On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 7:28:14 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> *What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with >> each other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in >> the room that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero >> grounding in empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. >> AG* > > > I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If > anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my > life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy. > *It can't be disproved because it makes no verifiable predictions! AG* > It’s just that it unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any > other alternative, so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the > observed data. To say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply > false - it’s the theory that simply takes the empirical data to its > logical conclusion without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function > is the whole thing. Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere > with one another is the same as asking what the mechanism is for the > Schrödinger wave function to interfere with itself. In the dual slit > experiment it’s an observed fact. > *The SE, when solved, give us the WF, which can be decomposed into a superposition of eigenstates in some appropriate vector space. But this superposition is not unique. So in what sense does the SE give us "an observed fact"? In fact, with numerous distinct possible superpositions, the worlds of the MWI seem ill-defined. AG* > It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old view of > matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of “worlds”, it > just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the nature of > quantum states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit experiment, > even if they become large and complex. Interference ceases when two > branches of the universal quantum state diverge far enough that they > completely decohere. When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really > means “what is the mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is > just imprecise circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So the > mechanism for interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts such > interference. MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description. > *The problem, of course, is that the MWI offers no concept of the process of interference among OTHER worlds, so it's no surprise that it adds nothing to the mathematical description. AG (More at end of this confusing file.)* > >> >> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote: >> >>> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>> >>>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> johnk...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring in the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go left, in another world Alan Grayson remembers having >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go right, other than that the two worlds are absolutely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identical, so which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one was the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MWI guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deals with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other worlds in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> third trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds are the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in each of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since no ensemble >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. The worlds that arise at each trial are different in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precisely one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way and one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiment. The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiations" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the consequences of that singular difference ramifies, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causing the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different worlds generated by the original experimental >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiply. "World" really means a unique configuration of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universal wave >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function, so two worlds at different trials can't possibly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be the "same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world", and yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "same other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world. It's that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> context and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and 1 twice >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then how can we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is "WTF?" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantum experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equally likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> per the Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> effectively - two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each version >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> record an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prediction of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between 1 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that way. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *seem* to be saying that probability can't describe QM >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiments because in each world there is only one outcome >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and therefore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no "ensemble" of outcomes from which a probability can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived. That is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally wrong-headed. There are two "ensembles": the ensemble >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiverse branches at each experiment, and the ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experimenter's prior measurements, and those are enough to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appearance of randomness and to justify a probabilistic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> description despite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the objective lack of randomness. If you agree with "what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> saying all along", then you must agree that every experimenter >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in every >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world in an MWI multiverse will see a record of an apparently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> random >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. Right? And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if not why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are disjoint from each other and each records only one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. So the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world. To get an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probability, you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bird's Eye >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse >>>>>>>>>>>>>> who records a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> really all that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> required to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get a probability" are moot. If the world is as described by >>>>>>>>>>>>>> MWI, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> appearance of probability is an outcome, and probability is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> best >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possible description of how quantum experiments turn out from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> any real >>>>>>>>>>>>>> observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> disagree >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0s, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you'll need to explain why you think that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, >>>>>>>>>>>>> a NEW OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. >>>>>>>>>>>>> So the >>>>>>>>>>>>> other observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume >>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise. You >>>>>>>>>>>>> need another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each >>>>>>>>>>>> world who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series >>>>>>>>>>>> of 1s >>>>>>>>>>>> and 0s or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in >>>>>>>>>>> this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were >>>>>>>>>> true* here. This is a thought experiment in which we are >>>>>>>>>> imagining how things would go if the MWI picture were correct. So if >>>>>>>>>> you're >>>>>>>>>> admitting that, in such a world, "AG in this world measures an >>>>>>>>>> apparently >>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 0's and 1's", then you have all the preconditions >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> making probabilistic predictions from it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of >>>>>>>>>>> what AG in this world measured. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once >>>>>>>>>> you remove the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm >>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> asking you to believe in them here, only to advance an argument >>>>>>>>>> based of >>>>>>>>>> "if" MWI were true. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs >>>>>>>>>>> always measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they >>>>>>>>>> don't measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when >>>>>>>>> created for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes >>>>>>>>> because, >>>>>>>>> unless you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> connected any other "other AG". AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more >>>>>>>> misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the >>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>> a tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>> observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are >>>>>>>> ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *I'm really dumb. Ask Bruce for confirmation. I agree; in a horse >>>>>>> race there's no difference between AG observing the winner, and a MWI >>>>>>> enthusiast imagining another winner in another world. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Bruce thinks that MWI violates Born’s rule and generally hates MWI. I >>>>>> don’t think his argument about the Born rule holds water, though it’s a >>>>>> well-known one. David Deutsch’s chapter on MWI in The Beginning of >>>>>> Infinity >>>>>> presents a refutation of that argument that I personally find >>>>>> convincing. >>>>>> But Bruce does at least understand MWI. I’m sure that while he shares >>>>>> your >>>>>> disdain for it, he would not accept that your specific argument against >>>>>> is >>>>>> valid. All you are doing is asserting that the other observers are >>>>>> imaginary, which is not a valid form of argument. >>>>>> >>>>>> Each AG’s past at a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs >>>>>>>> at that trial, though each AG’s future diverges into further trees of >>>>>>>> different observed realities. The equal status of all branches means >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> your idea that AG observers on other branches are in some way >>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>> from the AG branch you happen to be on in that they only ever have one >>>>>>>> observation is just totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get >>>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *What I get is that "ex hypothesi" covers a multiple of sins, >>>>>>> including a complete disregard of experimental verification in physics. >>>>>>> AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> A hypothesis by definition has no experimental verification - yet! >>>>>> The same objection could have been made against General Relativity in >>>>>> 1915. >>>>>> But I’m not trying to convince you of MWI. Only that your argument about >>>>>> it >>>>>> not giving rise to probabilities is not valid. You can’t assume the >>>>>> hypothesis isn’t valid in your argument against it. You have to show how >>>>>> it’s logically inconsistent. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Your comparison with GR is plainly deficient if not silly. GR was >>>>> published in Nov 1915, and with it was a postulated empirical test which >>>>> the theory passed in 1920 (the bending of starlight as it passes the >>>>> Sun). >>>>> By comparison, the MWI was published around 1957, and now, after about 63 >>>>> years, there's no proposal for a test of its validity. As for the >>>>> observers being imaginary, I contend they remain in that status until >>>>> they >>>>> are experimentally detected. Have you seen one? As for Bruce's position, >>>>> I >>>>> don't know his perspective on my argument, nor do I particularly care. >>>>> But >>>>> I am pretty sure he would not agree on the absolute thematical reliance >>>>> on >>>>> mathematics as support for the Interpretation. After all, he put forth >>>>> the >>>>> horse racing model to cast grave doubt on the MWI. AG* >>>>> >>>> >>>> If your argument is that MWI is wrong because it hasn’t been “proved” >>>> yet (or supported by empirical test) you’re welcome to hold that position >>>> and I won’t argue with you. My point relates to the internal logic of your >>>> argument. You’re saying the other observers are imaginary and then using >>>> that to build a case against MWI giving rise to probabilities. That’s >>>> illogical. If you want to argue against the internal logic of MWI, you >>>> have >>>> to start by accepting what it proposes then proceeding to demonstrate how >>>> that leads to internal inconsistency. However I can see the futility of >>>> trying to hold you to the finer points of logic so I will bow out at this >>>> point - as I note many here have before me. >>>> >>> >>> *If you don't like my characterization of those other worlds as >>> "imaginary", then you should certainly accept their status as >>> "speculative", as well as the idea that these other worlds interact with >>> each other. It's not that I oppose speculation, but given the lack of any >>> empirical evidence of such other worlds, seems to be a strong point against >>> their existence! But for you and others who apply Trumper-type logic to >>> physics, the lack of empirical evidence, after 63 years, has no >>> argumentative weight and the postulates remain "consistent". AG * >>> >>>> > If you consider them imaginary I don’t have a problem with that. It’s not > the point! I’m happy to call them speculative if you like. They exist or > they don’t, right? I’m not 100% sure they do. Of course not. Neither my > opinion nor yours has any bearing on their existence or otherwise. But when > we debate whether MWI is theoretically consistent with observation, we can > disregard the question of whether other observers/worlds are speculative or > imaginary. Otherwise your argument assumes it’s premises. Effectively > you’re saying “MWI can’t be right because the other worlds are purely > imaginary”. > *The ontological status of those OTHER worlds is problem, but that's not exactly what I am saying. Rather, I am saying is that the MW hypothesis leads nowhere. It has no predictive value that I can discern. It's just a form of possibly consistent ideology. Compare it to Einstein's postulate of the invariance of the SoL. It's really quite paradoxical when you think about; that the SoL does not depend on the motion of source or recipient. But from it we get the LT and a host of verifiable predictions. SR is a scientific theory since it can be disproven. I don't see that anything verifiable is predicted by the MWI. As such, it shouldn't be regarded as a scientific theory. It can't be so considered since it offer no path for being disproven. AG * > > “There’s no ensemble from which to derive probabilities because all the > other observers are purely imaginary” is thus a circular argument. That is > my point. Please try to get over your abhorrence for MWI long enough to get > it. > *That might be a circular argument, but **I never made it. Rather, I claimed there is no interaction among the OTHER worlds, so EACH world records only ONE measurement. Consequently, no OTHER world records an ensemble and Born's rule fails in those worlds. AG * -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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