> On 18 Jun 2021, at 20:46, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > In your opinion who has offered the best theory of consciousness to date, or > who do you agree with most? Would you say you agree with them wholeheartedly > or do you find points if disagreement? > > I am seeing several related thoughts commonly expressed, but not sure which > one or which combination is right. For example: > > Hofstadter/Marchal: self-reference is key
Hofstadter is very good including on Gödel, which is rare for a phsyicist (cf Penrose!). But Hofstadter is still remains in the Aristotelian theology/metaphysics. He miss the fact that all computation are realised in arithmetic. You can see the arithmetical reality as a combinatory algebra (using n * m = phi_n(m)). If o is computable, and ô is its code, the standard model of arithmetic N satisfies Er(T(ô, x, r) & U(r)), with T being Kleene’s predicate, and U the result-extracting function, which extract the result from the code of the computation r. See Davis ‘computability and unsolvability’ chapter 4 for a purely arithmetical definition of T. With this in mind, the burden of the proof is the hand of those who add some ontological commitment to elementary arithmetic. They have to abandon Mechanism, (and thus Darwin & Co.) or explain how a Reality (be it a god or a universe) can make some computations more real than other for the universal machine emulated by those computations. But with Mechanism, that is impossible without adding something non Turing emulable in the processing of the mind. > Tononi/Tegmark: information is key > Dennett/Chalmers: function is key With mechanism information is the key too, but “information” is like “infinite”: a very fuzzy complex notion, made even more complicated by the discovery of a physical notion of information (quantum information). With Mechanism, anything physical (and thus quantum information) must be derived from the first person plural appearance lived by the universal number in arithmetic. Then the mathematics of self-reference does exactly that, and indeed the observable enforces an arithmetical interpretation of quantum logic and physics. Mechanism (the simplest hypothesis in cognitive science by default) is not yet refuted. Here Tegmark has the correct mathematicalist position, but fail to take into account the laws of machine self-reference to derive physics. Tononi, Chalmers, Dennett remains also trapped in the materialist framework, but we cannot have both Mechanism and Materialism together, as they are logically contradictory (up to some technical nuances I don’t want bother people with here). > > To me all seem potentially valid, It would be valid, if it was made clear that to solve the mind-body problem (the consciousness-matter problem) we have to derive the physical laws from the statistic on all computations in arithmetic. This works as the first evidences are that the physical reality described well the many-worlds interpretation of elementary arithmetic (as seen from the universal number personal perspective, given by the intensional variant of Gödel’s provability predicate, which is a sort of logical (assertative, true or false) equivalent to Kleene’s predicate. Hofstadter and Dennett get very close to the correct theology in their bools “Mind’s I”, especially Dennett where we can find the text where he missed the first person indeterminacy explicitly. Bruno > and perhaps all three are needed in some combination. I'm curious to hear > what other viewpoints exist or if there are other candidates for the "secret > sauce" behind consciousness I might have missed. > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUik%3Du724L6JxAKi0gq-rPfV%3DXwGd7nS2kmZ_znLd7MT1g%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUik%3Du724L6JxAKi0gq-rPfV%3DXwGd7nS2kmZ_znLd7MT1g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A71188DE-0412-4118-ACE5-5C1E0E8FD47A%40ulb.ac.be.
