On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 9:40 PM smitra <[email protected]> wrote: > On 28-04-2022 02:14, Brent Meeker wrote: > > On 4/27/2022 2:00 PM, smitra wrote: > > > >>> If you agree, and are prepared, > >>> with me, to throw out Everett, then we agree, and there is nothing > >>> > >>> more to be argued about (at least, until you present some > >>> different complete theory). > >> I'm open to the idea that QM itself may only be an approximation to > >> a more fundamental theory. The arguments in favor of no collapse are > >> strong arguments but you then do get this issue with probability > >> that you have discussed here. The disagreement with you about this > >> is that I don't see it as a fatal inconsistency that would prove > >> the MWI to be wrong. Probabilities for the different branches do not > >> have to be equal. But that doesn't mean that this looks to be a > >> rather unnatural feature of the theory. This suggests that a more > >> fundamental theory exists from which one could derive quantum > >> mechanics with its formalism involving amplitudes and the Born rule > >> as an approximation. > > > > If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's > > theorem shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. So I > > don't seen any inconsistency in simply saying they are probabilities > > of measurement results, that's Copenhagen. But if they are > > probabilities of results that implies that some things happen and > > others don't...other wise what does "probability" mean and what use is > > it as an empirical concept? That brings back the original problem of > > CI, where and how is this happening defined? > > > > If there are 3 copies of an observer and 2 experience outcome A and 1 > experiences outcome B then the probability of the observer experiencing > outcome B is 1/3. Here we should note that the personal identity of an > observer is determined by all the information in the brain and is > therefore different from the different outcomes. So, we always have > (slightly) different observers observing different things, which is not > all that different from starting with 3 different people of whom 2 > experience outcome A and 1 experiences outcome B. >
That's just branch counting, which is known not to work. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQy0WgCuwwkv6%2B-z6H5o1r3OgZRZywq%3Di0zEUXaoC-MHw%40mail.gmail.com.
