Le mer. 12 févr. 2025, 00:01, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> a écrit :
> > > > On 2/11/2025 4:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Bruce, > > I'll still give it a try to get a discussion (dumb me). > > If your response boils down to "this is nonsense" and "you’re not clever > enough," then you’re not engaging with the actual argument. The question is > not whether the Schrödinger equation explicitly encodes the Born rule—it > does not, just as it does not encode classical probability either. The > question is whether MWI can recover the Born rule without adding collapse, > and there are multiple serious approaches to doing so. > > Your claim that "MWI does not match experiments because it cannot get the > Born rule" is just an assertion. The Schrödinger equation does evolve > amplitudes, and those amplitudes do determine the structure of the > wavefunction. You dismiss measure as meaningless, yet every quantum > experiment confirms that the statistics follow . If naive branch counting > were correct, experiments would contradict the Born rule—but they do not. > That means something in MWI must account for it. > > Saying "all branches exist equally" ignores what "equally" even means in a > probabilistic context. Probability is not about "some things happen while > others don’t"—that’s a description, not an explanation. Classical > probability arises because there are more ways for some outcomes to occur > than others. In MWI, the weight of a branch is not a degree of > existence—it’s a statement about how many copies of an observer find > themselves in that outcome. > > If you have a counterargument, provide one—just dismissing the approach as > "fantasy" without addressing the core point doesn’t make your position > stronger. If you want to argue that MWI cannot recover the Born rule, then > you need to explain why all proposed derivations (Deutsch-Wallace, Zurek’s > envariance, self-locating uncertainty, etc.) are fundamentally flawed, not > just assert that they don’t count. > > Let's see you explain the derivations. Then you see the problem: there > have been many attempts and they fail because they slip in assumptions that > are equivalent to assuming the Born rule; so it would take a pages to of > email to deal with each one. Here's a couple of papers that covers most of > them > > > https://pages.jh.edu/rrynasi1/HealeySeminar/literature/Vaidman2020DerivationsOfTheBornRule.pdf > > https://faculty.up.edu/schlosshauer/publications/bornrule.pdf > > Brent > Thanks, Brent. I'll go through these papers and get back to you so we can continue the discussion. As I mentioned, I'm not strictly an advocate of MWI—I tend to lean toward computational many-minds theories, where consciousness and reality itself emerge from computation. Ideas like Bruno Marchal’s UDA or Jürgen Schmidhuber’s computational universe have been exploring these questions for decades, and measure has always been a central issue in those frameworks. With advancements in AI, I believe these hypotheses will soon become testable. I also think mind uploading will eventually be possible, and while such a proof might not be externally verifiable, it would at least be convincing from a first-person perspective—much like quantum suicide. Quentin > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/adad8e9a-3b9f-46af-a095-77e0b6ad7a89%40gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/adad8e9a-3b9f-46af-a095-77e0b6ad7a89%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kApKt8Vn1OAE%3DH_byGhefDZQ%3DL1XF3a2knu1PUufZUJq8g%40mail.gmail.com.
