Ed Greshko wrote:
I think you have no concept of public/private encryption or signing.
My concept is that if I can fool you into accepting a false public
key, I can sign packages with the matching false private key, and when
you install the first such package it may (probably will) include evil
things of some nature.
Do you disagree? Or feel that if I can get you to run one evil package
I can't put in a root kit, or rend personal information from your
systems, or otherwise attack your system?
If you feel that line of attack is not possible do tell me how your
concept of encryption and signing prevents it.
I thought you were talking "real world" as opposed to purely hypothetical.
I think it is a reasonable real world assumption that some users could
have their DNS compromised in a way that would make them pull packages
from somewhere other than the official repositories. Can any key trust
scenario where they have to obtain a new key protect against installing
modified packages? (i.e. assume that the fake key and packages come from
the same place(s) pretending to be the official repositories and mirrors).
--
Les Mikesell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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