Les Mikesell wrote: > Ed Greshko wrote: >> > >>>> I think you have no concept of public/private encryption or signing. >>>> >>> My concept is that if I can fool you into accepting a false public >>> key, I can sign packages with the matching false private key, and when >>> you install the first such package it may (probably will) include evil >>> things of some nature. >>> >>> Do you disagree? Or feel that if I can get you to run one evil package >>> I can't put in a root kit, or rend personal information from your >>> systems, or otherwise attack your system? >>> >>> If you feel that line of attack is not possible do tell me how your >>> concept of encryption and signing prevents it. >>> >> I thought you were talking "real world" as opposed to purely >> hypothetical. > > I think it is a reasonable real world assumption that some users could > have their DNS compromised in a way that would make them pull packages > from somewhere other than the official repositories. Can any key > trust scenario where they have to obtain a new key protect against > installing modified packages? (i.e. assume that the fake key and > packages come from the same place(s) pretending to be the official > repositories and mirrors). > It would be very nice if someone would fully define what they mean by the very vague term "fake key".
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