Ed Greshko wrote:
It's not easy to fool everyone. The question is whether there is a
way to start from scratch so you can't fool anyone.
And, it is even less easy to "fool" the people whose networks have
something worth stealing....
And yet it happens regularly.
Why go through the laughingly improbably scenario of attempting to
subvert the public/private key infrastructure with the potential need
need to simultaneously subvert DNS infrastructure on a single target
when there are already other much more simple attack vectors?
What's the point of having the key at all if you implicitly trust the
delivery mechanism of the RPM packages?
--
Les Mikesell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
fedora-list mailing list
fedora-list@redhat.com
To unsubscribe: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list
Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Communicate/MailingListGuidelines
