I would like to bring your attention to the AES-XTS mode - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf and to the CTR mode - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4106 - http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/ctr/ctr-spec.pdf They both are good candidates for parallelization.
On 9/15/2015 7:42 PM, Jim Starkey wrote: > On 9/15/2015 12:57 PM, Leyne, Sean wrote: >>> None of these suggest that there is an attack -- read the comments. >> They refer to a possible attack and provide links to other sites. One of >> the sites has a link to the following: >> >> http://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2002/23320530/cbc02_e02d.pdf >> >> which (at least to my scanned reading) suggest that the is a vulnerability >> to CBC mode ciphers... >> >> > No, it's actually about the pitfalls of padding when using CBC. Cipher > text stealing (CTS) is an alternative to padding. The argument against > CTS is that in some applications it may make message traffic analysis > possible because it exposes the length of the encrypted message. That > and $2.00 will get you a cup of coffee at Starbucks. > > We all know about an infinite number of monkeys recreating Shakespeare. > A real life analog is the number junior academics trying to get > published with pinpricks in solid technology. Much of it boils down to > the quite uninteresting fact that if you corrupt the ciphertext, you > corrupt the decrypted text as well. Well, duh. > > The article you referenced assumes an oracle to which you can submit > artificial "ciphertext" and it will tell you whether it conforms to a > known format after decryption. Enough probes on a packet with known > padding and you might learn something. Well, duh. > > But none of this is about streams on a virtual circuit, e.g. TCP, with > running stream or CBC ciphers. If you have an environment like UDP > where somebody could slip you a bogus packet, then you need signed > messages, but that's not the issue here. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Firebird-Devel mailing list, web interface at > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/firebird-devel > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Firebird-Devel mailing list, web interface at https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/firebird-devel
