Dear Mark.
thanks for your criticisms with relation to the "Capurro trilemma".
There are other "solutions" (or "dissolutions" / "Auflösungen" in the
Kantian sense) of the trilemma, I think, beyond the one you suggest
which concerns, if I understood you correctly, more the measurement of
information in different areas and not the phenomena themselves. In this
case mathematics is the right medium since it starts with a "separation"
("chorismos" in Greek platonic sense) of the numbers from from (natural)
phenomena ("physei onta") and can then be applied everywhere and to
everything.
This is what my colleague and friend Michael Eldred and I call "digital
ontology" in case numbers (and points) are 'in-formed' into the
electromagnetic (or future surrogates) medium. See
http://www.capurro.de/oxford.html
and Michael's: http://www.arte-fact.org/dgtlon_e.html (as well as other
works in his website)
Another (dis)solution of the trilemma is to conceive a network of
phenomena that we address with the concept(s) of information or "as"
information. This is close to what Wittgenstein calls "family
ressemblancen" ("Familienähnlichkeiten"). It is less abstract, less
Platonic, not based on "the" idea of information, even if it is a formal
or mathematical one just because in this case the difference between the
phenomena become blurred and probably more practical!
From this perspective my answers to your questions are:
1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction between
information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or
qualitative characteristics of information?
not absolutely necessary but reasonable and useful if we do not want to
oversee the phenomena at stake
2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by
the general theory of information (GTI)?
This depends on how such a "general theory" is conceived, which means if
it is more platonic or wittgensteinian or...
3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between
information and an information carrier?
in the Platonic sense this distinction is necessary and useful and
surely reasonable (or "logical") as far as 'forms' (or 'ideas') are
separated from any carrier including the (human) 'logos' itself.
You write: "information is the basic phenomenon of our world". I would
say: the basic phenomenon of our world is - our world!
best regards
Rafael
Discussion session on information theory:
*
*
*INFORMATION: MYSTERY SOLVING*
*Mark Burgin*
Professor & Visiting Scholar
Department of Mathematics
University of California at Los Angeles
http://www.math.ucla.edu/~mburgin/
mbur...@math.ucla.edu
On the one hand, information is the basic phenomenon of our world. We
live in the world where information is everywhere. All knowledge is
possible only because we receive, collect and produce information.
People discovered existence of information and now talk of information
is everywhere in our society. As Barwise and Seligman write (1997), in
recent years, information became all the rage. The reason is that
people are immersed in information, they cannot live without
information and they are information systems themselves. The whole
life is based on information processes as Loewenstein convincingly
demonstrates in his book (1999). Information has become a key concept
in sociology, political science, and the economics of the so-called
information society. Thus, to better understand life, society,
technology and many other things, we need to know what information is
and how it behaves. Debons and Horne write (1997), "if information
science is to be a science of information, then some clear
understanding of the object in question requires definition."
On the other hand, the actual nature and essence of the information,
as well as of knowledge produced and distributed by information
technology, remains abstract and actually unknown to the majority of
people. Even more, many researchers assume that the diversity of
information types and uses forms an insurmountable obstacle to
creation of a unified comprehensible information theory. For instance,
Shannon (1993) wrote: "It is hardly to be expected that a single
concept of information would satisfactorily account for the numerous
possible applications of this general field." Other researchers, such
as Goffman (1970) and Gilligan (1994), argued that the term
/information/ has been used in so many different and sometimes
incommensurable ways, forms and contexts that it is not even
worthwhile to elaborate a single conceptualization achieving general
agreement. Capurro, Fleissner, and Hofkirchner (1999) even give an
informal proof of the, so-called, /Capurro trilemma/ that implies
impossibility of a comprising concept of information. According to his
understanding, information may mean the same at all levels
(/univocity/), or something similar (/analogy/), or something
different (/equivocity/). In the first case, we lose all qualitative
differences, as for instance, when we say that e-mail and cell
reproduction are the same kind of information process. Not only the
"stuff" and the structure but also the processes in cells and computer
devices are rather different from each other. If we say the concept of
information is being used analogically, then we have to state what the
"original" meaning is. If it is the concept of information at the
human level, then we are confronted with anthropomorphisms if we use
it at a non-human level. We would say that "in some way" atoms "talk"
to each other, etc. Finally, there is equivocity, which means that
information cannot be a unifying concept any more, i.e., it cannot be
the basis for the new paradigm...
The Capurro trilemma is a valid scientific result if it is assumed
that researchers tried to elaborate a definition of information in the
traditional form. Indeed, in this case, the trilemma clearly explains
and grounds why it is impossible to achieve a comprising definition of
information.
At the same time, utilization of a new type of definition, which is
called a parametric definition, made it possible to adequately and
comprehensively define information and build its unifying theory
called the general theory of information (GTI) (Burgin, 2010).
Parametric systems (parametric curves, parametric equations,
parametric functions, etc.) have been frequently used in mathematics
and its applications for a long time. For instance, a parametric curve
in a plane is defined by two functions /f/(/t/) and /g/(/t/), while a
parametric curve in space has the following form: (/f/(/t/), /g/(/t/),
/h/(/t/)) where parameter /t/ takes values in some interval of real
numbers.
Parameters used in mathematics and science are, as a rule, only
numerical and are considered as quantities that define certain
characteristics of systems. For instance, in probability theory, the
normal distribution has the mean mand the standard deviation sas
parameters. A more general parameter, functional, is utilized for
constructing families of non-Diophantine arithmetics (Burgin, 1997; 2001).
In the case of the general theory of information (GTI), the parameter
is even more general. The parametric definition of information
utilizes a system parameter. Namely, an infological system plays the
role of a parameter that discerns different kinds of information,
e.g., social, personal, chemical, biological, genetic, or cognitive,
and combines all existing kinds and types of information in one
general concept "information".
This parametric approach provides tool for building the general theory
of information as a synthetic approach, which organizes and
encompasses all main directions in information theory (Burgin, 2010).
On the meta-axiomatic level, it is formulated as system of principles,
explaining what information is (by means of Ontological Principles)
and how to measure information (by means of Axiological Principles).
On the level of science, mathematical model of information are
constructed. One type of these models bases the mathematical stratum
of the general theory of information on category theory (Burgin,
2010a). Abstract categories allow us to develop flexible models for
information and its flow, as well as for computers, networks and
computation. Another type of models establishes functional
representation of infological systems representing information as an
operator in functional spaces. Namely, a Banach or Hilbert space
serves as the state space of an infological system. Then
transformations of infological systems are mathematically modeled by
operators in Banach/Hilbert spaces (Burgin, 2010).
Taking into account the current situation and active quest for a
unified theory of information (UTI) (Hofkirchner, 1999), it is natural
to suggest the following questions for the discussion, answers to
which may clarify the current situation in information theory and pave
the way to new achievements in this area:
1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction
between information as a phenomenon and information measures as
quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?
2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by
the general theory of information (GTI)?
3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between
information and an information carrier?
Primary source:
Burgin, M. /Theory of Information/: /Fundamentality/,/Diversity and
Unification/, New York/London/Singapore: World Scientific, 2010
Additional sources:
Burgin, M. (2003) Information Theory: A Multifaceted Model of
Information, /Entropy/, 5(2), pp. 146-160
Burgin, M. (2003a) Information: Problem, Paradoxes, and Solutions,
/Triple*C*/, v. 1(1), pp. 53-70
Burgin, M. (2010a) Information Operators in Categorical Information
Spaces, /Information/, v. 1, No.1, pp. 119-152
Capurro, R., Fleissner, P., and Hofkirchner, W. (1999) Is a Unified
Theory of Information Feasible? In /The Quest for a unified theory of
information/, Proceedings of the 2^nd International Conference on the
Foundations of Information Science, pp. 9-30
Hofkirchner, W. (Ed.) (1999) /The Quest for a Unified Theory of
Information/, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on
the Foundations of Information Science, Gordon and Breach Publ.
Marijuán, P.C. (2009) The Advancement of Information Science,
/Triple*C*/, v. 7(2), pp. 369-375
Shannon, C. E. (1993) /Collected Papers/, (N. J. A. Sloane and A. D.
Wyner, Eds) IEEE Press, New York
---------------------------------------------------------
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--
Prof.em. Dr. Rafael Capurro
Hochschule der Medien (HdM), Stuttgart, Germany
Capurro Fiek Foundation for Information Ethics
(http://www.capurro-fiek-foundation.org)
Director, Steinbeis-Transfer-Institute Information Ethics (STI-IE), Karlsruhe,
Germany (http://sti-ie.de)
Distinguished Researcher in Information Ethics, School of Information Studies,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA
President, International Center for Information Ethics (ICIE)
(http://icie.zkm.de)
Editor in Chief, International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE)
(http://www.i-r-i-e.net)
Postal Address: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
E-Mail: raf...@capurro.de
Voice: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
Homepage: www.capurro.de
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