>>>>> "OS" == Oskar Sandberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Shy nodes ("Don't talk to strangers."). I realize it's a
>> social rather than a technical solution, but it might be the
>> only one that would even help.
OS> I have a better solution: Nodes don't talk to each other at
OS> all and reside only on computers not connected to the
OS> Internet.
Well, that would be the most secure option, yes.
I was just pointing out that the best way to keep hostile elements out
of Freenet is to require that they be vetted by an existing node
runner before even starting. Also, if a hostile element has obviously
"bad" data coming through, its peers can remove it from their trust
list, and it's essentially isolated and powerless.
Example: take A, B, C and D here.
A - B - C - D
OK, every node here is shy (except maybe B, who we don't really care
about. Screw B!). Unfortunately, A and C have been a little
promiscuous with their trust and provided an entry into Freenet for a
cancer node, B. The B stands for "bad" (and not of the Mr. Bad
variety). This -will- happen, no matter how much we emphasize the
importance of trust -- look at PGP signatures for an example.
Anyways, the node operator for A notices that it's been getting cancer
data from B (and not of the breast self-examination variety). She
sends a message to B* saying that he better knock it the hell off or
she's taking him out of her trust list. B ignores her, and A drops
him.
A B - C - D
Now, D notices the cancer data too. He gives C a warning like A did
with B. C does some investigating and warns B. B fails to respond, and
C drops B from her trust list. C then tells D about having fixed the
problem, and D does -not- drop C (although he keeps a very good eye on
data coming from that direction, believe you me). Now the network
looks like this:
A B C - D
The threat of B has been isolated and removed relatively easily.
As an alternative scenario, imagine that C is a dumb, lazy or
obstinate node runner and fails to investigate the problem that D has
reported. Then B and C will stay connected, but D will sever its trust
of C. So the network looks like this now:
A B - C D
You can imagine a kind of "DumbAndEvilNet" growing out of the nucleus
of the B-C pair, where ruthless cancer nodes feed on idiot node
runners. Too bad, so sad. If you feel sorry for them, remember that
without trust lists or some other mechanism, EVERYONE is part of
DumbAndEvilNet, without much recourse to fixing the situation. One bad
apple really does spoil the whole barrel.
One thing I find a little strange is that we haven't had to deal with
cancer nodes yet. It's not like we're not wide open to the problem
right now. It kind of sucks that we have literature about cancer nodes
on the Web site and nobody been interested enough to give it a try.
~Mr. Bad
* Can be email (since they ostensibly know each other OOB) or
freenetmail. Actually, I was thinking it might be nice to make a
convention of having "mailbox/[node address]/operator" be a
freenetmail mailbox for each node's node operator.
--
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/\____/\ Mr. Bad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
\ / Pigdog Journal | http://pigdog.org/ | *Stay*Real*Bad*
| (X \x)
( ((**) "If it's not bad, don't do it.
\ <vvv> If it's not crazy, don't say it." - Ben Franklin
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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