Phil,
 
There are many solutions* to the problem as written.  By focusing on A
solution, we lose sight of alternative, perhaps equally valid solutions -
which was the point of my post. For example, d may be a complex number (say,
representing day.ergs), not the assumed integer.
 
I have just finished writing a book on modeling complex systems.  In it I
cite Dennett and Kinsbourne's** studies of perception between what they call
the Cartesian Theater model and the Multiple Drafts model.  When one views a
model, or when one views a mathematical relationship, there are resonances
caused by consonance and dissonance in the understanding of the symbology.
These resonces are the source of emergent concepts from the Multiple Drafts.
You speak of divergence.  I see this more as a process of entanglement -
leading to what Prigogine refers to as a dissipative system, or Large
Poincare System.  Until the model is realized, the temporal symmetry is not
broken and you can have "do-overs" or reversibility.  Once the model has
been physically realized, having been realized in time, it cannot be totally
reversed in configuration space-time - so-called Arrow of Time.
 
*Possibly infinitely many.
**Time and Observer http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time
<http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm> &obs.htm
 
Ken


  _____  

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of Phil Henshaw
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 8:34 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group';
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein



Ken,

To make that divergent math work, your 2 + 2 = n + d is just the kind of
dilemma with modeling the emerging divergent systems of nature that not
studying divergent sequences distracts us from.   There's a solution.  Can
you guess?

 

Phil

 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of Kenneth Lloyd
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 10:12 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein

 

Nick,

 

First, 2 + 2 does not equal 4 in base 3.  Second, equality only works in
equilibrium. What if our mathematics rule stated for every day d that
passed, 2 + 2 = n + d? The mathematics would be linearly dynamic.

 

There are subtle cultural assumptions being imbued upon mathematics that may
not hold.  Mathematics is designed to communicated the least false concept
with the least information content at some maximum entropy. Thus 2 apples +
2 oranges does not equal 4 orapples, but 1 fruit basket, yet generally 2 + 2
= 4 (in equilibrium).

 

Ken

 


  _____  


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 11:18 PM
To: Friam@redfish.com
Subject: [FRIAM] Wittgenstein

 I have put the following material in an email message because is suspect it
would fascinate some of you., and given that you are mostly people with real
jobs and given that the information comes from the guts of a 700 page book,
I suspect that many of you would be unlikely to stumble on it on your own.


 

I have, as I have said, been reading Monk's biography of W.  In it we learn
many weird things, for instance, that W. turned up at Russell's door in
Cambridge in 1911 or so, an  callow Austrian  lad, who had graduated from a
technical school and got a job making kites in Manchester.  Within a year,
Russell was ruminating  about whether he should turn his entire project in
the foundations of mathematics over to W. and do something else himself.  

 

By 1937, W. had developed enormous contempt for the whole foundationalist
project.  As luck would have it, both he and Turing were giving relevant
lectures at Cambridge and Turing came to hear W.  talk.  W. (never a
particularly nice man) took the occasion to beat on Turing about the
absurdity of the foundationalist project 

 

Here is a quote from Monk, p. 418. 

 

"Wittgensteins technique was not to reinterpret certain particular proofs,
but, rather, to redescribe the whole of mathematics in such a way that
mathematical logic would appear as the philosophical aberration he believed
it to be, and in a way that dissolved entirely the picture of mathematics as
a science which discovers facts about mathematical objects  .  I shall try
again and again, he said, to show that what is called a mathematical
discovery had much better be called a mathematical invention.  There was,
on his view, nothing for the mathematician to discover.  A proof in
mathematics does not establish the truth of a conclusion; if fixes, rather,
the meaning of certain signs. The inexorability of mathematics, therefore,
does not consist in certain knowledge of mathematical truths, but in the
fact that mathematical propositions are grammatical.  To deny, for example,
that two plus two equals four is not to disagree with a widely held view
about a matter of fact;  it is to show ignorance of the meanings of the
terms involved.  Wittgenstein presumably thought that if he could persuade
Turing  to see mathematics in this light, he could persuade anybody."  

 

Turing apparently gave up on W. a few lectures later.  

 

I have to admit the distinction that W. is making here does not move me
particularly.  It seems to me as much of a discovery to find out what is
implied by the premises of a logical system as to find out how many
electrons there are in an iron atom, and since logic is always at work
behind empirical work, I cannot get very excited about the difference.
Perhaps because I am dim witted.  

 

No response necessary. 

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, 

Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED])

 

 

 

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