Jack, Glen, Thanks for your comments. I think Jack's position is closer to what I am saying that Glen's. Although I'm not sure I understand Glen's perspective, it seems to reverse the roles of symbols and reality from how I'm understanding those terms.
Jack's position is the model theoretic framework. Whether or not you think that framework is useful, at least it offers a fairly well defined way to understand the way we are using terminology. In that framework, symbols are not reality; they are opaque. They get meaning only when mapped to a model. I hesitate to impose on you, but I've written a draft paper that discusses these issues along with emergence and reduction. It claims that computer science thinking is grounded and that philosophical thinking isn't. It attempts to express the argument using model-theoretic language -- even though I'm not a mathematician or mathematical logician. (I don't make any use of model theory results, just the terminological framework.) One of the reasons I claim we (CS) are grounded and the Philosophy isn't is because we think of reduction differently. We think of reduction constructively; they think of it, well, reductively. If any of you have the time and patience to look at the paper, I would greatly appreciate comments. It's (currently) called "Emergence, reduction, and concept grounding in philosphy and computer science.<http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/9/90/APA_Newsletter.doc> ." It's only about 5,000 words. -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:10 AM, glen e. p. ropella < g...@agent-based-modeling.com> wrote: > Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 07:58 PM: > > On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 5:14 PM, glen e. p. ropella < > > g...@agent-based-modeling.com> wrote: > >> I disagree. I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of > >> anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-). An explicit and eminent > > > > "concepts is a peculiar form of anthropocentrism" is a very interesting > > point. You raise the issue of consciousness and in particular what it > means > > to have concepts. Are you saying that having concepts is limited to > humans? > > Perhaps it is. > > No, sorry. I wasn't clear. The _emphasis_ on concepts is > anthropocentric. It's a natural consequence of our being very > reflective animals. I suspect each animal has its own degree of > reflection. An animal that acts purely "on instinct", and doesn't > engage in much self-reflection, doesn't spend a lot of time wondering > about their concepts. So, no, concepts are definitely NOT limited to > humans. But humans spend an extraordinary amount of time talking and > thinking about their concepts. > > Hence, the _emphasis_ on concepts is anthropocentric. The point being > that concepts are trivial and it's the symbols that are important. > > > If that's the case, do you expect to find symbols generated > > elsewhere in the universe through non-conscious processes? > > Yes. A symbol can occur anywhere there is some sort of "proxy", > "placeholder", or "agent" mechanism. Symbols are just special cases of > networks. Any indirect effect can be said to be symbolic. Perhaps the > example of a line of dominoes would make it clear what I mean. The > force exerted on the first domino knocks over the last domino. The > first domino can be a means to knocking over the last domino. Hence, > the first domino can be a symbol for the last domino. > > The grounding doesn't have to be made by a conscious observer. The > first domino is networked to the last domino through the objective rules > of physics. Hence, it's physical cause-effect that makes the first > domino a symbol or stand-in for the last. > > If your definition for "symbol" requires a conscious observer, then > that's fine. I'll change my usage from "symbol" to "potential symbol". > One object is a potential symbol for another when there is some network > of connections between them. > > In the context of math (and other languages), the network of connections > is spanned by the alphabet and rules of the language. When one > (simpler) formal system is embedded in another (more complex), we can > say that the simpler language is grounded in the more complex one. And > this would be true regardless of whether there are humans using the > language to map sentences to concepts. > > >>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the > >> internal) are way more important than the concepts. > >> > >> ... > >> > >> > > You say that you disagree, but what you are saying is very much what I > said > > -- but you seem to be taking it negatively > > > > We use symbols to externalize concepts. (In fact I wrote a paper to that > > effect: "If a tree casts a shadow is it telling the > > time?< > http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/6/66/If_a_tree_casts_a_shadow_is_it_telling_the_time.pdf > >") > > I agree. The concepts come before the symbols in that case. > > I'm very strongly disagreeing with that statement. (Note that I am > playing Devil's Advocate... but pretend that I am disagreeing strongly > for the moment.) The concepts do NOT ever come before the symbols. The > concepts are trivial or epiphenomenal. The symbols are what's real. > The symbols come before the concepts. In fact, the symbols cause the > concepts. > > We can see this quite well by imagining the origins of language. When > we started using our paws/fins to _point_ at things, "concepts" were > born. Prior to that, it was just symbols (or "potential symbols" -- see > above -- ... artifacts that can be used as symbols). > > > The symbols help > > us be clear and keep us honest about our concepts. I don't understand why > > you say you disagree with that. Symbols by themselves have no meaning. > I'm > > not sure if you are agreeing about that or not. And in order for > something > > to have meaning, it must have meaning in the mind of a conceptualizing > > being. > > Symbols by themselves have ALL the meaning. It's the abstract concepts > in our minds that have no meaning. > > To go back to math and science, one can sit around all day _thinking_ > and it doesn't matter at all. Thinking is totally and completely > useless without the languages into which we translate our thoughts. > Concepts are NOT important in this context. The external, objective, > language is the important thing. > > Math and science have, as a primary objective, the task of constructing > linguistic objects that at least guide the thoughts of others, if not > outright _create_ thoughts in others. Hence, the symbols (e.g. > equations) are the most important part of math. Similarly, the most > important part of science is the _stuff_ ... the beakers, telescopes, > dosage protocols, etc... everything you find in the "methods" section of > the papers. That's the most important part, not the random, bizarre, > baroque, peculiar, and particular concepts in any given scientist's mind. > > (Remember that I'm arguing this _strongly_ just to make my point clear. > What is actually true is that symbols and concepts are two aspects of > the exact same thing. Neither precedes the other. Neither is more > important than the other. I'm making the strong case for the eminence > of symbols just to make my point clear.) > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
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