Nick, I think the Peirce-James divide is there, but I think it plays out differently than you say.
I have, when in a cranky mood, asserted to my Peirce-obsessed colleagues that there is a difference between the idea "I will have cake" and "I'll have cake" because when I go to write them it happens differently. They role their eyes, and I know it is unfair, but it is honestly ambiguous in Peirce's work exactly why it is unfair. I *think* Peirce would say that he is only interested in consequences that *logically* flow from the idea in question. If I asked you to list all the logically derivable consequences of it being "true" that wafers sometimes turned into flesh at a particular point, in a particular ceremony, at no point would you list amongst those consequences that "Members of religion X are going to be so happy about this they will dance in the street." The latter would be a consequence of our *providing evidence* that transubstantiation was true, but would not be a consequence of the truth itself. The scientist-qua-scientist is similarly not, for example, in a position to tell your 4th grade grade teacher how dumb that rule about not ending sentences in prepositions is. We could examine various hypotheses about how people react to such sentences under certain circumstances, but the social convention itself is not "true" or "false". Now, James, I think, took young Peirce to heart when Peirce said he was illustrating the view *of the scientist*. James misinterpreted that to be a welcome invitation for someone to explore the views of other types of people. A teacher would be fully within his right, for example, to look me in the eyes and say "I don't give a damn what you think. In my classroom, the rule about prepositions is true." The obvious consequence would by my losing point when I write a sentence "wrong." In time we might have an entire world in which people were corrected whenever they made such *faux pas*, and in such a world there would be nothing wrong (James asserts) with saying that the rule was "true." All the consequences which logically follow from the rule hold true. While James is explaining this, that vein on Peirce's forehead throbs. If Peirce manages to say anything at all, he might point out that in 500 years language might have changed to the point where there are no such things as prepositions, or an end of a sentence, and so the idea that such a rule is "true" is clearly crazy (periods are, after all, a fairly recent invention). Alas, the problem, alluded to in my first paragraph might raise its head at some point. Who is Peirce, after all, to claim a monopoly on determining the consequences of an idea? Why can't at least some social conventions count? We know that "they are spelled differently" shouldn't count, and "experiment A will yield results B, but only under conditions C" should count, but where between them do we draw the line? And, should different people be allowed to draw the line in different places? Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Hi, John, > > Don't worry. Nobody took you for somebody who actually cared about > Charlemagne's breakfast menu. > > The point you raise about transubstantiation is I think one that neatly > divides pragmatists. "If it makes a difference in the behavior of > Christians, the assertion, 'This is the blood and body of christ' has > meaning" is I think the more Jamesian view. The more Peircean view would > be, I think, "On sober examination by humans examining their experiences > with the substances offered in communion, and the behavior of humans with > respect to the substances, we would have to conclude not only that they > were > wine and a wafer, but that everybody in the room KNEW they were was wine > and > a wafer. Who, after all, would drink raw blood that had been left out on > the counter all night? Hence, the ritual assertion of the nature of the > wine and wafer is nonsense. > > As always, I hope the Peirce experts on the list will correct me. There > are > at least two who have not spoken yet. > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison > Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2016 12:52 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Weeds of pragmatism: Subjectivity and intimacy > > Eric and Nick, > > The issue of whether Charlemagne ate eggs for breakfast is not the question > I am raising, it is only an illustration of my question. My actual question > (as I now understand it) is whether there is a reality to what did and what > did not happen in the past that is independent of what we can figure out > scientifically (which, I think, only addresses the issue of what probably > happened). This is a real question with real consequences, even though I > chose to illustrate with a question that is, admittedly, trivial. (But > which > I thought was so simple it would make my meaning clear.) > > I liked the example of transubstantiation vs consubstantiation and agree > that it was pretty silly (even though lots of Christians killed other > Christians because they disagreed). > > Wait a second, does that mean it is a real issue because it clearly had > consequences? Perhaps I should say that people were killed because they > said > they disagreed. > > --John > > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson > [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] > Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2016 1:55 PM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'; 'M. D. Bybee'; > 'John Shook' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Weeds of pragmatism: Subjectivity and intimacy > > John, > > Below, reforwarded, is the message from Eric that I so enthusiastically > endorsed. > > To be completely honest, I have never quite gotten the old Peirce / young > Peirce thing. I know it's a thing because many wise people have told me > about it. And there are areas of Peirce's thought where I think I do > detect a change . say with "abduction", which seems to begin as affirming > the consequent and end up as "inspired guessing". In that case, I like > Eric, prefer the early Peirce. > > As to the rest, I cannot speak and, as the philosopher said, "Of that about > which I cannot speak, I should remain silent." > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles > Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 9:55 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com > >; > M. D. Bybee <mikeby...@earthlink.net>; John Shook <jsh...@pragmatism.org> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Weeds of pragmatism: Subjectivity and intimacy > > Nick, > I worked hard on phrasing those parts ;- ) The first part is specifically > worded to avoid the red flags that pragmatism-talk might throw up for some > people... I don't think an argument about the psychology that flows from > pragmatism need obligate first discussing Pierce's philosophy of science. > But we can certainly do it that way if you want. > > Regarding the philosophy of science: Peirce would say that it is startling > that investigations about anything leads to convergence of agreement > amongst > serious investigators. It is borderline miraculous, he asserts, and we must > latch onto such situations with tenacity whenever we should encounter them. > We would have no reason, were we blank slates, to assume that worlds should > contain such consistencies regarding any things that might be investigated. > Indeed, were we interested in the past, we would find that the past is > dominated by earnest investigators failing utterly to create long-standing > convergence of ideas, and would have every reason to be suspicious of such > efforts moving forward. > > Knowing full well the problem of induction, Peirce also knows that past > agreement about a topic need not guarantee future agreement. Until much > time > and additional investigation has passed, there was no reason to think that > the identification of carbon as the organic element would stand the test of > time any better than agreement upon the frock coat as the proper attire for > an afternoon (but not morning or evening) stroll. Not only might we mistake > transient social convergence of ideas for actual scientific progress, we > might have not yet gotten to the crucial experiments that will knock down > our imagined structures. We might, at the least, always discover that there > was something unique about the context of our investigations. (We might > realize, for example, that the ground around Tesla's lab works differently > than ground does in most other parts of the world. See also physicists, on > the behavior of quantum-scale 'particles'.) With that in mind, Peirce > thinks > science work the opposite of the way we are taught to think about science > in > our early years. It is not that knowledge about anything you can imagine > will converge if only we can apply the scientific method to it properly. > Rather, science is the process of determining those things about which > knowledge converges under investigation. And we can never know what those > things are, except that we keep trying to do science and miraculously don't > fail at it! > Thus, Peirce would declare "science of psychology is possible" to be a > hypothesis! It is akin to the failed hypothesis that we could make a > science > about bumbs on people's heads, and it is akin to the successful hypothesis > that we could make a science of "atoms". > James (IMHO) understands the ramifications of this much better than Peirce > does. If a science of psychology is possible, then the very foundation of > western thinking about psychology must be thrown out? Why? Because the > foundation declares a priori that such a science is impossible. Whatever > combination of beliefs and logical inferences led those Big Names to > declare > such a science to be impossible, that amalgamation of ideas must be wrong. > Of most obvious note, metaphysical dualism must be wrong. The mind cannot > be > something independent of the rest of the investigatable world. > > But Peirce has been swayed too much by Kant to see how wrong Kant's views > about psychology are. Kant takes the difficulties of doing ANY science, and > acts as if they are only problems of doing psychology. It is a bum move. > > If we are not a priori dualists, then we have no reason to believe that the > problem of knowing another person's mind are any different than the problem > of knowing anything else about the world. > Best, > Eric > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall > Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu> > > On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison > <jkenni...@clarku.edu<mailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu>> wrote: > I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to > apply > it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all we > have > are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects and/or > documents really go back to a historical period under examination--but we > have some way of testing for various relations between these relics. Se > then > look for a theory of the past which best accounts for the relics that we > have. We may be able to measure how well different theories do this > accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then history. > > But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth > about > what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not be > recoverable. > > > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] > on > behalf of Nick Thompson > [nickthomp...@earthlink.net<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>] > Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 1:34 AM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Weeds of pragmatism: Subjectivity and intimacy > > Eric, > > I really like all of you said. What follows is a cavil, and will problem > interest most readers as much as the bickering among monks about how often > to wash their hair shirts. Please do not reply to this message unless you > are interested in what follows. > > ________________________________ > ONLY PERSONS UNINTERESTED IN THE WEEDIEST THICKETS OF PRAGMATISM SHOULD > READ > BELOW THIS LINE ________________________________ I think, Eric, you left > the door open for dualism, when you describe the settlement of scientific > opinion, and I need to close it behind you. You wrote: > > 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be > true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out > there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield > stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. > > > Here you imply that science is possible because there is Truth out there, > concerning which human experience is fated to converge. The real world is > somehow responsible for the convergence of opinion among scientists. Note > the subtle difference in the way you presented it only a few paragraphs > later: > > 7) And that's where we find ourselves. If a science of psychology is > possible, then de facto the subject matter of psychology is some swath of > empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of > investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process > takes its course. > > Here, you focus exclusively on the convergence of opinion, eliminating > altogether the notion of a truth outside human experience. Peirce would > say > - and perhaps James would not agree - that "that opinion upon which human > scientists are fated to agree " is exactly, and only, what is meant by the > truth. So, there is a truth "out there", beyond what you, or I, or any > other individuals might come to believe, but not a truth beyond what all > humans might come to believe. All we know now is that those opinions which > are enduring and coherent with other enduring opinions have the best > mathematical chance of being those opinions upon which we will ultimately > converge. Lets say we are in a group of geographers wandering in a > blizzard. We are completely disoriented and we have no consensus > concerning > what is the right direction home. Some propose going down hill, some up > hill, some following the slope to the right or left. What is the function > of "home" in our discussion. It is the place which, when we get there, we > will terminate the discussion of where it is. > > To all intents and purposes, this distinction is monk's work. The kind of > question only true believers in pragmatism could trouble themselves with. > For the rest of you, who need to get on with your work of building bridges > and electing politicians, you need only say to yourselves (quietly, please, > so Peirce will not hear you), "the REASON that scientists converge on some > opinion is that there is something outside the world of human experience > that beckons them toward it. Some Truth. But that is dualism, and Peirce > never would have tolerated it. > ________________________________ > SEE. I TOLD YOU THIS WOULD BORE YOU! > ________________________________ > If you want to continue the previous conversation, but don't want to go > into > the Weeds Of Pragmatism with me and Eric, I suggest you reply to an > earlier > message, not to this one. > > Nick > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > From: Friam > [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] On > Behalf Of Eric Charles > Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 8:09 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > <friam@redfish.com<mailto:friam@redfish.com>> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy > > Russ said: "Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are to > do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally > empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way so that it's > easier to do science." > Exactly! Let me try another tact. > 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds > in > which things worked differently from each other. > 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of > those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up > empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce > was > particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century chemistry.) > Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the world, i.e., > ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. (Early attempts at > the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an excellent example of > this, > leading to countless confirmatory experiments, including the correct > prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated elements.) > > 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be > true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out > there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield > stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. > > 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of > psychology > is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that context simply > cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime example. Those > big-names declared that another person's mind was not the type of thing > that > you could examine empirically, because the province of the soul did not > yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those big-names are > correct, > and minds cannot be investigated, by their very nature, we would expect > efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce the convergence-of-ideas > characteristic of successful science. > 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can > imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated > empirically, but not minds, and in which all attempts to produce a science > of the mind would fail pathetically. > 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for > centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started > thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it > went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in > either scientific circles or philosophical ones. > 7) And that's where we find ourselves. If a science of psychology is > possible, then de facto the subject matter of psychology is some swath of > empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of > investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process > takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know > without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted > science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying > bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted > sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind > seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and > empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that > progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently > uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. > If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate > with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to > study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be > something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods > and > categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of > psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. > Best, > Eric > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall > Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: > echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu><mailto: > echarles@american > .edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu>> > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott > <russ.abb...@gmail.com<mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com><mailto: > russ.abbott@gmai > l.com<mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>>> wrote: > I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role -- > except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you want. > > [NST==>"close" is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst] > > That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my sense) > on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating in the > same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is > required > (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective experiences > of one's) experiences. > > [NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you > entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using > the > same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, > feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the > amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time > than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I > am > up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater > familiarity with me than you do, I don't have any special access to me. > <==nst] > > What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? I > think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More > generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? > I'll > agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's behavior > in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be talking > about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? > > I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things > without having what I would call subjective experience. > > [NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head (or > a > steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind things, > than a robot "has" a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. <==nst] > > I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about > subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I > agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. > > By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are to > do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally > empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way so that it's > easier to do science. > > [NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the > Vital< > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_t > he_mark_of_the_vital> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is > not an necessary condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign > relation (cf Peirce). <==nst] > > I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The > upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with > that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with > not > having subjective experience. What is intentionality without subjectivity? > (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have "goal-directed" software > even though the software and the computer that runs it has no subjective > experience.) > > I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are > using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really > to attribute those processes to computers or software. > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson > <nickthomp...@earthlink.net<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net><mailto: > nickth > omp...@earthlink.net<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>>> wrote: > See Larding below: > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > From: Friam > [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com > ><mailto:f > riam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>>] On Behalf Of > Russ Abbott > Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > <friam@redfish.com<mailto:friam@redfish.com><mailto:friam@redfish.com > <mailto > :friam@redfish.com>>> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy > > Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to > defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. > In > response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the > following. > > -------------- > > Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world from > where you stand. > > I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean > distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close > you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. > [NST==>"close" is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst] > > Version 2: When the self you see projected in another 's behavior toward > you > is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. [NST==>You > will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the > notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of > equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and > thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time > we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do > around > me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, thinking > about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity with me than > you do, I don't have any special access to me. <==nst] > > If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me clearer > and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil's Advocate questions, in some > ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded that I > was nuts, and we let it go at that. > > I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" > What > does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say that > it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time must > they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if the > projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions in > the > papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) [NST==>If you insist that > a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head (or a steel cabinet, etc.), > than I can only say that if a robot does mind things, than a robot "has" a > mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. <==nst] > > -------------- > > You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your > paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, > if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the > second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by > a > self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be "the > same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that you > also > don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be > intentionality > without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what does "projected" > mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? > [NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the > Vital< > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_t > he_mark_of_the_vital> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is > not an necessary condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign > relation (cf Peirce). <==nst] > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen > <geprope...@gmail.com<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com><mailto: > gepropella@gmail.c > om<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>>> wrote: > > I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is > meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: > > 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly > > This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do > with > non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with "delicate" > attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could easily be > intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering to many of > the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every tiny > preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate by way > of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the interface > isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of whatever specific > details are appropriate to those robots. > > Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, it's > still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can become > intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are > pre-adapted > for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be inter-subjectivity, but a > kind of similarity of type. And that might be mostly or entirely genetic > rather than ontogenic. > > And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the irrelevance > of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ different > understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if we believe > the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) > > > On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! > > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that you > see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we are > being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. > > > > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in Hollywood: > cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a person, it is > like > sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the person sees. In a > sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the pain of loosing > someone. > > -- > ? glen > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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