Uh-Oh.  Dave’s on the case.  I am in DEEP trouble here. 

 

Can I assert that anything is real without implying that some things are 
“unreal” and, since we are talking about them, must be mere matters of the 
mind.    In other words, can one be a monist realist?  

 

I admit that things aren’t looking good for that position.  

 

However, for your part, inconsistency-wise in your note you trade on the notion 
of the real to challenge realism.  You assert that there is something that is 
the customs of that tribe, that there is some that those customs define as man 
and woman, and that those customs are so demanding … so real … that they 
require some men to adopt part of the role of women to serve other men.  Yes I 
am the pot calling the kettle black.

 

To be honest, I don’t know how we get out of this mess.  One solution I am 
exploring is trying to make every assertion that something is real into a three 
valued assertion including point of view.  If you come stand where I am 
standing, you will see what I see. That you can see what I see from where I 
stand is The Real.   

 

I have to admit, seeing the Wittgenstein quote unnerved me.   In his family 
resemblance model there needs only to be a network of associations but no 
constant in that network that anchors it and keeps it from drifting off.  

 

My wife got mad at me because I put my dogs on the coffee table.

Why did she get mad?

Because she says the nails scratch the table.

So, why don’t you trim the nails?

Well, I probably would have to have the whole shoe resoled.  

Why do you call your shoes “dogs”?  I thought they were quite handsome.

Well, I call them that because they have been enduring and reliable and 
trustworthy.   Best shoes I ever had. 

Dogged?

Right

Will you be sorry to see them go when they are worn out? 

Yeah, doggone it. 

And so on.  

 

I suspect that there may be a way out of this via Peirce’s sign theory, but I 
have never understood Peirce’s sign theory, try as I might.  I am not even sure 
there is a there there.  I.e., not sure that there is a real thing called 
Peirce’s Sign Theory.  

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2019 10:38 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Motives - Was Abduction

 

 

Aww Nick,

 

Surely you jest: "Something about the category is real."

 

Real? 

Real, as in dualist metaphysics?

Or merely real in the sense that there is a group of humans willing to behave 
in a manner consistent with a pretend belief that a labeled category is real?

 

About a decade back there were ten states (Oregon's courts recently struck down 
this kind of law, so I think Texas is the last remaining state where this is 
true) that presenting yourself a "software engineer" was a minor felony. This 
despite the fact that universities in those states issued hundreds if not 
thousands of diplomas reading software engineering. The activities typically 
associated with 'software engineering', primary among them, programming, were 
being practiced for nearly 20 years before the phrase"software engineering" was 
first uttered. [[LEO I, first business computer, in 1951 - software engineering 
first coined in 1968.]]

 

Transgender as a term, let alone a category, is, in the culture most of the 
FRIAM list exist within, is less than fifty-years old. [The Sioux had a 
term,"berdache," for men that dressed and behaved as women while providing 
sexual services to men observing the 7-year post-partum sex with spouse taboo. 
And there are hundreds of terms in other cultures not afflicted with the need 
to disambiguate absolutely everything.]

 

Can you offer an example of a category where membership criteria is not 
completely arbitrary and does not change over time? A category that is not not 
constantly 're-defined' in light of new information? (I am thinking here of 
biological categories like Linneaus's taxonomy of categories replaced with 
DNA-based categories, being questioned and on the verge of re-definition as we 
recognize how "muddled" DNA can be.)

 

Can a "category" ever be more than a "metaphor?"

 

When it comes to human beings; can categorization ever rise above being an 
expression of differentiation between thee and me? It seems to me that 
categorization is, mostly, little more than a disguised expression of 
xenophobia.

 

davew

 

 

 

 

On Wed, Jan 9, 2019, at 8:50 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< Ok, Marcus, I am standing my ground as a realist here: ():-[) >

 

There you go trying to claim semantics for terms in a public dictionary again.  
 (That’s an example of taking ground, like in my Go example.)    Doing so 
constrains what can even be said.   It puts the skeptic in the position of 
having to deconstruct every single term, and thus be a called terms like 
smartass 
<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kellyanne-conway-embarrasses-cnns-jim-acosta-during-heated-exchange>
  when they force the terms to be used in other contexts where the definition 
doesn’t work.   A culture itself is laden with thousands of de-facto 
definitions that steer meaning back to conventional (e.g. racist and sexist) 
expectations.   To even to begin to question these expectations requires having 
some power base, or safe space, to work from. 

 

In this case, you assert that some discussants are software engineers and that 
distinguishes them from your category.  A discussant of that (accused / 
implied) type says he is not a member of that set and that it is not even a 
credible set.  Another discussant says the activity of such a group is a skill 
and if someone lacks it, they could just as well gain it while having other 
co-equal skills too.   So there is already reason to doubt the categorization 
you are suggesting.    

 

< You cannot be against categories because you cannot TALK without categories.  
“person” and “dog” are categories. Yes, the thought they call up in me is 
inevitably wrong in some respect.  I see you with Korgies, but they are 
actually Irish Wolf Hounds.  You cannot bake a sentence without breaking some 
categories, yet the categories endure.  Something about the category is real.  >

 

Are you claiming that the concept of membership in particular biological 
species is a subjective concept?   That I am hijacking the meaning of a person 
or a dog?  Really?

 

< So, if you are not against categorization, per se, and since all categories 
do violence of one sort or another, you must be against categories that do more 
violence than they do good.  So, when I called you a gazelle, what violence did 
I do?  Would I have done better to call you a Wildebeest?  Would I be more or 
less disappointed in my expectations had I called you a Springbok?  >

 

For example, it would be better to call the young person in this story a girl.  
 That requires having the cognitive flexibility to recognize that some terms 
are dynamic or at least a matter of debate.

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/opinion/trans-teen-transition.html

 

Marcus

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