Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits of what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist American University - Adjunct Instructor <echar...@american.edu> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in > convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in > the meantime, ... > > "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald > Trump isn't funny > > https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/ > > There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread: > > 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous > juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument, > you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument." > > I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole > purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually > *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke. > > And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is > illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is > salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..." > > I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of > play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of > times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening", > and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think > monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than > pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At > least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to > *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various > types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or > 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing > competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate. > > As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's > the failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should > work toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is > we think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally > ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything. > > On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote: > > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots > of experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible" > nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor > communicated using words. > > > > Words fail! Indeed! > > > > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail. > > > > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT > render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about > an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally > ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make > a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of > Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find > my own experience of like kind. > > > > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters > thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein > you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken > in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades > and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never > expressing, in words or language, the experience itself. > > > > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a > language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or > mathematical symbols or such-based languages. > > > > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids > in ontology? > > > > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it. > > > > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the > notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe to > be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does not > follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words. > > > > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because you > are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the > "N-Word" or the "C-Word." > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
