I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen.
----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's > unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: > > Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in > any language will be a false description? > > Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting > Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way > that could happen: > > von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always one > order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce the > object. > > Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly > from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete > description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the > non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete > description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of > course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to > be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of > thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two > complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of > other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. > > By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will > fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types > conception. > > > > [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing > Automata > > On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: > > > > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to > all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, > were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, > recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's > experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently > experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as > the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my > experience. > > > > God is therefore real and extant? > > > > But wait ... > > > > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and > the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, > a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, > of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of > the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I > was raised. > > > > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is > false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact > continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the > meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the > "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) > "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the > "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or > even differentiable from each other. > > > > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns > of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain > before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and > experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of > the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual > experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the > "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, > "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " > > > > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, > possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from > "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental > context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm > the prediction of effects. > > > > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes > quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? > > > > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its > totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are > false-to-fact. > > > > ???? > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I > want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I > want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some > reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that > I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly > what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not > convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to > express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way > I will return to what I think is the broader issue. > >> > >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to > exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no > effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might > as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. > >> > >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive > the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects > is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of > is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in > principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed > adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts > can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. > >> > >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The > bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic > maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we > may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means > to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, > be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of > what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but > which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. > >> > >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove