Eric, Was it Barrier to Objects? https://scholar.harvard.edu/walterfontana/publications/barrier-objects-dynamical-systems-bounded-organizations
That was the constructivist lambda calculus paper. Bill Mckelvey extended to pi calculus On Sat, Apr 18, 2020, 12:36 AM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu> wrote: > Very good Nick. > > You see, unfortunately it appears that the reason I was put on Earth was > to be the evangelist of distributional thinking. > > In one of Walter Fontana’s early papers, which I probably saw in 1998, he > opened with a quote “Ever focused on objects, we something something > something…(some expression of loss)”. This was in his Lambda-calculus > papers about the concreteness of realized patterns that are not objects, > and their fundamental role for biology. For as much as I like it, you > would think I had remembered either the text or the source. Cannot find it > now. > > But, to your point: > > I think where the discussion happens is not about knowledge, or even > regularity, but rather how wide and how flexible a scope you are willing to > cast for what counts as an “object of knowledge”. Or even “objects in > knowledge”. > > Yes, the values taken at events can be very good things to have found out > about. They inhabit the past, and our sense of knowing them is heavily > wrapped up in both the senses of “the past” and of “knowledge". It is a > very small set of cases that are so constrained that the future may as well > be in the past. Nonetheless, the longing for it seems to be an eternal > wellspring for delusions. The Popol Vu has something about, for the > adepts, ’The future and the past are laid out before them [like symmetric > spatial dimensions]’ or something to that effect. Lakoff probably can cite > no end of metaphors by which people have mapped between the two, conceiving > of time as having the same symmetric availability as space. I expect it is > a human cognitive and cultural universal. > > But what happens when the future really is different from the past? Do we > insist that every “real” object of knowledge about the future must have a > model in only the most singular of things archived from the past? I would > say no. There are lots of cases in which the outcome delivered by an event > not yet performed is not available for knowing. How you plan to sample, > though, and features of the distribution from which you will sample, may be > very good things to know. Back in Ancient Greece, we could have argued > interminably about whether a distribution is less privileged as an “object” > of knowledge than the particular value yielded by a sample from the > distribution. > > But a lot has happened since Ancient Greece, and today we have many many > reasons to see them as deserving peers, and even to be cautious that we may > not be able to tell them apart. > > Entropy in thermodynamics is a distributional concept, yet it does very > very much of the work in the world that we used to ascribe to Newtonian > objects. > > In high-energy physics, post Gell-Mann/Wilson (so 1954 Gell-Mann and Lowe, > Wilson 1974), we have learned that everything we used to think _were_ > objects, turned out to be distributions. In hindsight this was of crucial > conceptual importance. If objects had been primary, and distributions had > been mere step-children when we could not pin things down, and that had > been _all_ there was to our science, we would have suffered an infinite > regress. Until we had a Theory of Everything, or a bottoming out of the > well of smallness, we could never know if the science was predictively > closed. But now with some understanding of phase transitions, we know that > the world could as well be distributions all the way down forever (or it > might not be; it might have a bottom), and the foundation of _any_ of the > predictive science we currently use would not be any worse in one case than > in another. They are not currently “exactly” closed, but we can put bounds > on how closed they must be. Everything is Probably Approximately Correct > (Leslie Valiant), and that was all we had ever had. It was more valuable > to learn that there are ceilings and floors in the scope of influence of > variations within distributions, than whether there is any smallest level > of objects, or even any need for a concept of “object” distinct from what > we can do with distributions. A short incantation that I use to ward off > the vampires who mis-use the word “reductionism” is that “Only with a > theory of emergence did reductionist science become well-founded." > > Biology has been conceptually impaired by too literalist a view of > objects, whether organisms for Darwin, genes for Williams and Dawkins, or > whatever other “unit of selection” you want to use as a shibboleth. People > fret over whether “viruses are alive”, having already committed that > “alive” must a predicate defined over objects, and they worry whether there > “really are” any individuals, since material is always coming and going and > there are more bacterial cells in my gut than human cells in the rest of > me. Habits of understanding that determinism can dwell in the distribution > opens a treasure chest of methods but also styles of thought, with which > all these “not-even-wrong” frets simply dissipate the same way we no longer > agonize over Zeno paradoxes. > > I have no gripe with object-oriented thinking, or event-outcome-oriented > thinking; we can do much with those, and they account for a lot of our > animal habit and our “folk physics”. But to put it up as a gold standard > is very limiting. We know lots of things that cannot be done within that > frame, but that can be done, and some things where we thought it was the > right frame and we were wrong. > > There was a source I thought of putting on the list early in this thread, > here: > https://philpapers.org/rec/ROTLOB > I have seen a copy of this, but I don’t know where to get a legally > distributable copy and this is either paywalled or not even electronic. > Some of you may have it already. > > It was when Dave gave the assertion that the rural people are actually the > careful balanced thinkers, and Frank put up an article as “another > perspective, or perhaps David will see it as confirming evidence”. > > I know probably most of you have read Heidegger, and Husserl, and Fink, > and lots of others. I had not. So I found Rota’s notes, structured by > Heidegger but drawing in many of their good parts on Husserl, helpful to > sort-of recognize what the phenomenologists are on about. > > In one of the late lectures, Rota explains the phenomenologists strong > emphasis that no mere events in our existence have any particular meaning. > There can be the sequence of lines in a proof, or a recipe for doing an > experiment. By themselves, they are just artifacts, inscribed in a library > somewhere. Even read through, or performed, they may just be motions in > nature. They become “a proof” or “evidence”, when they are experienced as > evidence-for a truth or a bit of knowledge. This concept of > “perceiving-as” or “evidence-for”, the phenomenologists claim, is simply > different in kind from any of the procedures in which it occurs. If I > understand them, they assert that the moment of experiencing something “as” > in fact defines an experiential notion of the temporal present that is > different entirely in kind from the notations of either the past or the > future. > > It is a bit of a digression from this post, but I will remark, that this > position makes the world look pretty hopeless to me, since anyone can > experience anything “as” evidence for anything. And there is a part of > reality-building in those moments for them, that nobody else outside them > has any grip on. > > But in a more positive note, and on the point of this post, I feel like it > is a Husserlian/Heideggerian shift in the occupancy of the temporal > present, to find it as normal to experience distributionally-defined > patterns as objects, as event-outcome-defined patterns. They just do > different things. > > Anyway, sorry. Big long TLDR to state the obvious. > > Eric > > > > > > > On Apr 18, 2020, at 12:36 PM, <thompnicks...@gmail.com> < > thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Dear Cranky Eric, > > When Peirce writes, countering determinism, that “everything is just about > as random as it could be” he is referring to contingencies amongst events, > I think. At the risk of quoting myself: > > Considering all the events that are going on at any one moment -- the > ticking of the clock, the whuffing of the wind in the eaves, the drip of > the faucet, the ringing of the telephone, the call from the seven-year-old > upstairs who cannot find his shoes, the clunking in the heating pipes as > the heat comes on, the distant sound of the fire engine passing the end of > the street, the entry of the cat through the pet door, the skitter of > mouse-feet behind the wainscoting -- most will be likely unrelated to the > fact that the egg timer just went off. Perhaps not all, however. Perhaps > the cat anticipates cleaning up the egg dishes. Perhaps the same stove that > is boiling the egg water has lit a fire in the chimney. But whatever > relations we might discover amongst all these events, we can find an > infinite number of other temporally contiguous events that are not related > to them. Thus, as Peirce says, events are just about as random as anybody > could care them to be. > > But – and here is the main point – to the extent that events are related, > these relations would be useful. They would, for instance allow the cat to > predict that there would be food in a few moments, the mouse to predict > that the cat has entered the house, and you to predict, among other things, > that your eggs are ready. For this reason, on Peirce’s account, organisms > are designed to ferret out these few regularities and take action based on > them. This, and only this, is the reason that the world appears regular. > So, I stipulate the ubiquity of randomness. > > What I am less certain about is whether randomness should – note the use > of modal language – should ever be offered as the reason for anything. If > we regard science as an extension of this animal propensity for ferreting > out regularities, then to declare that anything occurred because it was > random is a kind of copping out. It is like ferrets giving up on the idea > that borrows contain prairie dogs. That’s just NOT what we ferrets DO! > It’s certainly not what we do if we ever expect to catch any prairie dogs. > > > Oh, and: The problem is not that I need a religion; the problem is I > already HAVE one and I don’t know what it is. > > Oh, and #2. “Enjoy these conversations” is, for me, vastly understate the > case. They are literally keeping me alive, particularly these days, when, > it appears, for the first time in 50 years, I won’t have a garden in the > Mosquito Infested Swamp. > > CrankyNick > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > thompnicks...@gmail.com > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *David Eric Smith > *Sent:* Friday, April 17, 2020 6:08 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations > > Cranky Nick, you really need to join a church. > > > Now, what most people wanted to know from Nate Silver is whether Clinton > was going to win the election. Nate constantly says that making such > predictions is, strictly speaking, not his job. As long as what happens > falls within the error of his prediction, he feels justified in having made > it. He will say things like, "actually we were right." I would prefer > him to say, "Actually we were wrong, *but I would make the same > prediction under the same circumstances the next time.” *In other words, > the right procedure produced, on this occasion, a wrong result. > > > The thing you say here that “most people want to know” of course, you know > full-well, doesn’t exist. So you need to join a church because they are > the ones who will tell you they are giving it to you, when at least you, > and maybe even they, know it doesn’t exist. > > What Nate gave you is a sample estimator for a probability distribution > (each of those words means something specific; they are not an evocative > construction within common vernacular). He didn’t even give you the > “actual” probability distribution for the underlying process, because, as > Pierce saith both rightly and interestingly, the “actual” probability > distribution is something we don’t have access to. What we have, and all > we ever have, are sample estimators to probability distributions. Nate’s > estimator includes biases. Some of these, like method biases in polling, > are things he can also try to estimate and correct for. Others, like > systematic biases in the relation between sampling and underlying > correlations — as in the really interesting and exactly relevant link > Marcus sent — are things Nate (et al. of course) haven’t identified. The > acknowledgement of those, too, was in the advertising. > > So, the sample estimator for a probability distribution, with known biases > described and correction methods listed, and unknown biases acknowledged, > is what Nate gave you, and in the only sense that “right” can be applied — > which is an accurate rendering of methods — it was right. > > If someone gives me a revolver with two filled chambers, and in the > afterlife I protest that I didn’t pull one of the empty ones, well, we know > what we think of my judgment, and we don’t spend a lot of time on this list > putting that out as a philosophical problem. > > > I don’t actually write this note to be nasty -- because of course I know > you know all this as well as your interlocutors do — but to be colorful to > make a different point. It has to do with liking the fact that learning is > not most interesting when one accretes an acquaintance with new facts, but > when one realizes new ways of using words are necessary as a vehicle to > taking on new frames of mind. > > The claim that “right/wrong” are only allowed to be applied to certain and > definite values, and are _not_ allowed to be applied to more composite > deliverables such as sample estimators for probability distributions, is > where terminology nazis close off conversation by insisting on a language > in which terms that are needed to express the pertinent ideas are > disallowed. We see it in every field. Stanley Miller ruled out metabolism > as being a concept that could be presaged in geochemistry by “defining” > metabolism as chemical reactions catalyzed by enzymes within a cell. > Historical linguists did it for a century insisting that absolutely regular > sound correspondences (none of which ever actually exist) were the only > signatures of genetic relatedness among languages, and probabilistic > fingerprints had no interpretation. The Stochastic Thermodynamics cabal do > it when the say that thermodynamic laws for non-equilibrium processes that > don’t come from Boltzmann/Gibbs free energies have “no physical meaning”, > thereby scoping “physical” to refer to equilibrium thermodynamic states, > the narrowest of special cases. > > And Dave did it in his post of long questions some weeks ago — which at > the time I didn’t want to respond to because my responses are sort fo dull > and unhelpful — when he said most physicists are realists but quantum > physicists are anti-realists. What the quantum physicists say is that the > old classical assumption that “observables” and “states” are the same kind > of thing turned out to be wrong. They are different kinds fo things. > States can be real, and can even evolve deterministically, but may not be > associated with any definite values for observables, because observables, > when formalized and fully expressed through the formalization, are > different kinds of things (they are a kind of operator, which one can think > of as a rule for making a mapping) than states or than particular numbers > that the observables can yield as their output from some states. So to > claim that the quantum physicists are anti-realists is to scope “real” as > coextensive with interpreting “observables” not as operators but as simple > definite numbers. That is, to adopt the frame of classical mechanics. So > Dave’s “anti-realist” actually means > “anti-classical-mechanics-assumptionist”, which of course is exactly right, > but never the scope I would use for the word “real”. Anyone who insists > that is the only way it is allowed to be used has just dictated rules for > conversation in which there is no way I can engage and still work for > sense-making. > > Anyway, the whole tenor of the discussion is fine. I enjoy all the parts > of it, including your stubbornness for its own sake. Wittgenstein was > reportedly impossible in that way, though I forget the reference and > source. Some fellow-philosopher complaining that “it was impossible to get > Wittgenstein to admit there was not a rhinoceros in the room." > > Eric > > > > > > > That’s all, > > Nick > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > thompnicks...@gmail.com > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 4:45 PM > To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations > > Again, though, you seem to be allowing your metaphor to run away with you. > When someone who does quantitative modeling says "expected value", they do > NOT mean what the layperson means when they say "I expect X". We can pick > apart your statement and accuse you of an ambiguity fallacy if we want. > > Your first use of "expected value" relies on the jargonal definition. Then > you switcheroo on us and your 2nd use of "I expect that" relies on the > vernacular concept. Up to this point, we can give you the benefit of the > doubt. We all munge things a bit when talking/thinking. But *then*, on your > 3rd use of "what he expected", you explicitly switched the meaning from > jargon to vernacular. > > I don't think you do this on purpose. (If you do, I laud you as a fellow > troll! >8^) I think it's an artifact of your being a "metaphorical > thinker", whatever that means. > > FWIW, I only had to pull a little on the Sabine Hossenfelder thread to > find that she tweeted this, as well: > > Embracing the Uncertainties > While the unknowns about coronavirus abound, a new study finds we ‘can > handle the truth.’ > > https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/science/coronavirus-uncertainty-scientific-trust.html?smid=tw-share > > The effects of communicating uncertainty on public trust in facts and > numbers https://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7672.abstract > > If they're right, then the right-leaning local media might band together > with the clickbaity national media and give it to us straight ... or they > might simply skew their "expected value" reporting to continue serving > their politics. Pfft. > > > On 4/17/20 2:58 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: > > If expert X tells me that the expected value of variable A is K, then, > > when it's all over and the data are in, and A did not equal K, I expect > that expert to admit that /what he expected did not happen./ Only after > that confession has been made, should a conversation begin about whether > the expert’s prediction process was faulted or not. It seems to me that > the shaded area is part of that second conversation. > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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