I don’t know, Steve, I looked at that one, and at all the early ones I could find, and in quick skimming I didn’t find what I thought was a quote in the epigraph position. I am beginning to wonder if it was a draft of something that never got published in the manuscript version I saw. A pity if so.
I also looked for poetic quotes on “Ever focused on objects”, but the only google hits I got were a bunch of studies on autistic kids. Poetic in a different sense, but now what I was looking for. Also, it turns out I put in a dud link to Rota’s phenomenology lectures; apologies. A link that at least goes to a first page is here: https://www.pdcnet.org/nyppp/content/nyppp_2008_0008_0225_0319 <https://www.pdcnet.org/nyppp/content/nyppp_2008_0008_0225_0319> You are up either very early, or very late. Best, E > On Apr 18, 2020, at 3:55 PM, Stephen Guerin <stephen.gue...@simtable.com> > wrote: > > Eric, > > Was it Barrier to Objects? > https://scholar.harvard.edu/walterfontana/publications/barrier-objects-dynamical-systems-bounded-organizations > > <https://scholar.harvard.edu/walterfontana/publications/barrier-objects-dynamical-systems-bounded-organizations> > > That was the constructivist lambda calculus paper. Bill Mckelvey extended to > pi calculus > > > > On Sat, Apr 18, 2020, 12:36 AM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu > <mailto:desm...@santafe.edu>> wrote: > Very good Nick. > > You see, unfortunately it appears that the reason I was put on Earth was to > be the evangelist of distributional thinking. > > In one of Walter Fontana’s early papers, which I probably saw in 1998, he > opened with a quote “Ever focused on objects, we something something > something…(some expression of loss)”. This was in his Lambda-calculus papers > about the concreteness of realized patterns that are not objects, and their > fundamental role for biology. For as much as I like it, you would think I > had remembered either the text or the source. Cannot find it now. > > But, to your point: > > I think where the discussion happens is not about knowledge, or even > regularity, but rather how wide and how flexible a scope you are willing to > cast for what counts as an “object of knowledge”. Or even “objects in > knowledge”. > > Yes, the values taken at events can be very good things to have found out > about. They inhabit the past, and our sense of knowing them is heavily > wrapped up in both the senses of “the past” and of “knowledge". It is a very > small set of cases that are so constrained that the future may as well be in > the past. Nonetheless, the longing for it seems to be an eternal wellspring > for delusions. The Popol Vu has something about, for the adepts, ’The future > and the past are laid out before them [like symmetric spatial dimensions]’ or > something to that effect. Lakoff probably can cite no end of metaphors by > which people have mapped between the two, conceiving of time as having the > same symmetric availability as space. I expect it is a human cognitive and > cultural universal. > > But what happens when the future really is different from the past? Do we > insist that every “real” object of knowledge about the future must have a > model in only the most singular of things archived from the past? I would > say no. There are lots of cases in which the outcome delivered by an event > not yet performed is not available for knowing. How you plan to sample, > though, and features of the distribution from which you will sample, may be > very good things to know. Back in Ancient Greece, we could have argued > interminably about whether a distribution is less privileged as an “object” > of knowledge than the particular value yielded by a sample from the > distribution. > > But a lot has happened since Ancient Greece, and today we have many many > reasons to see them as deserving peers, and even to be cautious that we may > not be able to tell them apart. > > Entropy in thermodynamics is a distributional concept, yet it does very very > much of the work in the world that we used to ascribe to Newtonian objects. > > In high-energy physics, post Gell-Mann/Wilson (so 1954 Gell-Mann and Lowe, > Wilson 1974), we have learned that everything we used to think _were_ > objects, turned out to be distributions. In hindsight this was of crucial > conceptual importance. If objects had been primary, and distributions had > been mere step-children when we could not pin things down, and that had been > _all_ there was to our science, we would have suffered an infinite regress. > Until we had a Theory of Everything, or a bottoming out of the well of > smallness, we could never know if the science was predictively closed. But > now with some understanding of phase transitions, we know that the world > could as well be distributions all the way down forever (or it might not be; > it might have a bottom), and the foundation of _any_ of the predictive > science we currently use would not be any worse in one case than in another. > They are not currently “exactly” closed, but we can put bounds on how closed > they must be. Everything is Probably Approximately Correct (Leslie Valiant), > and that was all we had ever had. It was more valuable to learn that there > are ceilings and floors in the scope of influence of variations within > distributions, than whether there is any smallest level of objects, or even > any need for a concept of “object” distinct from what we can do with > distributions. A short incantation that I use to ward off the vampires who > mis-use the word “reductionism” is that “Only with a theory of emergence did > reductionist science become well-founded." > > Biology has been conceptually impaired by too literalist a view of objects, > whether organisms for Darwin, genes for Williams and Dawkins, or whatever > other “unit of selection” you want to use as a shibboleth. People fret over > whether “viruses are alive”, having already committed that “alive” must a > predicate defined over objects, and they worry whether there “really are” any > individuals, since material is always coming and going and there are more > bacterial cells in my gut than human cells in the rest of me. Habits of > understanding that determinism can dwell in the distribution opens a treasure > chest of methods but also styles of thought, with which all these > “not-even-wrong” frets simply dissipate the same way we no longer agonize > over Zeno paradoxes. > > I have no gripe with object-oriented thinking, or event-outcome-oriented > thinking; we can do much with those, and they account for a lot of our animal > habit and our “folk physics”. But to put it up as a gold standard is very > limiting. We know lots of things that cannot be done within that frame, but > that can be done, and some things where we thought it was the right frame and > we were wrong. > > There was a source I thought of putting on the list early in this thread, > here: > https://philpapers.org/rec/ROTLOB <https://philpapers.org/rec/ROTLOB> > I have seen a copy of this, but I don’t know where to get a legally > distributable copy and this is either paywalled or not even electronic. Some > of you may have it already. > > It was when Dave gave the assertion that the rural people are actually the > careful balanced thinkers, and Frank put up an article as “another > perspective, or perhaps David will see it as confirming evidence”. > > I know probably most of you have read Heidegger, and Husserl, and Fink, and > lots of others. I had not. So I found Rota’s notes, structured by Heidegger > but drawing in many of their good parts on Husserl, helpful to sort-of > recognize what the phenomenologists are on about. > > In one of the late lectures, Rota explains the phenomenologists strong > emphasis that no mere events in our existence have any particular meaning. > There can be the sequence of lines in a proof, or a recipe for doing an > experiment. By themselves, they are just artifacts, inscribed in a library > somewhere. Even read through, or performed, they may just be motions in > nature. They become “a proof” or “evidence”, when they are experienced as > evidence-for a truth or a bit of knowledge. This concept of “perceiving-as” > or “evidence-for”, the phenomenologists claim, is simply different in kind > from any of the procedures in which it occurs. If I understand them, they > assert that the moment of experiencing something “as” in fact defines an > experiential notion of the temporal present that is different entirely in > kind from the notations of either the past or the future. > > It is a bit of a digression from this post, but I will remark, that this > position makes the world look pretty hopeless to me, since anyone can > experience anything “as” evidence for anything. And there is a part of > reality-building in those moments for them, that nobody else outside them has > any grip on. > > But in a more positive note, and on the point of this post, I feel like it is > a Husserlian/Heideggerian shift in the occupancy of the temporal present, to > find it as normal to experience distributionally-defined patterns as objects, > as event-outcome-defined patterns. They just do different things. > > Anyway, sorry. Big long TLDR to state the obvious. > > Eric > > > > > > >> On Apr 18, 2020, at 12:36 PM, <thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>> <thompnicks...@gmail.com >> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Dear Cranky Eric, >> >> When Peirce writes, countering determinism, that “everything is just about >> as random as it could be” he is referring to contingencies amongst events, I >> think. At the risk of quoting myself: >> >> Considering all the events that are going on at any one moment -- the >> ticking of the clock, the whuffing of the wind in the eaves, the drip of the >> faucet, the ringing of the telephone, the call from the seven-year-old >> upstairs who cannot find his shoes, the clunking in the heating pipes as the >> heat comes on, the distant sound of the fire engine passing the end of the >> street, the entry of the cat through the pet door, the skitter of mouse-feet >> behind the wainscoting -- most will be likely unrelated to the fact that the >> egg timer just went off. Perhaps not all, however. Perhaps the cat >> anticipates cleaning up the egg dishes. Perhaps the same stove that is >> boiling the egg water has lit a fire in the chimney. But whatever relations >> we might discover amongst all these events, we can find an infinite number >> of other temporally contiguous events that are not related to them. Thus, as >> Peirce says, events are just about as random as anybody could care them to >> be. >> >> But – and here is the main point – to the extent that events are related, >> these relations would be useful. They would, for instance allow the cat to >> predict that there would be food in a few moments, the mouse to predict that >> the cat has entered the house, and you to predict, among other things, that >> your eggs are ready. For this reason, on Peirce’s account, organisms are >> designed to ferret out these few regularities and take action based on them. >> This, and only this, is the reason that the world appears regular. >> So, I stipulate the ubiquity of randomness. >> >> What I am less certain about is whether randomness should – note the use of >> modal language – should ever be offered as the reason for anything. If we >> regard science as an extension of this animal propensity for ferreting out >> regularities, then to declare that anything occurred because it was random >> is a kind of copping out. It is like ferrets giving up on the idea that >> borrows contain prairie dogs. That’s just NOT what we ferrets DO! It’s >> certainly not what we do if we ever expect to catch any prairie dogs. >> >> Oh, and: The problem is not that I need a religion; the problem is I >> already HAVE one and I don’t know what it is. >> >> Oh, and #2. “Enjoy these conversations” is, for me, vastly understate the >> case. They are literally keeping me alive, particularly these days, when, >> it appears, for the first time in 50 years, I won’t have a garden in the >> Mosquito Infested Swamp. >> >> CrankyNick >> Nicholas Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> Clark University >> thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> >> >> >> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> >> On Behalf Of David Eric Smith >> Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 6:08 PM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com >> <mailto:friam@redfish.com>> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations >> >> Cranky Nick, you really need to join a church. >> >>> Now, what most people wanted to know from Nate Silver is whether Clinton >>> was going to win the election. Nate constantly says that making such >>> predictions is, strictly speaking, not his job. As long as what happens >>> falls within the error of his prediction, he feels justified in having made >>> it. He will say things like, "actually we were right." I would prefer >>> him to say, "Actually we were wrong, but I would make the same prediction >>> under the same circumstances the next time.” In other words, the right >>> procedure produced, on this occasion, a wrong result. >> >> The thing you say here that “most people want to know” of course, you know >> full-well, doesn’t exist. So you need to join a church because they are the >> ones who will tell you they are giving it to you, when at least you, and >> maybe even they, know it doesn’t exist. >> >> What Nate gave you is a sample estimator for a probability distribution >> (each of those words means something specific; they are not an evocative >> construction within common vernacular). He didn’t even give you the >> “actual” probability distribution for the underlying process, because, as >> Pierce saith both rightly and interestingly, the “actual” probability >> distribution is something we don’t have access to. What we have, and all we >> ever have, are sample estimators to probability distributions. Nate’s >> estimator includes biases. Some of these, like method biases in polling, >> are things he can also try to estimate and correct for. Others, like >> systematic biases in the relation between sampling and underlying >> correlations — as in the really interesting and exactly relevant link Marcus >> sent — are things Nate (et al. of course) haven’t identified. The >> acknowledgement of those, too, was in the advertising. >> >> So, the sample estimator for a probability distribution, with known biases >> described and correction methods listed, and unknown biases acknowledged, is >> what Nate gave you, and in the only sense that “right” can be applied — >> which is an accurate rendering of methods — it was right. >> >> If someone gives me a revolver with two filled chambers, and in the >> afterlife I protest that I didn’t pull one of the empty ones, well, we know >> what we think of my judgment, and we don’t spend a lot of time on this list >> putting that out as a philosophical problem. >> >> >> I don’t actually write this note to be nasty -- because of course I know you >> know all this as well as your interlocutors do — but to be colorful to make >> a different point. It has to do with liking the fact that learning is not >> most interesting when one accretes an acquaintance with new facts, but when >> one realizes new ways of using words are necessary as a vehicle to taking on >> new frames of mind. >> >> The claim that “right/wrong” are only allowed to be applied to certain and >> definite values, and are _not_ allowed to be applied to more composite >> deliverables such as sample estimators for probability distributions, is >> where terminology nazis close off conversation by insisting on a language in >> which terms that are needed to express the pertinent ideas are disallowed. >> We see it in every field. Stanley Miller ruled out metabolism as being a >> concept that could be presaged in geochemistry by “defining” metabolism as >> chemical reactions catalyzed by enzymes within a cell. Historical linguists >> did it for a century insisting that absolutely regular sound correspondences >> (none of which ever actually exist) were the only signatures of genetic >> relatedness among languages, and probabilistic fingerprints had no >> interpretation. The Stochastic Thermodynamics cabal do it when the say that >> thermodynamic laws for non-equilibrium processes that don’t come from >> Boltzmann/Gibbs free energies have “no physical meaning”, thereby scoping >> “physical” to refer to equilibrium thermodynamic states, the narrowest of >> special cases. >> >> And Dave did it in his post of long questions some weeks ago — which at the >> time I didn’t want to respond to because my responses are sort fo dull and >> unhelpful — when he said most physicists are realists but quantum physicists >> are anti-realists. What the quantum physicists say is that the old >> classical assumption that “observables” and “states” are the same kind of >> thing turned out to be wrong. They are different kinds fo things. States >> can be real, and can even evolve deterministically, but may not be >> associated with any definite values for observables, because observables, >> when formalized and fully expressed through the formalization, are different >> kinds of things (they are a kind of operator, which one can think of as a >> rule for making a mapping) than states or than particular numbers that the >> observables can yield as their output from some states. So to claim that >> the quantum physicists are anti-realists is to scope “real” as coextensive >> with interpreting “observables” not as operators but as simple definite >> numbers. That is, to adopt the frame of classical mechanics. So Dave’s >> “anti-realist” actually means “anti-classical-mechanics-assumptionist”, >> which of course is exactly right, but never the scope I would use for the >> word “real”. Anyone who insists that is the only way it is allowed to be >> used has just dictated rules for conversation in which there is no way I can >> engage and still work for sense-making. >> >> Anyway, the whole tenor of the discussion is fine. I enjoy all the parts of >> it, including your stubbornness for its own sake. Wittgenstein was >> reportedly impossible in that way, though I forget the reference and source. >> Some fellow-philosopher complaining that “it was impossible to get >> Wittgenstein to admit there was not a rhinoceros in the room." >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> That’s all, >>> >>> Nick >>> >>> Nicholas Thompson >>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >>> Clark University >>> thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> >>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >>> <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> >>> On Behalf Of u?l? ? >>> Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 4:45 PM >>> To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>> >>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations >>> >>> Again, though, you seem to be allowing your metaphor to run away with you. >>> When someone who does quantitative modeling says "expected value", they do >>> NOT mean what the layperson means when they say "I expect X". We can pick >>> apart your statement and accuse you of an ambiguity fallacy if we want. >>> >>> Your first use of "expected value" relies on the jargonal definition. Then >>> you switcheroo on us and your 2nd use of "I expect that" relies on the >>> vernacular concept. Up to this point, we can give you the benefit of the >>> doubt. We all munge things a bit when talking/thinking. But *then*, on your >>> 3rd use of "what he expected", you explicitly switched the meaning from >>> jargon to vernacular. >>> >>> I don't think you do this on purpose. (If you do, I laud you as a fellow >>> troll! >8^) I think it's an artifact of your being a "metaphorical >>> thinker", whatever that means. >>> >>> FWIW, I only had to pull a little on the Sabine Hossenfelder thread to find >>> that she tweeted this, as well: >>> >>> Embracing the Uncertainties >>> While the unknowns about coronavirus abound, a new study finds we ‘can >>> handle the truth.’ >>> https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/science/coronavirus-uncertainty-scientific-trust.html?smid=tw-share >>> >>> <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/science/coronavirus-uncertainty-scientific-trust.html?smid=tw-share> >>> >>> The effects of communicating uncertainty on public trust in facts and >>> numbers https://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7672.abstract >>> <https://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7672.abstract> >>> >>> If they're right, then the right-leaning local media might band together >>> with the clickbaity national media and give it to us straight ... or they >>> might simply skew their "expected value" reporting to continue serving >>> their politics. Pfft. >>> >>> >>> On 4/17/20 2:58 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> > If expert X tells me that the expected value of variable A is K, then, >>> > when it's all over and the data are in, and A did not equal K, I expect >>> > that expert to admit that /what he expected did not happen./ Only after >>> > that confession has been made, should a conversation begin about whether >>> > the expert’s prediction process was faulted or not. It seems to me that >>> > the shaded area is part of that second conversation. >>> >>> -- >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >>> .... . ... >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> <http://bit.ly/virtualfriam> unsubscribe >>> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> >>> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >>> .... . ... >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> <http://bit.ly/virtualfriam> >>> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >> .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> <http://bit.ly/virtualfriam> >> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > <http://bit.ly/virtualfriam> > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
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