Oops, weird slip. Meant Bill Macready On Sat, Apr 18, 2020, 12:55 AM Stephen Guerin <stephen.gue...@simtable.com> wrote:
> Eric, > > Was it Barrier to Objects? > > https://scholar.harvard.edu/walterfontana/publications/barrier-objects-dynamical-systems-bounded-organizations > > That was the constructivist lambda calculus paper. Bill Mckelvey extended > to pi calculus > > > > On Sat, Apr 18, 2020, 12:36 AM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu> > wrote: > >> Very good Nick. >> >> You see, unfortunately it appears that the reason I was put on Earth was >> to be the evangelist of distributional thinking. >> >> In one of Walter Fontana’s early papers, which I probably saw in 1998, he >> opened with a quote “Ever focused on objects, we something something >> something…(some expression of loss)”. This was in his Lambda-calculus >> papers about the concreteness of realized patterns that are not objects, >> and their fundamental role for biology. For as much as I like it, you >> would think I had remembered either the text or the source. Cannot find it >> now. >> >> But, to your point: >> >> I think where the discussion happens is not about knowledge, or even >> regularity, but rather how wide and how flexible a scope you are willing to >> cast for what counts as an “object of knowledge”. Or even “objects in >> knowledge”. >> >> Yes, the values taken at events can be very good things to have found out >> about. They inhabit the past, and our sense of knowing them is heavily >> wrapped up in both the senses of “the past” and of “knowledge". It is a >> very small set of cases that are so constrained that the future may as well >> be in the past. Nonetheless, the longing for it seems to be an eternal >> wellspring for delusions. The Popol Vu has something about, for the >> adepts, ’The future and the past are laid out before them [like symmetric >> spatial dimensions]’ or something to that effect. Lakoff probably can cite >> no end of metaphors by which people have mapped between the two, conceiving >> of time as having the same symmetric availability as space. I expect it is >> a human cognitive and cultural universal. >> >> But what happens when the future really is different from the past? Do >> we insist that every “real” object of knowledge about the future must have >> a model in only the most singular of things archived from the past? I >> would say no. There are lots of cases in which the outcome delivered by an >> event not yet performed is not available for knowing. How you plan to >> sample, though, and features of the distribution from which you will >> sample, may be very good things to know. Back in Ancient Greece, we could >> have argued interminably about whether a distribution is less privileged as >> an “object” of knowledge than the particular value yielded by a sample from >> the distribution. >> >> But a lot has happened since Ancient Greece, and today we have many many >> reasons to see them as deserving peers, and even to be cautious that we may >> not be able to tell them apart. >> >> Entropy in thermodynamics is a distributional concept, yet it does very >> very much of the work in the world that we used to ascribe to Newtonian >> objects. >> >> In high-energy physics, post Gell-Mann/Wilson (so 1954 Gell-Mann and >> Lowe, Wilson 1974), we have learned that everything we used to think _were_ >> objects, turned out to be distributions. In hindsight this was of crucial >> conceptual importance. If objects had been primary, and distributions had >> been mere step-children when we could not pin things down, and that had >> been _all_ there was to our science, we would have suffered an infinite >> regress. Until we had a Theory of Everything, or a bottoming out of the >> well of smallness, we could never know if the science was predictively >> closed. But now with some understanding of phase transitions, we know that >> the world could as well be distributions all the way down forever (or it >> might not be; it might have a bottom), and the foundation of _any_ of the >> predictive science we currently use would not be any worse in one case than >> in another. They are not currently “exactly” closed, but we can put bounds >> on how closed they must be. Everything is Probably Approximately Correct >> (Leslie Valiant), and that was all we had ever had. It was more valuable >> to learn that there are ceilings and floors in the scope of influence of >> variations within distributions, than whether there is any smallest level >> of objects, or even any need for a concept of “object” distinct from what >> we can do with distributions. A short incantation that I use to ward off >> the vampires who mis-use the word “reductionism” is that “Only with a >> theory of emergence did reductionist science become well-founded." >> >> Biology has been conceptually impaired by too literalist a view of >> objects, whether organisms for Darwin, genes for Williams and Dawkins, or >> whatever other “unit of selection” you want to use as a shibboleth. People >> fret over whether “viruses are alive”, having already committed that >> “alive” must a predicate defined over objects, and they worry whether there >> “really are” any individuals, since material is always coming and going and >> there are more bacterial cells in my gut than human cells in the rest of >> me. Habits of understanding that determinism can dwell in the distribution >> opens a treasure chest of methods but also styles of thought, with which >> all these “not-even-wrong” frets simply dissipate the same way we no longer >> agonize over Zeno paradoxes. >> >> I have no gripe with object-oriented thinking, or event-outcome-oriented >> thinking; we can do much with those, and they account for a lot of our >> animal habit and our “folk physics”. But to put it up as a gold standard >> is very limiting. We know lots of things that cannot be done within that >> frame, but that can be done, and some things where we thought it was the >> right frame and we were wrong. >> >> There was a source I thought of putting on the list early in this thread, >> here: >> https://philpapers.org/rec/ROTLOB >> I have seen a copy of this, but I don’t know where to get a legally >> distributable copy and this is either paywalled or not even electronic. >> Some of you may have it already. >> >> It was when Dave gave the assertion that the rural people are actually >> the careful balanced thinkers, and Frank put up an article as “another >> perspective, or perhaps David will see it as confirming evidence”. >> >> I know probably most of you have read Heidegger, and Husserl, and Fink, >> and lots of others. I had not. So I found Rota’s notes, structured by >> Heidegger but drawing in many of their good parts on Husserl, helpful to >> sort-of recognize what the phenomenologists are on about. >> >> In one of the late lectures, Rota explains the phenomenologists strong >> emphasis that no mere events in our existence have any particular meaning. >> There can be the sequence of lines in a proof, or a recipe for doing an >> experiment. By themselves, they are just artifacts, inscribed in a library >> somewhere. Even read through, or performed, they may just be motions in >> nature. They become “a proof” or “evidence”, when they are experienced as >> evidence-for a truth or a bit of knowledge. This concept of >> “perceiving-as” or “evidence-for”, the phenomenologists claim, is simply >> different in kind from any of the procedures in which it occurs. If I >> understand them, they assert that the moment of experiencing something “as” >> in fact defines an experiential notion of the temporal present that is >> different entirely in kind from the notations of either the past or the >> future. >> >> It is a bit of a digression from this post, but I will remark, that this >> position makes the world look pretty hopeless to me, since anyone can >> experience anything “as” evidence for anything. And there is a part of >> reality-building in those moments for them, that nobody else outside them >> has any grip on. >> >> But in a more positive note, and on the point of this post, I feel like >> it is a Husserlian/Heideggerian shift in the occupancy of the temporal >> present, to find it as normal to experience distributionally-defined >> patterns as objects, as event-outcome-defined patterns. They just do >> different things. >> >> Anyway, sorry. Big long TLDR to state the obvious. >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Apr 18, 2020, at 12:36 PM, <thompnicks...@gmail.com> < >> thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Dear Cranky Eric, >> >> When Peirce writes, countering determinism, that “everything is just >> about as random as it could be” he is referring to contingencies amongst >> events, I think. At the risk of quoting myself: >> >> Considering all the events that are going on at any one moment -- the >> ticking of the clock, the whuffing of the wind in the eaves, the drip of >> the faucet, the ringing of the telephone, the call from the seven-year-old >> upstairs who cannot find his shoes, the clunking in the heating pipes as >> the heat comes on, the distant sound of the fire engine passing the end of >> the street, the entry of the cat through the pet door, the skitter of >> mouse-feet behind the wainscoting -- most will be likely unrelated to the >> fact that the egg timer just went off. Perhaps not all, however. Perhaps >> the cat anticipates cleaning up the egg dishes. Perhaps the same stove that >> is boiling the egg water has lit a fire in the chimney. But whatever >> relations we might discover amongst all these events, we can find an >> infinite number of other temporally contiguous events that are not related >> to them. Thus, as Peirce says, events are just about as random as anybody >> could care them to be. >> >> But – and here is the main point – to the extent that events are related, >> these relations would be useful. They would, for instance allow the cat to >> predict that there would be food in a few moments, the mouse to predict >> that the cat has entered the house, and you to predict, among other things, >> that your eggs are ready. For this reason, on Peirce’s account, organisms >> are designed to ferret out these few regularities and take action based on >> them. This, and only this, is the reason that the world appears regular. >> >> So, I stipulate the ubiquity of randomness. >> >> What I am less certain about is whether randomness should – note the use >> of modal language – should ever be offered as the reason for anything. If >> we regard science as an extension of this animal propensity for ferreting >> out regularities, then to declare that anything occurred because it was >> random is a kind of copping out. It is like ferrets giving up on the idea >> that borrows contain prairie dogs. That’s just NOT what we ferrets DO! >> It’s certainly not what we do if we ever expect to catch any prairie dogs. >> >> >> Oh, and: The problem is not that I need a religion; the problem is I >> already HAVE one and I don’t know what it is. >> >> Oh, and #2. “Enjoy these conversations” is, for me, vastly understate >> the case. They are literally keeping me alive, particularly these days, >> when, it appears, for the first time in 50 years, I won’t have a garden in >> the Mosquito Infested Swamp. >> >> CrankyNick >> Nicholas Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> Clark University >> thompnicks...@gmail.com >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *David Eric Smith >> *Sent:* Friday, April 17, 2020 6:08 PM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations >> >> Cranky Nick, you really need to join a church. >> >> >> Now, what most people wanted to know from Nate Silver is whether Clinton >> was going to win the election. Nate constantly says that making such >> predictions is, strictly speaking, not his job. As long as what happens >> falls within the error of his prediction, he feels justified in having made >> it. He will say things like, "actually we were right." I would prefer >> him to say, "Actually we were wrong, *but I would make the same >> prediction under the same circumstances the next time.” *In other >> words, the right procedure produced, on this occasion, a wrong result. >> >> >> The thing you say here that “most people want to know” of course, you >> know full-well, doesn’t exist. So you need to join a church because they >> are the ones who will tell you they are giving it to you, when at least >> you, and maybe even they, know it doesn’t exist. >> >> What Nate gave you is a sample estimator for a probability distribution >> (each of those words means something specific; they are not an evocative >> construction within common vernacular). He didn’t even give you the >> “actual” probability distribution for the underlying process, because, as >> Pierce saith both rightly and interestingly, the “actual” probability >> distribution is something we don’t have access to. What we have, and all >> we ever have, are sample estimators to probability distributions. Nate’s >> estimator includes biases. Some of these, like method biases in polling, >> are things he can also try to estimate and correct for. Others, like >> systematic biases in the relation between sampling and underlying >> correlations — as in the really interesting and exactly relevant link >> Marcus sent — are things Nate (et al. of course) haven’t identified. The >> acknowledgement of those, too, was in the advertising. >> >> So, the sample estimator for a probability distribution, with known >> biases described and correction methods listed, and unknown biases >> acknowledged, is what Nate gave you, and in the only sense that “right” can >> be applied — which is an accurate rendering of methods — it was right. >> >> If someone gives me a revolver with two filled chambers, and in the >> afterlife I protest that I didn’t pull one of the empty ones, well, we know >> what we think of my judgment, and we don’t spend a lot of time on this list >> putting that out as a philosophical problem. >> >> >> I don’t actually write this note to be nasty -- because of course I know >> you know all this as well as your interlocutors do — but to be colorful to >> make a different point. It has to do with liking the fact that learning is >> not most interesting when one accretes an acquaintance with new facts, but >> when one realizes new ways of using words are necessary as a vehicle to >> taking on new frames of mind. >> >> The claim that “right/wrong” are only allowed to be applied to certain >> and definite values, and are _not_ allowed to be applied to more composite >> deliverables such as sample estimators for probability distributions, is >> where terminology nazis close off conversation by insisting on a language >> in which terms that are needed to express the pertinent ideas are >> disallowed. We see it in every field. Stanley Miller ruled out metabolism >> as being a concept that could be presaged in geochemistry by “defining” >> metabolism as chemical reactions catalyzed by enzymes within a cell. >> Historical linguists did it for a century insisting that absolutely regular >> sound correspondences (none of which ever actually exist) were the only >> signatures of genetic relatedness among languages, and probabilistic >> fingerprints had no interpretation. The Stochastic Thermodynamics cabal do >> it when the say that thermodynamic laws for non-equilibrium processes that >> don’t come from Boltzmann/Gibbs free energies have “no physical meaning”, >> thereby scoping “physical” to refer to equilibrium thermodynamic states, >> the narrowest of special cases. >> >> And Dave did it in his post of long questions some weeks ago — which at >> the time I didn’t want to respond to because my responses are sort fo dull >> and unhelpful — when he said most physicists are realists but quantum >> physicists are anti-realists. What the quantum physicists say is that the >> old classical assumption that “observables” and “states” are the same kind >> of thing turned out to be wrong. They are different kinds fo things. >> States can be real, and can even evolve deterministically, but may not be >> associated with any definite values for observables, because observables, >> when formalized and fully expressed through the formalization, are >> different kinds of things (they are a kind of operator, which one can think >> of as a rule for making a mapping) than states or than particular numbers >> that the observables can yield as their output from some states. So to >> claim that the quantum physicists are anti-realists is to scope “real” as >> coextensive with interpreting “observables” not as operators but as simple >> definite numbers. That is, to adopt the frame of classical mechanics. So >> Dave’s “anti-realist” actually means >> “anti-classical-mechanics-assumptionist”, which of course is exactly right, >> but never the scope I would use for the word “real”. Anyone who insists >> that is the only way it is allowed to be used has just dictated rules for >> conversation in which there is no way I can engage and still work for >> sense-making. >> >> Anyway, the whole tenor of the discussion is fine. I enjoy all the parts >> of it, including your stubbornness for its own sake. Wittgenstein was >> reportedly impossible in that way, though I forget the reference and >> source. Some fellow-philosopher complaining that “it was impossible to get >> Wittgenstein to admit there was not a rhinoceros in the room." >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That’s all, >> >> Nick >> >> Nicholas Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> Clark University >> thompnicks...@gmail.com >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of u?l? ? >> Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 4:45 PM >> To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] anthropological observations >> >> Again, though, you seem to be allowing your metaphor to run away with >> you. When someone who does quantitative modeling says "expected value", >> they do NOT mean what the layperson means when they say "I expect X". We >> can pick apart your statement and accuse you of an ambiguity fallacy if we >> want. >> >> Your first use of "expected value" relies on the jargonal definition. >> Then you switcheroo on us and your 2nd use of "I expect that" relies on the >> vernacular concept. Up to this point, we can give you the benefit of the >> doubt. We all munge things a bit when talking/thinking. But *then*, on your >> 3rd use of "what he expected", you explicitly switched the meaning from >> jargon to vernacular. >> >> I don't think you do this on purpose. (If you do, I laud you as a fellow >> troll! >8^) I think it's an artifact of your being a "metaphorical >> thinker", whatever that means. >> >> FWIW, I only had to pull a little on the Sabine Hossenfelder thread to >> find that she tweeted this, as well: >> >> Embracing the Uncertainties >> While the unknowns about coronavirus abound, a new study finds we ‘can >> handle the truth.’ >> >> https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/science/coronavirus-uncertainty-scientific-trust.html?smid=tw-share >> >> The effects of communicating uncertainty on public trust in facts and >> numbers https://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7672.abstract >> >> If they're right, then the right-leaning local media might band together >> with the clickbaity national media and give it to us straight ... or they >> might simply skew their "expected value" reporting to continue serving >> their politics. Pfft. >> >> >> On 4/17/20 2:58 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: >> > If expert X tells me that the expected value of variable A is K, then, >> > when it's all over and the data are in, and A did not equal K, I expect >> that expert to admit that /what he expected did not happen./ Only after >> that confession has been made, should a conversation begin about whether >> the expert’s prediction process was faulted or not. It seems to me that >> the shaded area is part of that second conversation. >> >> -- >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >> .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >> .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >> .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >> .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> >
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