Hm. I can't quite parse this, but don't want to ignore it.
I'm not convinced that Chalmers' naturalistic dualism is at all different from
Peirce's real/extant distinction. From that perspective, Chalmers' dualism and
Nick's monism are irrelevant to whether or not Nick understands the hard
problem. What one thinks is actually the case can be unrelated to one's
taxonomy of possible cases. ("There are many like it, but this one is mine.")
I can admit, however, that any one formulation of the hard problem may *seem*
very different from another formulation. But the mere rejection of a lexicon
(e.g. "Chalmers-esque") is not a rejection of the problem being outlined. If
category theory has taught us anything, it's that problems can seem quite
different, but really be about the same thing. The very fact that we can have
the discussion we're having is an indication that there is a "hard problem" and
that it can act as a foil for choosing one's rifle.
On 5/2/20 6:12 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
> To paraphrase Nick's answer:
> Yes, of course we /can /build such a machine, so long as you agree to treat
> "enjoy" and "think" and "feel" in the way that I do, and NOT as Chalmers or
> the other dualists would. My approach does not contain a Chalmers-esque hard
> problem.
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