I don't think this gets us anywhere. My claim is that whatever motivates Nick's insistence that metaphor is important to thought *is* a member of the class represented by the hard problem. If you *also* insist that metaphor is important to thought, yet you reject the hard problem, then I would need, from you, some explanation of why we need metaphor.
But I'm also happy to let the thread rest in peace, as Nick and I have come to some agreement. We can formulate something very much like the hard problem using parallax. And the problem comes down to one of how hard is it, actually ... and that's a great question. On 5/4/20 5:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > At any rate: Nick and I deeply believes that there are no valid questions > about psychology that are not properly understood as empirical questions > about behavior. So either Chalmers has asked an invalid question, or he > doesn't understand his own question's researchable implications. There is no > third option. -- ☣ uǝlƃ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
