Thought of another way, I can interpret Peirce-truthiness in terms of alethic operators. Let's say that an apt-belief is Peirce-true if it belongs to the collection of everyone's potential apt-beliefs, in other words, they will be found to be necessarily apt-believable (□). This leaves the collection of apt-beliefs that at least one other person will never find believable, those that are possibly apt-believable (◇), and doomed to never be Peirce-true.
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