Jon, 

I was the youngest in my family by many years and have the psychology of a 
tag-along.  When you leap ahead like this, I feel like a little kid left behind 
in my bulky snowsuit in the deep snow, while my siblings, and the dog, bound 
off into the distance.  "Hey, WAIT FOR ME!"

One little scrap I can grasp at here, and perhaps make a contribution.  There 
is a subtle point, perhaps a weakness in Peirce, to which the term "believable" 
points.  Note the mode.  "believable--that which is readily believed."  But 
Peirce is pointing not to that but to "that which SHALL be believed" or "that 
which is fated to be believed" in the very long run.  Not "credibles" but 
"credibilenda" .  

Now to the extent that the human cognitive system has been designed in the 
course of evolution to scope out the world humans live in, the two will be the 
same.  But just because of the lesson hidden in the Sober machine (and the Law 
of Short Sighted Striving), it is easy to walk humans out of their zone of 
tolerance (known in the literature as the "environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness") and find propositions that are "believable", yet not "to be 
believed".  That, for all its other faults, is one of the insights of 
evolutionary psychology.   Thus, to the extent that our belief systems are 
embodied, that which we believe may not be that which we ought to believe. 

I don't think it makes any difference to your Haskell model, but the actual 
object that Sober used is not quite as complicated as you envision.  The 
colored objects that are sorted differ only in size, as do the holes in the 
three levels of the "machine".  Thus if you shake the toy long enough, the 
small (yellow) balls will find their way all the way to the bottom, the 
medium-sized (blue balls) to the middle, and fat red balls will be stuck at the 
top (or something like that). Size is the thing selected for, color the 
spandrel.    If shape were the thing that was being selected, the toy would 
work only in infinite time, although, of course, the logic is the same, and 
therefore, this paragraph probably nugatory.  

How does a "citizen" such as myself appreciate your Haskell model.  Is it 
possible to make  visual out of it.  Large red, medium sized brown, and tiny 
black ants all striving toward food through screens and only the black ants 
make it?  Or is that just "eye-candy".  

What is the relation between the SoberSort and the concept of intention in your 
world.  In my world, the INtension of the sort is that for which the balls are
sorted; the EXtension is any characteristic that the sorted balls share.  

Thanks for all the thought you put into this.  Please send the dog back to get 
me. 

Nick 

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
thompnicks...@gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
 


-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of jon zingale
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 9:08 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] OK. That's funny.

Thought of another way, I can interpret Peirce-truthiness in terms of alethic 
operators. Let's say that an apt-belief is Peirce-true if it belongs to the 
collection of everyone's potential apt-beliefs, in other words, they will be 
found to be necessarily apt-believable (□). This leaves the collection of 
apt-beliefs that at least one other person will never find believable, those 
that are possibly apt-believable (◇), and doomed to never be Peirce-true.



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