uǝlƃ ☤>$ wrote:
Thanks for the monist re-statements. From a perspective of inconsistency
robustness (and a flowering of alternative consequence relations), Yagasawa's
extension makes some attractive sense. But it seems to *break* Lewis' handling
of consistency and completeness. I'm guessing we could argue that this is an
inherent flaw in all monist conceptions.
You have clearly thought this through a lot more than I have, and/or are
a much quicker study. I'll chew this cud a little and see if any more
of it digests.
Pluralism allows for enlarging the universe of discourse as needed, maybe
similar to the distinction in the conception of the universal Turing machine
between an infinite tape versus a finite, but infinitely extensible tape.
this fits my intuitive view...
Are infinities real? Or a convenient fiction? I think those of us who believe
in actual infinities *should* tend toward Lewis' modal realism and avoid the
sophist[icated] prestidigitation inherent in monism.
I have to admit to having always treated infinities as real only in a
possible/virtual sense rather than a literal one... or maybe more to
the point, set theoretic infiinties (aleph-this-n-that) as "real" vs a
finite cardinality of "real things" which I suppose loops us back to the
original discussion in a klein-bottle-esque tailpipe/carburator
arrangement?
Even the hedging compromise of the parallel worlds interpretation of QM gives too much
credibility to monism by metaphysically asserting universal laws across the multiverse, and
using "dippy" trickery [Ω] to skirt infinities. En garde! >8^D
more cud to masticate methinks...
Ultimately, your pining for symmetry in, presumably bidirectional, traveling
along a modal dimension (as opposed to the one way trip of a branching
multiverse) sounds like a fideistic clutching to egalitarianism. Life isn't
fair. It sucks; then you die. 8^D
I think it is more along the lines of my strong ambivalence implied by
your question of infinities above? I'm of (at least) two minds on
these topics. I don't know if it is a "fideistic clutching" so much as
"lame habituation" to the form implied.
I haven't the slightest idea how to respond to the Bildungsroman hook. I *think* Galen
Strawson addresses ontogeny somewhere ... perhaps in "The Impossibility of Moral
Responsibility", though Lewis handles Strawson's argument well, I think.
My Bildungsroman "hook" was intended to be nothing more than a hangnail
to see what it might snag. Your reference (as yet unfollowed) to
Strawson and ontogeny feels like what I was "fishing" for.
As a Pseudoruminant with Aleph(naught){\displaystyle \,\aleph
_{0}\,}stomachs I'm afraid this is going to be cud all the way down for
me. "... and thanks for all the fiber!" (wink to Douglas Adams).
- Sieve
[Ω]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renormalization#Attitudes_and_interpretation
On 12/2/21 8:21 AM, Steve Smith wrote:
All systems (existing within the same light-cone) are "nearly decomposable" ?
Herb Simon Sez:https://www.jstor.org/stable/1909285
One of the attractive qualities of modal realism is that it addresses both
consistency (through concrete possible worlds) and completeness (through
counterpart theory) in positing and testing various models. The problem becomes
one of discovering which world you inhabit *from the data*, not from whatever
abstracted models you may prefer.
Lewis's Modal Realism<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_realism> is a new
one on me, but very interesting framing. Only skimming the Wikipedia Article on the
topic leaves me with only enough information to be dangerous... so I am refraining
from rattling on about all of my reactions to it's implications (for me) and in
particular some of the objections listed there to his theory. From this thin
introduction I think I find Yagasawa's extension of possible worlds being distributed
on a modal dimension rather than isolated space-time structures (yet) more
compelling/useful?
And what would Candide<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bildungsroman> have to
say about this?
On 12/1/21 6:35 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
Me -> We've imputed in all cases. Certainly we can assume artificial systems
were designed for a purpose, but we still don't know what that purpose is without
imputing a model onto that system. And, in both cases, we could proceed to
experiment with the system, in order to test the predictions of the imputed model
and increase our confidence that we have imputed correctly. The ability to do
these things does not distinguish between the two types of system. There are long
and respected scientific traditions using experimental methods to gain confidence
in our understanding of why certain systems were favored by natural selection,
i.e., to determine the manner in which they help the organism better fit its
environment.
Me -> Well.... it might be reification in some sense, but that term usually
implies inaccuracy, which we cannot know in this case without experimentation.
Even with a system we designed ourselves, where we might have a lot of insight
into why we designed the system the way we did, we certainly don't have perfect
knowledge. All we have there is a model of our own behavior to impute off of. Once
again, this doesn't clearly differentiate the two situations. In all of these
situations it is a mistake to uncritically reify our initial intuitions about the
system's purpose.
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