OK. If the answer is "yes" at least in some special cases, then why can't the answer be 
"yes" in the large intimate network sense? What's different about the advocacy of (good 
faith) vulnerability in men? ... caveated with scoped cliques in the networks, of course. Perhaps 
the question boils down to how big the networks can be? Or perhaps whether there are sub-networks 
within the networks? E.g. scales of vunlerability?

Just the other day, I was sporadically commenting in the chat of a Twitch streamer. A question 
about an artifact of the game he was playing came up. His moderator gave one (false) answer. I gave 
a (true) contradictory answer. The streamer and moderator called my answer a "lie" and 
then commented "that sets the tone for the relationship" ... i.e. the *para*social 
relationship between the streamer and me, a rando on the internet. Note, they did not test the 
answers by taking the action in the game. So neither of us were provided the opportunity to be 
demonstrated as wrong or right. As the rando on the internet, I don't take offense for being 
falsely accused of lying because the streamer is the vulnerable one. We see his face, can deduce 
where he's from by things he says and his accent, can induce many other characteristics from all 
sorts of data he provides ... however well he thinks he can shield himself.

It strikes me that such parasocial relations are a scaled back intimacy ... somewhere 
more intimate than, say, movie star, but less intimate than, say, your local Rotary Club 
president, which is less intimate than your local "drum circle" or poker pals. 
Etc.

Given that heterarchy, I'm having trouble reconstructing your original complaint about 
the article, that it's overbearing on both men and women. In fact, the article seems to 
be indirectly arguing *for* such a heterarchy. We might sum it up as: Be intimate. That 
the author didn't caveat it with "in moderation" shouldn't bother us too much 
... because it's common sense that everything be done in moderation.

On 1/14/22 09:04, Marcus Daniels wrote:
Glen writes:

< Does the state-hiding machine present a more expressive problem solver than 
would otherwise be achievable without hiding state? And is that extra expressibility 
necessary (or more convenient/efficient) than with an in principle equivalent 
flattened (set of) machine(s)? >

Yes, modularity in computer software is one example that comes to mind.    When 
all the world is expressed in readable, or especially writable global 
variables, it is very difficult to build a reliable system, because programmers 
will inevitably misunderstand when/what/how/why they can touch something.   
Similarly, it is simply too difficult to understand another person to reliably 
anticipate all their needs and help them.  Some of their needs are inherently 
private and they must learn ways to maintain themselves.

Another example that comes to mind are metapopulations.   The spatial 
separation of groups allow for the local adaptation to different environments 
and innovation in those environments.   The spatial separation ensures that if 
there is an environmental crisis, the species won't go extinct.  Musk's slogan 
for going for Mars, for example.   If we are all entangled into one emotional 
stew, there better be isolated airlocks to jettison parts of the superorganism 
if a part has a massive malfunction or infection.

Marcus

________________________________
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of glen <geprope...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 14, 2022 9:34 AM
To: friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] gene complex for homosexuality

Well, this reminds me of hidden state machines and the law of requisite 
variety. If we're trying to explain why humans have persnickety preferences, 
including state-hiding tendencies like focusing on emotion vs brute fact, 
rather than argue for a flattening of the collective human/biological 
machine(s), we should look at both the machine(s) and the environment(s) in 
which they're grown.

Does the state-hiding machine present a more expressive problem solver than 
would otherwise be achievable without hiding state? And is that extra 
expressibility necessary (or more convenient/efficient) than with an in 
principle equivalent flattened (set of) machine(s)?

I'm then reminded of demonstrations (?) that zero determinant game strats, while able to 
dominate in ideal contexts, don't do so well in evolutionary contexts. So, perhaps the 
answer to these questions is simply "No" ... that the hidden state doesn't 
provide any extra problem solving ability and the tendency to (or advocacy of) avoid the 
flattening is an operable sign of bad faith? Or, in the lingo of the laity, curmudgeons 
are a justified cost because they more quickly indicate the bad actors. Get off my lawn!

And if the answer is "No", how do we explain the existence of this "cognitive 
ease", this tendency to rely on stereotypes and historicity-reinforced signs (perhaps now 
having lost/changed their referents)?

On 1/13/22 16:48, Marcus Daniels wrote:
Anyway, the reason I noticed this article is that I posit that the steely harm 
reduction approach that was discussed recently is in my mind a form of 
stoicism.   Can one put away their emotional responses and make hard choices 
based on the greater global good?   If one engages in large intimate social 
networks, I would say two things are likely to happen:  1) executive decisions 
become harder because there is diffusion of sensitive information, and thus 
political complications in making them.  Members in the network may not be 
sharing the whole factual context (preferring the emotionally laden parts) 2) 
there are still dominance relations (her language), but they are just manifest 
in different ways.  Namely by being in the center of a social network and 
slightly censoring the information that gets passed along.

As it relates to the subject line, there may be some weak tendency one has to 
share or not share by default depending on hormones/genetics.
________________________________
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of Marcus Daniels 
<mar...@snoutfarm.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2022 5:12 PM
To: friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] gene complex for homosexuality

< So, I'd argue against you completely. This essay is talking about how to detect 
and operate in the presence of bad faith. And, to be clear, the bad faith actor 
doesn't necessarily *know* that they're acting in bad faith. In fact, it's a more 
canonical case of bad faith if the actor has simply habituated to it. >

A contrast she draws is between petulant vulnerability and "real" vulnerability.   That it is 
"scary" and "any less necessary, for men".
There's another option which is not to use "the language of vulnerability as a cudgel", 
but also not engage "the human condition of reliance on others."  She is expressing an 
expectation for high intimacy, and it is implicit that there is something wrong with keeping your 
distance.   I've seen this false choice portrayed by other so-called feminists.  I don't buy it.

Marcus
________________________________
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of glen <geprope...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2022 4:55 PM
To: friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] gene complex for homosexuality

What's interesting about that essay is its appeal to character or "virtue ethics", I 
think. I've tried to address this a few times in past threads, especially when concepts like 
"bad faith" arise. Rittenhouse' crying looked precisely like bad faith to me. I get 
accused of it a lot because I enjoy playing roles and believe playing roles (like Devil's Advocate) 
facilitates healthy reasoning. (E.g. EricC's accusation of illiberalism on my part when condemning 
the anti-masker's punching of the doctor.)

So, I'd argue against you completely. This essay is talking about how to detect and 
operate in the presence of bad faith. And, to be clear, the bad faith actor doesn't 
necessarily *know* that they're acting in bad faith. In fact, it's a more canonical case 
of bad faith if the actor has simply habituated to it. Rittenhouse's crying on the stand 
and Kavanaugh's crying in his confirmation hearings both seem to me to be statements 
about their *character*. That means whatever ways we have/develop to detect bad faith can 
be made reflective ... kinda like the Reddit forum "Am I the Asshole?" 8^D

I doubt one's oxytocin-laced skepticism over such acting is completely 
arbitrary ... or even a preference at all.

On 1/13/22 14:33, Marcus Daniels wrote:
Well, now that I've taken one extreme position, let me take the other extreme 
position!   This essay reflects, IMO, an arbitrary preference for social 
affinities of a certain sort, and it is only one sort of valid class of 
relationships.  Relationships that have benefits, but also costs.   It's not 
just overbearing on how men should be, but also on how women should be.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/opinion/toxic-masculinity.html

--
glen
Theorem 3. There exists a double master function.


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