Great question. I agree with Dave's emphasis against "finite sequences from a finite
alphabet" as being central to our SAM. *If* Wolpert's actually relying on that as crucially as
he seems to be, then the "grow vs. specify" accusation isn't a strawman.
But the question Wolpert wants to ask remains; and your concise phrasing nails it. If there is an
"effective computing" artifact that demonstrates maximal intelligence with minimal cultural
grounding, what is it? One valid answer is there is no such thing. All forms of "intellignece" are
not abstract, are embedded-embodied-concrete, tightly grounded to context. (Where I'm probably relying on my
definition of "concrete" more than Dave's.)
But I think that answer, however valid, is unsound. There are ways of behaving that
*translate* across contexts. The berserker physicists who take that to the extreme
notwithstanding, anyone who travels experiences this. As Wolpert explicitly mentions,
perhaps the "level" at which this occurs is our bodies? As long as the society
I visit on Alpha Centauri was built by homonid-similars, I think some set of my behaviors
will translate, however small that set.
But maybe there's a lower level, perhaps capturing less concrete detail than a
homo-built society, of water and carbon based life? I.e. any society built by
water and carbon based life will allow some translation of behaviors to our
society?
I don't grok Dave's antipathy, though. It seems to me like Wolpert is *asking*
these questions and challenging our berserker Scientismists and Mathematicians
in the very same gist as Dave does. Wolpert wouldn't write (and distribute)
papers like this if he *weren't* a bit skeptical of the universality of our SAM.
On 9/14/22 22:29, Marcus Daniels wrote:
What would be convincing evidence of a superior intelligence independent of
cultural inheritance?
On Sep 14, 2022, at 7:34 PM, Steve Smith <sasm...@swcp.com> wrote:
On 9/14/22 7:31 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
ML gets better every day because it learns more like a newborn child than a
university student. This isn't 1970s AI anymore. It all seems like a
strawman argument, whether you know it or not.
And as I have referenced watching a puppy and a kitten grow together from 3 and
4 months respectively, I believe that broadly, contemporary ML is learning like
they are. Current fetishes for NLP to drive NLG and Visual Art misses a *lot*
that animals (even one's domesticated by us for millenia) do so well as they
express what their genes and gestation already prepare them for.
I'd claim the puppy knows a modest vocabulary of human utterances/gestures already, though to a
dog, I think human language is very tonal to animals, to the point that maybe I can say
"YES" in the same tone I say "NO" and vice versa and the tone, not the phoneme
would dominate.
The kitten is (as I feel all cats are) almost entirely disinterested in our
*intentional* communications and *much more* aware of the implications of our
*actions* than in our words. The puppy does seem to have a much stronger sense
of anticipating our interests and seeking our approval. The cat is more
interested in her interests and treating us as facilitators or constraints to
obtaining those.
Paw prints of either species qualify as "art" in our house anytime they get
involved in a painting project or the setting of plaster, cement, or clay. Our
appreciation of same reflects *our* training more than *theirs*.
-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2022 5:54 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Wolpert - discussion thread placeholder
Regarding Wolpert's first four questions:
In my opinion, all four reflect a kind of arrogance that I have accused
Scientists and Mathematicians of many times in the past—an attitude that modern
formal and abstract math and science are a kind of ultimate achievement of our
species. Any and all other forms/means of understanding are discounted or
denied. This is analogous to the arrogance of Simon and Newell (mentioned
previously) that a machine that thought like a university professor was
necessarily intelligent.
Ignored in the AI instance is the learning ability of a new born child. Ignored
in the case of SAM is the very real Science and Mathematics exhibited by our
species beginning in the Neolithic. Metallurgy, agriculture, animal husbandry,
pottery, weaving, cooking, food preservation, etc.
Levi-Strauss writes extensively of two different kinds of science: concrete and abstract; the
former grounded in perception and imagination, the latter divorced from same. The object of all
science is connections and explanations and based on experimentation and empirical evidence, but
"concrete science" relies far more heavily on sensible intuition and not formal
"proof."
SAM, for Wolpert, seems to be restricted to the that which came into being the past few
hundred years. This fetish makes questions like—"Why do we have that cognitive ability
despite its fitness costs?"—somewhat nonsensical. What fitness costs? Mutually assured
destruction with nuclear weapons?" Certainly there were no evolutionary fitness costs;
and, in fact, those cognitive abilities were essential and the prime mover of our species out
of the neolithic.
A more reasonable question is what caused a small subset of our species to 'go beserk'
and take a subset of the SAM that served our species so well for so long, to such
abstract extremes? An answer might be found, and is argued, in the Ian McGilchrist works
on recent "left-brained" dominance. [left-brain is such a limited shorthand
for what McGilchrist argues in some 700 pages of prose, that I am trepedatious using it
lest it evoke the wrong headed popularization of the notion.]
If we ignore the aberrant contemporary SAM and ask if we can find evidence that
other species, e.g., cephalopods and cetaceans, have an equivalent to the
concrete SAM that was widespread among our own species as far back as the
neolithic. The answer is yes. Tool making, modification of environment,
herding, even quasi-domestication of other species can be found.
The cognitive abilities of dolphins and octopi (et. al.) are well documented
and include language, reasoning, knowledge of spatial relationships, planning,
and even (when given LSD (famously the research by John Lilly with dolphins and
more recently with octopi), altered states. There is little, or no, reason not
to assume them to be SAM-sufficient for their environments and needs, just as
humans were prior to, roughly, the Renaissance.
to be continued ...
davew
On Mon, Sep 12, 2022, at 6:29 AM, glen∉ℂ wrote:
My question of how well we can describe graph-based ... what? ...
"statements"? "theorems"? Whatever. It's treated fairly well in List's
paper:
Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework by
Christian List http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21103/
in section "6.3 Indexical versus non-indexical and first-personal
versus third-personal descriptions". We tend to think of the 3rd
person graph of possible worlds/states as if it's more universal ... a
complete representation of the world. But there's something captured
by the index/control-pointer *walking* some graph, with or without a
scoping on how many hops away the index/subjective-locus can "see".
I liken this to Dave's (and Frank's to some extent) consistent
insistence that one's inner life is a valid thing in the world, Dave
w.r.t. psychedelics and meditation and Frank's defense of things like
psychodynamics. Wolpert seems to be suggesting a "deserialization" of
the graph when he focuses on "finite sequences of elements from a
finite set of symbols". I.e. walking the graph with the index at a
given node. With the 3rd person ... whole graph of graphs, the
serialization of that bushy thing can only produce an infinitely long
sequence of elements from a (perhaps) infinte set. Is the bushiness
*dense* (greater than countable, as Wolpert asks)? Or sparse?
I'm sure I'm not wording all this well. But that's why I'm glad y'all
are participating, to help clarify these things.
On 9/12/22 06:13, glen∉ℂ wrote:
While math can represent circular definitions (what Robert Rosen complained about), there
are deep problems in the foundations of math ... things like the iterative conception of
sets ... that are attempts to do what Wolpert asks for in the later questions. And it's
unclear to me that commutative categories reduce to "finite sequences of elements
from a finite set", prolly 'cause I'm just ignorant. But diagrammatic loops in
graphs don't look to me like finite sequences.
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