I agree, the problem of replicating the human mind may just be NP-hard, not necessarily NP-complete.
davew On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, at 11:01 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote: > Dave, > > Regarding your statement: > >> *However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, "I see no reason to >> believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality >> that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."* >> >> *The fallacy that the brain is just another physical symbol system and the >> mind is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a >> simplistic, reductionist fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.* >> >> *The human organism—as a whole—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous and >> constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is involved >> in "preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.), and the >> brain's operation is entirely dependent on that substrate.* >> > I don't disagree that reducing the brain to just a "physical symbol system" > is an oversimplification. My view is that the brain is a complex adaptive > system, where the mind—including consciousness—emerges from the vast network > of simple interactions between billions of neurons and other biological > processes. > > I also fully agree with your point that the whole organism plays a role in > processing sensory input, and that the brain depends on this broader system. > > When I say I see no reason this complex system *cannot* be replicated, I > don’t mean with today’s knowledge or technology—it is clearly far beyond our > current capabilities. I'm talking about the possibility in the future, > whether that’s a year from now or a million years from now—I have no idea. My > guess is somewhere in between. > > Of course, this is speculation. But isn’t that how knowledge grows? We begin > with speculation and build from there. > > > On Fri, 7 Mar 2025 at 06:21, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> > wrote: >> Question: >> >> If we relied only on third person accounts, would the question of free will >> ever arise? In what context? >> n >> >> On Wed, Mar 5, 2025 at 7:20 PM Pieter Steenekamp >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note >>> to self: keep an eye on its development. >>> >>> Now, back to the question: Will it have free will? >>> >>> I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free >>> will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s >>> take on free will). >>> >>> However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and >>> biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t >>> prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess >>> some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon >>> or artificial biology. >>> >>> Appendix, Grok's take on free will: >>> >>> Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will. >>> >>> Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg) >>> >>> Key Points >>> • Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can >>> make choices independently of prior causes. >>> • Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while >>> others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined. >>> • Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but >>> interpretations vary, fueling controversy. >>> • The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making it >>> a deeply debated topic. >>> Definition and Philosophical Debate >>> Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully >>> determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into >>> two main camps: >>> • Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism, >>> meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those >>> desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because >>> you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by >>> upbringing. >>> • Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined by >>> prior causes. They split into: >>> • Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false, >>> suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices. >>> • Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an >>> illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes. >>> Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism >>> is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which >>> claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not >>> external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s >>> argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, >>> and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist >>> regardless of determinism. >>> Scientific Insights >>> Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain >>> activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, >>> suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this >>> is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue >>> we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for >>> significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging >>> Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, >>> as experimental procedures can influence results (Neuroscience News >>> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). >>> Implications and Conclusion >>> The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people >>> responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus >>> exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, >>> even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist >>> view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion >>> continues. >>> >>> A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and >>> Societal Dimensions >>> Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of >>> deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific >>> research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its >>> definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader >>> implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper >>> understanding. >>> Historical and Philosophical Context >>> The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has >>> evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often >>> defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior >>> events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing >>> otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, >>> leading to divergent philosophical positions. >>> Key Philosophical Positions >>> Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists, >>> each with nuanced subcategories: >>> • Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with >>> determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to >>> one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior >>> causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is >>> considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing. >>> • Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free >>> will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and >>> second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free >>> will, regardless of determinism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy >>> <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>). >>> • Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue >>> that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, >>> such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a >>> deterministic framework. >>> • Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with >>> determinism, splitting into two camps: >>> • Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires >>> indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, >>> possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to >>> decision-making, allowing genuine freedom. >>> • Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free >>> will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior >>> causes, leaving no room for alternative choices. >>> The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define >>> free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same >>> circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” >>> includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states >>> differ. >>> Major Arguments >>> To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from >>> both sides, drawn from philosophical literature: >>> *Position* >>> *Main Arguments* >>> *Key Details and Examples* >>> *References/URLs* >>> Against Free Will (Incompatibilism) >>> - >>> Consequence Argument >>> : If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section 4a). >>> - Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐ >>> (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is >>> true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed). >>> Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983) >>> >>> - >>> Origination Argument >>> : Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents >>> this (Section 4b). >>> - Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism >>> means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused); >>> concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. >>> self-origin). >>> Kane (1998) >>> For Free Will (Compatibilism) >>> - >>> Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments >>> : Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or >>> reasons-responsive views (Section 5a). >>> - Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire >>> mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and >>> Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk >>> decision. >>> Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998) >>> >>> - >>> Frankfurt’s Argument >>> : Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section >>> 5b). >>> - Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she >>> didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative >>> (Section 5b). >>> Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003) >>> >>> - >>> Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes >>> : Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by >>> determinism (Section 5c). >>> - Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism; >>> not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being >>> pushed); supports compatibilism. >>> P. Strawson (1963) >>> Pessimism >>> - Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true >>> (Section 3c). >>> - If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur >>> randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based >>> on chance. >>> Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994) >>> The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if >>> determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no >>> room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The >>> Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of >>> actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, >>> where actions are externally caused. >>> Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent >>> is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but >>> doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative >>> possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this, >>> arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist >>> regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility. >>> Scientific Investigations >>> Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new >>> dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using >>> electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness >>> potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting >>> decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free Will >>> Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>). This >>> has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard >>> determinism. >>> However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry >>> Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential >>> may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental procedures >>> can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not conclusively >>> disprove free will (Neuroscience News >>> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). Additionally, some >>> argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them, >>> preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like >>> choosing a career over a trivial finger movement. >>> Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, >>> such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that >>> brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences, >>> potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The Johns Hopkins >>> News-Letter >>> <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>). >>> Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that >>> free will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and >>> environment, with no room for independent choice (New Scientist >>> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>). >>> Societal and Practical Implications >>> The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal >>> identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible >>> for their actions, or should we see them as products of their >>> circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in >>> free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial >>> for social order (The Atlantic >>> <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>). >>> Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment, >>> and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical >>> frameworks. >>> Quantum Mechanics and Beyond >>> Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic >>> rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing >>> for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing >>> that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This >>> remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the >>> complexity. >>> Conclusion >>> The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments >>> like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and >>> compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle >>> ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively >>> disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in >>> meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that >>> free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for >>> maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate >>> will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our >>> agency in a potentially deterministic universe. >>> Key Citations >>> • Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy >>> <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/> >>> • Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American >>> <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/> >>> • There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic >>> <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/> >>> • Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will> >>> • A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience >>> News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/> >>> • Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins >>> News-Letter >>> <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will> >>> • Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist >>> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> https://corticallabs.com/research.html____ >>>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >>>> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >>> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> >> >> -- >> Nicholas S. 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